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Foreword 
 
Noreen Burrows  University of Glasgow  
 
Jo Shaw  University of Edinburgh 
 
 
The first, perhaps apocryphal, story regarding the teaching of EU law after Brexit 
was the one about the enterprising student who phoned the Law Society of Scotland 
on 24 June 2016 and asked whoever they got through to whether or not they really 
had to do their EU law resit examination. It appears that they received a dusty 
response: Oh yes, you do. 
 
Joking aside, it is clear that the teaching and learning of EU law has never been 
more important than it is now. For years, those of us who have taught EU law at 
various levels in universities have struggled with raising interest in the concept of the 
non-tariff barrier to trade in goods. Endless bottles of Cassis have been supped in 
class in the search for enlightenment. It was certainly hard to find examples of media 
discussions of basic internal market trade law issues, even in the field of services, 
that could bring the importance of these matters to the modern economy alive for 
students. In the constitutional sphere, there remained a residual sense even 
amongst legal academics that EU law was somehow separate to the core UK legal 
order. 
 
Now, of course, although the newspapers and other broadcast and web outlets for 
news and commentary still contain more than a modicum of misleading and frankly 
incorrect reports about EU law, there is a great deal more informed reporting and 
informed commentary than ever before. Legal academics have been to the fore – 
especially on social media, where they have tried to correct many a 
misapprehension. Activities in the legal sphere, including the Miller case and the 
precise and illuminating work by some parliamentary committees, have painted an 
alarming picture for all to see of just how badly the UK’s constitutional fabric might be 
ripped apart (in relation to matters such as parliamentary oversight of the executive, 
protection of human rights and the territorial dimension) by a badly conceived and 
implemented Brexit. 
 
With the UK – at the time of writing – still contemplating what might precisely be its 
legal status after 29 March 2019, it is more important than ever that law students, 
and any other interested parties – whether in universities or beyond – who come 
across our open access materials, are fully informed about the character of those 
different options, whether for a transition towards an EEA-type option or a so-called 
‘cliff-edge’ Brexit with WTO rules coming immediately into play. 
 
We are very grateful to our colleagues in the Scottish Law Schools (and in a few 
cases beyond – both in geographical and disciplinary terms) for putting together this 
important project under the umbrella of the Scottish Universities Legal Network on 
Europe (SULNE), making full use of the flexibility and immediacy of internet 
technology. In particular, we would like to thank Nicole Busby and Rebecca Zahn of 
Strathclyde Law School for taking a leading role and coordinating and directing this 
work, and the Society of Legal Scholars for providing funding to support the project. 
 
 
Co-Chairs of the Scottish Universities 
Legal Network on Europe 
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It is important to stress that this is ‘work-in-progress’. Best endeavours have been 
made to ensure the accuracy at the time of writing and ‘publishing’, but we are 
interested in ensuring that this process is dialogic with its readership. Do get in touch 
with us if you have comments or suggestions to make.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Nicole Busby  University of Strathclyde 
 
Rebecca Zahn  University of Strathclyde 
 
The idea for this book originated from a one-day seminar which was held at the 
University of Strathclyde in May 2017 as part of Engage with Strathclyde 2017 at 
which academics, students, practitioners and representatives from the Law Society 
of Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates met to discuss how best to teach EU law in 
Scotland during the Brexit negotiations and following the UK’s departure from the 
EU. The event was organised in collaboration with the Scottish Universities Legal 
Network on Europe (SULNE) and was generously funded by the Society of Legal 
Scholars. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main theme which emerged from our discussions at the 
seminar was uncertainty. Although all participants were in agreement that EU law 
should most definitely continue to be included in the legal education syllabus in 
Scotland for the foreseeable future, we also agreed that it was difficult if not 
impossible to determine exactly what form its inclusion should take. Additional 
challenges were identified when it came to deciding how to guide students in their 
reading and research. Textbooks are likely to go out to date rather quickly and the 
UK’s uncharted and fast-changing position means that books written for mainstream 
students of EU law in other (continuing) Member States will need to be 
supplemented with specialised reading for UK and, in some contexts, Scottish-
specific audiences. Although there are a plethora of online resources available, 
these are written and published by a variety of organisations and individuals and 
their suitability as authoritative legal texts varies considerably. 
 
We concluded by setting ourselves a challenge – how could we help students (and 
ourselves) to make sense of EU law as the Brexit negotiations unfolded? The result 
is this e-book which has been written as a collaborative venture between academics 
across and beyond Scotland who have spent many years teaching in and reading, 
researching and writing about their respective fields of expertise. It also contains 
contributions from Rob Marrs of the Law Society of Scotland and Kirsty Hood QC of 
the Faculty of Advocates. We extend our thanks to Nina Miller-Westoby and Anthony 
Salamone for editorial assistance. 
 
This is not a traditional textbook. It does not provide detailed coverage of all aspects 
of the relevant law and it is intended to be used in a particular way. Chapter 2 on 
Study Skills provides advice about how to stay up to date, and reminds students to 
refer to primary sources as the starting point when exploring any area of law. 
Chapters 3 to 17 provide overviews and Brexit-related analyses of a range of 
substantive areas of EU law. These chapters are intended to give sufficient 
background information on their respective topics to equip the reader with the 
necessary understanding to be able to engage in critical further reading. 
 
These chapters aim to supplement – not replace – mainstream reading, be it from 
textbooks, journal articles, professional publications or other secondary sources. The 
Further Reading section at the end of each chapter is purposefully ‘light touch’ so 
that students are expected to identify and access other sources by continuing to 
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refer to course reading lists and by conducting their own searches of appropriate 
legal databases, alongside the mainly online sources to which this book directs 
them. In recommending particular sources, the chapter authors have cast their 
discerning eyes over the range of materials available and selected those which are 
most suitable in terms of usefulness and authority. The intention is to keep these 
recommendations updated on a regular basis. Indeed the chapters’ authors will 
endeavour to update the whole text on a regular basis so that the legal implications 
of the UK’s negotiations with the EU and their impact on both EU and UK law are 
reflected in the book as events unfold. 
 
In pooling our resources and working together on this book, the Scottish Law 
Schools have produced what we hope will be a useful guide for all those who need 
to stay informed and up to date as the UK government’s negotiations regarding our 
future relationship with the EU develop. The electronic format has been chosen 
because of its accessibility, both for authors, who can update their chapters more 
easily and quickly than traditional publications, and for students, who are provided 
with a free and easy to use study aid. 
 
We hope that the book fulfils its purpose effectively in helping us all to understand 
what Brexit means, what its impact will be on the UK’s relationship with the EU and 
any specific implications that may have for Scotland. 
 
Do get in touch with us if you have comments or suggestions to make.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Study Skills 
 
Maria Fletcher  University of Glasgow 
 
Tamara Hervey  University of Sheffield 
 
Sarah McCloskey  University of Sheffield 
 
Lawyers and legal scholars always need to be sure that they are working from the 
most recent legal texts. Being up to date with the law is even more critical at a time 
of rapid political change, such as the period following the triggering of Article 50 
TEU. It is important that lawyers understand the legal ramifications of political 
developments, and follow proposed new legal texts, as well as being on top of the 
latest legal position. 
 
But to understand the latest legal position, often we need to understand the history. 
What is now the European Union (EU) came from the European Community (EC) 
and before that the European Economic Community (EEC). Each of these phases of 
European integration involved different legal texts. 
 
To better understand the changing legal landscape and consequences of the UK 
leaving the EU, and the future EU-UK relationship(s), we need to follow the position 
both from the point of view of the EU – its laws and legal institutions (its legislature, 
its courts); and from the point of view of the UK – its laws and legal institutions, 
including of course the devolved nations/regions. 
 
Key Sources and Resources: Primary Legal Sources 
 
As lawyers, we should reach first for primary legal sources. When the law is 
changing, we also need to be mindful of both laws and political practice that 
determine the procedures by which those changes are made. 
 
Key Sources and Scope of EU Law 
 
The single authoritative source of all EU law is EUR-Lex. This gives texts of the EU’s 
primary law (treaties), secondary legislation (principally, Directives, Regulations and 
Decisions), and the case law of its courts (Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and General Court). The two key EU treaties are the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). If 
you are unclear on these distinctions, see this guide. If you do not already know how 
to use EUR-Lex, several tutorials are available. 
 
The EU may only adopt legislation in accordance with the powers (or competences) 
given to it in the treaties – the EU is a body of ‘constrained’ or ‘limited’ competence. 
The EU has exclusive (or full) competence in some policy fields and it has much 
weaker supporting powers in other fields. However, in the large majority of policy 
fields covered by EU law, competence is shared between the EU and its Member 
States. The principle of subsidiarity governs whether the EU should exercise such 
shared powers (as opposed to Member States or sub-national authorities). A 
glossary of key terms concerning competence is available. 
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In 2013-2014, the UK government conducted a comprehensive review of the balance 
of competences between the EU and the UK, to audit what the EU does and how it 
affects the UK. The review found that, on balance, the allocation of competences 
between the EU and its Member States is about right, but the UK government never 
promoted this conclusion. 
 
Key principles of EU law outline how EU law and national law interrelate. Some EU 
primary and secondary law has direct effect, that is to say it is the source of rights 
enforceable before national courts in the Member States. The CJEU is the authority 
on questions of the interpretation and validity of EU law. Validly adopted EU law 
enjoys primacy (sometimes known as supremacy or precedence) over national law. 
 
Following the Brexit process means following the EU’s treaty law, because the 
process by which a Member State leaves the EU is set out in Article 50 TEU. This 
process will determine the adoption of the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement. After 
notification, a Council of the EU27 negotiates with the leaving Member State. The 
European Parliament must consent. If no agreement is reached after two years, the 
leaving Member State is deemed withdrawn, unless agreement to extend this period 
is reached. The two year period for the UK to negotiate its withdrawal from the EU 
ends on 29 March 2019. The EU’s negotiating positions are transparent and publicly 
available. 
 
The process by which the EU adopts a new treaty with a non-EU country is in Article 
218 TFEU. This will be the process by which the EU-UK relationship is legally 
defined in the future (i.e. post-withdrawal). Recent practice of the EU is to make its 
negotiating positions for new trade treaties transparent. 
 
It is possible that there will be challenges to the withdrawal agreement and any 
future EU-UK agreements before the CJEU. For instance, the European Parliament 
has indicated that it will veto the withdrawal agreement if it fails to protect EU 
citizens’ ‘acquired rights’. The European Parliament might also rely on Article 263 
TFEU to challenge the withdrawal agreement, or any future EU-UK agreements, on 
the grounds of ‘infringement of the Treaties, or any rule of law relating to their 
application’. 
 
A recent case in which a free trade agreement was challenged is the Singapore FTA 
case. In this case, the Commission sought an Opinion from the Court under Article 
218(11) TFEU on the allocation of competences between the EU and the Member 
States as regards concluding the Free Trade Agreement envisaged between the EU 
and the Republic of Singapore. This, and other case law on the EU’s External 
Relations competences, provide important legal context in terms of what the EU 
may (and may not) agree with the UK for the future. There was to have been a case 
seeking to determine whether Article 50 TEU is revocable, but this has been 
withdrawn (click on Case updates). 
 
Key Sources UK Law 
 
The sources of ‘UK’ law consist of: statute; delegated (or secondary) legislation; and 
case law. Legislation can be found on the official website or you can access all 
sources on the legal database to which your university subscribes, for example, 
LexisNexis or Westlaw, each of which has its own ‘how-to’ tutorials. 
 
Importantly, the term ‘UK law’ although commonly used, is something of a misnomer. 
The UK is a single state but does not have a single legal system. Rather, it has 
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three: the legal systems of (1) England and Wales; (2) Scotland; and (3) Northern 
Ireland. These are three distinct legal systems, but they have many points in 
common, including laws that apply in more than one, or in all of these systems. It is 
the latter that generally comprises what people are referring to when they talk about 
UK law. Many other laws apply in only one of the three legal systems. There are 
even laws which apply only in Wales, even though Wales does not have a separate 
legal system. 
 
All this was true before the devolution of political power to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland in 1999. The difference devolution has made is that, since 1999, 
there have been elected assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
empowered to make laws for those nations on certain policy topics. This is very 
important for Brexit. The elected assemblies were given powers to make laws on 
some topics governed by EU law. Brexit will remove the EU law constraints on the 
exercise of those law-making powers for the future. This raises the important 
constitutional question of whether, when powers on these topics are ‘repatriated’ 
from the EU to the UK, they should be exercised by the UK parliament or by the 
devolved assemblies. 
 
In contrast to the EU, the UK has been slow to make clear its detailed negotiation 
positions. Back in February 2017, a broad outline of the government’s vision was 
published in a White Paper, but disclosure of more detailed positions on specific 
matters has only trickled out gradually. Even then, positions have already been 
altered and adapted. (See, for example, the approach to the CJEU.) What we know 
so far and any developments will be published by the UK government’s Department 
for Exiting the European Union. 
 
Regarding the transition UK law faces after leaving the EU, the 2017 Queen’s 
Speech outlined a number of Bills. Of the 27, eight wholly concern measures around 
Brexit. These include the Immigration Bill, the Customs Bill, and the infamous (Great) 
Repeal Bill, or the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, to give it its proper title. Time 
will tell what these will entail and how they will progress through parliament. It is 
important to keep up to date with this as Brexit negotiations progress. You can find 
the Bills before parliament on its website and follow their progress by clicking on 
each respective one. This page also has the option of subscribing to email updates. 
If you need to brush up on the process a bill takes, the UK parliament website has 
made a simplified video and the government website provides a more detailed 
outline. 
 
In addition, each of the devolved nations’ parliamentary bodies has a dedicated page 
linking to key information regarding Brexit and its effects on their national interests. It 
is worth keeping an eye on these given that Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all 
face unique dilemmas when exiting the EU. One issue common to all the devolved 
nations, however, is that the statutes governing the devolution settlements in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all directly incorporate EU law. They will 
therefore require amendment as part of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, to do 
this, the Sewel Convention dictates that the UK parliament will usually require the 
consent of the devolved legislature. 
 
Further, many areas within the devolved nations’ competences (e.g. agriculture and 
the environment) are currently covered by EU law. The question therefore arises as 
to where these repatriated powers will fall within the UK post-Brexit. The UK 
government’s White Paper on exiting the EU emphasises the importance of ensuring 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 2 | Study Skills  12 
stability and certainty. It outlines an intention to discuss a way forward with the 
devolved administrations and to identify what ‘common frameworks’ need to be 
retained. Whether this means that such areas will be addressed by UK-wide 
frameworks or instead devolved nations’ interests will prevail remains to be seen. 
 
However, the UK government’s preference became clear with the publication of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill which was introduced into parliament on 13 July 
2017. Clause 11 in effect freezes devolved competence on exit day by ensuring that 
the repatriation of powers from the EU flows, at least in the first instance, back to 
London (and not Belfast, Cardiff or Edinburgh) and does not result in any accrual of 
authority to the devolved legislatures, even in subject areas that are devolved. Some 
initial legal commentary on the Bill has been offered, in addition to the immediate 
political reaction from Edinburgh and Cardiff. 
 
There may well be more sources of UK law relevant to Brexit. For example, we might 
see challenges to interpretation, or Human Rights Act compliance, of the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill and its impact on citizens’ rights. Similarly, we might see litigation 
involving trade and commerce (e.g. involving property rights) in light of the Customs 
Bill. Whether case law will be fundamental to post-Brexit development will become 
clear with time. This is something to keep an eye on. 
 
Finally, the unique challenges of Brexit might even necessitate the establishment of 
new bodies and, in turn, new sources of authority. For example, a new dispute 
resolution body may be established to handle disputes under the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Or, indeed, dependent on the direction of the negotiations, existing 
bodies’ jurisdiction might extend to the UK (e.g. the EFTA Court). 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Secondary sources (anything that is not a primary legal text) can help enormously 
with understanding of primary legal sources. It is important, however, to exercise 
discretion when choosing which secondary sources to trust. 
 
Some secondary sources, such as government guidance or interpretations of legal 
text, purport to be authoritative. While courts are likely to give these the utmost 
respect, they are ultimately not the law itself, and it is possible that they do not 
express what the legal text means. It is important to explicitly acknowledge this if you 
do refer to these sources, but they can provide a good platform from which to debate 
points of contention, to represent how vested interests impact upon interpretation, or 
simply to suggest what application of the law will look like in the absence of case 
law. 
 
A couple of pertinent examples include the Explanatory Notes accompanying the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill and a July 2017 National Audit Office report concerning HM 
Revenue and Customs’ development of the new Customs Declaration Service. The 
former, written by the Department for Exiting the EU (DexEU), envisages the Bill’s 
practical implementation, its impact on existing legislation, and hopes to inform its 
debate in parliament. The latter similarly considers future impact, but instead 
concerns a computer system.  
 
When considering these sources for analysis, it is important to consider the 
organisations behind them and how this affects their reliability and legitimacy. Here, 
for example, a crucial difference is that the Explanatory Notes were created by a 
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government department while the report on the Customs Declaration Service was 
produced by an independent body. 
 
Our key focus here is on the legal aspects of Brexit. But law is not an isolated 
subject. It is not possible to understand legal implications without at least some 
attention to their social, economic, political, cultural or other contexts. At the same 
time, some sources, even apparently reputable sources, do not provide accurate 
statements of the legal position. Again, some discretion will be required to discern 
which sources are useful. 
 
Learning with Published Works 
 
These are some suggestions on books and journals with which you can start. 
 
Books on Brexit 
 
 Armstrong, K (2017) Brexit Time: Leaving the EU: Why, How and When? 
(Cambridge University Press) 
 Dougan, M (ed) (2017) The UK after Brexit (Intersentia) 
 Hassan, G and Gunson, R (eds) (2017) Scotland, the UK and Brexit: A Guide to 
the Future (Luath Press) 
 
Printed texts may not be up to date, but the publisher may offer online updates (e.g. 
law books from Oxford University Press). 
 
Journals – Special Editions/Collections 
 
Look out for special editions on Brexit and Law of x (e.g. environmental, consumer 
protection, employment, health or trade law) in specialist law journals. All the general 
EU law and domestic law journals are covering the law of Brexit as it unfolds. Some 
examples: 
 
 Craig, PP (2016) ‘Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts’, European Law Review 
 Kostakopoulou, D (2017) ‘What Fractures Political Unions? Failed Federations, 
Brexit and the Importance of Political Commitment’, European Law Review 
 Edinburgh Law Review – Forthcoming special edition on Brexit and Scotland 
 
Learning with Multi-media Resources 
 
Academic and Professional Blogs 
 
With the uncertainty surrounding Brexit, any resources that have the capacity for fast 
publication are going to be particularly useful. In this respect, academic and 
professional blogs are fantastic – they can post swift reactions without the usual 
constraints of publication. To take full advantage of this, it is important to check the 
date of publication in relation to the events you are looking at. Timeliness is one of 
the assets of this source but inevitably it is also a weakness; particularly on a matter 
like Brexit, the relevance and accuracy of blogs can quickly diminish. This should 
also be borne in mind when looking at blogs linked to by other sources. Certain 
outlets might link to outdated sources in a new context in pursuit of a particular 
agenda. 
 
Further, the ease of access that gives rise to the opportune nature of blogs means 
that it is crucial to identify reputable blogs as the internet gives a platform to 
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virtually anyone. This can be achieved by looking into who is the host of the website, 
or who the author of the piece is. For example, university blogs following 
developments in Europe include those from LSE, Durham and Edinburgh. In these 
cases, it is fairly self-evident that posts will be founded in academic research and 
opinion and therefore represent a reliable source. If you come across a site that you 
are unsure of, you might find that it has an About Us page that can give you further 
insight into what the motivations of the blog are, who runs it, and what angle it has 
taken. An example is that on The UK in a Changing Europe. 
 
It is advisable to be a bit more sceptical of blogs by individuals. This can again be 
resolved by some quick research. For example, if we take EU Law Analysis, the 
equivalent About pages list the blog contributors. Their credentials are given with 
their names, but a quick search will bring up the university profiles for the likes of 
Steve Peers, Jo Shaw, and Catherine Barnard, confirming their reputations. While 
this will determine what is reliable, it is still important to distinguish between 
academic comment and analysis, and research: the former is persuasive while the 
latter is more authoritative. 
 
Some useful examples: 
 
Legal focus 
 EU Law Analysis 
 DELI Blog (Durham European Law Institute) 
 Many law firms’ and chambers’ websites have blogs and some have specific 
Brexit-oriented ones, such as EUtopia Law (Matrix Chambers) and Inside Brexit 
(Norton Rose Fulbright) 
 
More general 
 Ideas on Europe 
 The UK in a Changing Europe 
 EUROPP (LSE) 
 European Futures (University of Edinburgh) 
 Public Law for Everyone 
 
Hybrid/Non-Blog Resources 
 
Some digital resources are hybrids of journalism and blogs. For instance, The 
Conversation is written by academics and journalists in collaboration. It carries 
regular Brexit-related stories. Research centres, academic networks and think tanks 
can also provide valuable analysis. Examples include the Centre on Constitutional 
Change, the Scottish Centre on European Relations and the Scottish Universities 
Legal Network on Europe. 
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Audiovisual  
 
Short videos, podcasts and ‘talking heads’ have become a more commonly used 
method for imparting knowledge and understanding. Many of the same pieces of 
advice outlined above in relation to blogs – identifying reputable sources, being wary 
of outdatedness – also apply to relying on audiovisual sources. In general, 
audiovisual sources should be used as supplementary to other sources. 
 
Some useful examples: 
 
 LSE Public Lectures – Podcasts and Videos 
 Prof Michael Dougan’s Videos on Brexit 
 SULNE Brexit Videos 
 The UK in a Changing Europe – Multimedia resources 
 Centre for European Reform – Podcasts 
 
Twitter 
 
Given the warnings of the previous sections, this recommendation that Twitter might 
be a resource to use might come as a surprise. The same approach should be taken 
to Twitter – but perhaps with even greater care. Follow only reputable accounts and 
be wary of taking replies to their tweets at face value. But do use it as a platform 
from which to conduct further research. Twitter live updates are useful and links to 
more detailed analyses can provide a good gateway to more information. 
 
Online (and Print) Media 
 
Online and print media can again provide a useful gateway into topics you are 
researching. The reason for this is because they are aimed at a wide audience so 
they cannot presume knowledge in the same way as, for example, a journal. For this 
same reason, it is important to be wary of their output. Sometimes, simplifying 
information comes at the expense of accuracy. 
 
Equally, the race to be the first to report has created the era of post-truth and fake 
news. Just because a reputable media outlet re-shares a story does not mean it is 
true. The BBC is one among many that has failed to fact check in the past. Be sure 
to look elsewhere at a variety of sources before relying on what you have read. 
Websites dedicated to verifying the truth of news stories can also be helpful. 
 
Wikipedia 
 
Wikipedia should not feature in your bibliography, because of its nature as a source. 
But, when attempting to tackle a big area, it provides useful summaries on a whole 
host of topics. This can provide a helpful starting point for research. 
 
Designing Research Projects and Research Questions 
 
For students who have an opportunity to write a dissertation or other independent 
piece of work, the pace of legal change, and the scale of the challenge of Brexit 
provides an opportunity to produce something original. It also provides a chance to 
produce a piece of work relevant to future career plans. 
 
Originality is not usually a requirement of undergraduate, or postgraduate taught, 
work, but it is invariably one criterion used in assessment of that work. It might seem 
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risky to produce some work on a topic where there is not much (or any) literature. An 
example in Sheffield Law School in 2016-2017 was a dissertation on the legal 
position concerning blood and plasma supply on Brexit Day, in the event of a ‘no 
deal’ Brexit. There was literally no literature (of any sort) on this topic whatsoever at 
the time the dissertation was submitted. But if students are able to work with the 
primary legal texts, their legal skills will be rewarded. 
 
When embarking on an extended piece of independent work, it is important to think 
carefully about research design. Remember that you are producing a piece of legal 
research. You need to think about what is a legal question, to which you can provide 
an answer. 
 
It is also important to think about the scope of your project. Typically, dissertations 
allow you to deal in depth with one relatively narrow point, which you can put into its 
broader contexts to show its more general significance. So you might focus, for 
instance, on the continued rights to UK child benefit in divorced or separated families 
where one parent and the children are relying on EU citizenship law for their 
residence entitlements in an EU27 Member State. This very specific topic would give 
sufficient precision to ensure depth of legal analysis rather than superficiality. But it 
would also allow you to make more general points about the way EU citizens 
resident in an EU Member State of which they are not a national are being treated in 
the Brexit process. 
 
Skills of legal analysis can be demonstrated through careful and considered 
interpretation of legal texts, especially where interpretation is disputed or disputable. 
As new legal texts appear during the Brexit process, they will be debated and 
scrutinised. What do the texts mean? Whose legal position do they affect, in what 
ways? Do the texts mean what their authors intend them to mean? Are there 
unforeseen and unintended consequences? Are there gaps in their scope? Does 
their scope extend wider than appropriate/intended? Thinking about the law in its 
various contexts, legal analysis may extend to highlighting the significance of what 
seems a dry or technical legal question. For instance, law in context analysis might 
explain: How many people would be affected, which people, and how they would be 
affected, by different legal interpretations of texts. 
 
There is no reason why competent student projects cannot contribute to these wider 
processes and avenues of legal scrutiny and debate. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Vote to Leave the EU: Why Did 
It Happen and What Has Happened 
Since? 
 
Daniel Kenealy  University of Edinburgh 
 
On 23 June 2016, voters in the UK opted to leave the EU by a margin of 51.9% to 
48.1%. This chapter, offered as a contextualisation of the referendum, has three 
sections. The first looks at the road to 23 June 2016. The second considers the 
referendum campaign and, more importantly, the result itself. The third looks at 
events since the referendum and up to the triggering of Article 50 TEU by the UK 
government on 29 March 2017. 
 
The Road to the Referendum 
 
Much like Anthony Eden and Suez, and Tony Blair and Iraq, the six year premiership 
of David Cameron is likely, historically, to be associated with one word: Brexit. To 
understand why Cameron ended up leading the UK into a referendum on its 
membership of the EU – and losing it – it is essential to understand political 
dynamics within the Conservative party in prior decades. Before discussing that, it 
must also be understood that the UK has always been something of an ‘awkward 
partner’ in the process of European integration. 
 
The UK stood aside from the first steps towards integration, opting not to join the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957. Some years later, driven largely by economic struggles, 
the UK joined the EEC on 1 January 1973. In subsequent years, the UK remained 
detached from several major policy initiatives. It waited until 1990 to join the 
European Monetary System and negotiated opt-outs from the single currency (the 
euro), the Schengen Agreement and EU legislation in the Area of Freedom, Justice 
and Security. 
 
Soon after joining in 1973, UK citizens were asked to decide whether they wished to 
remain. In a referendum on 5 June 1975 a substantial majority – 67.2% of 
participants – voted to remain. That referendum exposed fractures within the Labour 
party and, for much of the 1970s and 1980s, it was Labour for whom European 
integration proved most divisive. But it is within the Conservative party that the idea 
of leaving the EU has most firmly taken root since the late 1980s. By the 21st 
century, the debate about the UK’s relationship with the EU ‘was really a family row, 
one raging in the Conservative party’. Party divisions on the issue had been a 
powerful contributing factor to the downfall of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 and posed 
a serious challenge to John Major’s government during the parliament of 1992-1997. 
 
Thatcher shifted, over time, from her belief that the EEC could be an international 
vehicle through which she could spread and strengthen her free market, neoliberal 
ideas to a suspicion – and later an almost paranoia – that European integration 
represented a threat to the very notion of the nation state. Major was incapable of 
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preventing party divisions over the Maastricht Treaty. So small was his parliamentary 
majority that a small group of Eurosceptic MPs – whom he famously labelled ‘the 
bastards’ – were able to wield influence within the Conservative party 
disproportionate to their size. In 1994 Norman Lamont, Major’s former Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, became the first leading Conservative politician to publicly give voice 
to the possibility of the UK leaving the EU. 
 
In opposition, during the Tony Blair-Gordon Brown years, the EU remained highly 
divisive amongst Conservatives although the issue failed to become a major priority 
for the electorate. After being elected party leader in December 2005, Cameron told 
his party to ‘stop banging on’ about Europe.1 Nevertheless, the number of 
Eurosceptic MPs in the Conservative parliamentary party rose following the 2010 
general election.2 Cameron attempted to appease them, failing to realise that, for 
many of them, securing the UK’s exit from the EU was an article of faith. 
 
He withdrew his party’s MEPs from the European People’s Party, the main centre-
right grouping in the European Parliament, establishing a new group – the European 
Conservatives and Reformists – that saw Conservative MEPs caucusing with far-
right Eastern European parties. After becoming Prime Minister, he passed the 2011 
European Union Act, committing the UK government to holding a referendum on any 
future treaty that transferred new powers to the EU. But the hard-line Eurosceptics in 
his party could not be appeased and, in fact, efforts to appease them simply served 
to embolden them as they sensed weakness and fear amongst the party leadership. 
 
The hung parliament elected in 2010 led to a coalition government with the pro-EU 
Liberal Democrats. The EU issue did not go away within the Conservative party, but 
Cameron had a convenient excuse for why he could not offer a referendum. Beyond 
internal disagreements, many Conservative MPs – Cameron included – were 
concerned about the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a populist party that 
fused anti-immigration and anti-EU stances with calls for the UK to take back its 
sovereignty and control of its borders. 
 
The EU issue was threatening Cameron’s party from within and without. The issue 
came to a head in January 2013 when Cameron finally conceded to the hard-liners 
in his party, committing to an in/out referendum. That referendum was to follow a 
renegotiation of the terms of the UK’s membership. At the time the commitment was 
made, it seemed unlikely that Cameron would lead a Conservative majority 
government after the 2015 general election. Events took an unexpected turn and in 
May 2015 Cameron secured a slim parliamentary majority, further empowering 
Eurosceptic MPs who were increasingly acting as a caucus within the parliamentary 
party. He had little choice but to press ahead with a referendum. 
 
Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership culminated in February 2016. 
The concessions were fairly modest and, perhaps more importantly, were ‘too 
complex’ to be useful in the referendum campaign. They failed to shift the attitudes 
of many Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, 45% of whom campaigned, against their 
prime minister, to leave the EU in the referendum that followed. Before considering 
                                            
1 See D’Ancona, M (2013) In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition Government 
(Penguin) – Chapter 13 
2 See Heppell, T (2013) ‘Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers’, British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations, 15(3), 340-361 
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the referendum campaign and the result it is important to note that, beyond the 
difficulties that the EU posed for the Conservative party, UK society had never really 
warmed to European integration. Over more than forty years of membership, 
‘relatively few had taken the [EU] to heart and developed a strong sense of 
European identity. As a result, the country’s position as a member … was always 
open to challenge’.3 
 
Understanding the Result 
 
A brief chapter does not allow for a comprehensive account of the referendum 
campaign. In broad terms the Remain campaign (Stronger In) focused on the 
economic risk and uncertainty of Brexit, attempting to emulate the successful 
campaign against independence in Scotland, which had been dubbed ‘Project Fear’. 
Doing so meant failing to put across a positive message about EU membership, 
despite some evidence that this might have been a more effective strategy. 
 
In contrast, the Leave campaign settled on a simple slogan – ‘Vote Leave, Take 
Control’ – and managed to capture the narrative, threading together their messages 
about sovereignty and immigration, as the campaign entered its closing stages. The 
presence of political heavyweights such as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove in the 
Vote Leave team was undoubtedly helpful, adding gravitas and complementing the 
populism of UKIP’s Nigel Farage who was closely involved in the parallel (though not 
the official) Leave campaign, Leave.EU.4 The media landscape ought also to be 
noted briefly. Six of the nine main UK national newspapers supported leaving the 
EU, with coverage skewed towards Leave. 
 
Early analysis of the result confirms, and nuances, the notion that citizens who have 
been ‘left behind’ by economic changes associated with globalisation and a liberal 
policy consensus voted to leave the EU, in opposition to mainstream establishment 
actors. However, arguments about the economy, immigration, national identity, and 
sovereignty were all persuasive to different voters. As Curtice puts it: ‘the way that 
people voted in the EU referendum was related both to what they thought the 
instrumental consequences of leaving would be and to their sense of identity. The 
outcome … is best understood as the product of the interplay between both these 
forces’. Crucially, the referendum outcome was determined by a group of voters who 
felt that leaving the EU would ‘not make much difference either way – and rather 
than splitting evenly between the two camps, only around one in three of them voted 
to Remain’. 
 
It seems that, especially for economically disaffected voters, the Remain campaign’s 
emphasis on economic risk failed to resonate. The referendum result also reveals 
deep social divisions within UK society. Brexit supporters held ‘a more socially 
conservative outlook on Europe, immigration, and national identity that in recent 
years has become just as important as old disputes between labour and capital’. 
Figures reveal that age and education were two strong indicators of how people 
voted. The older you were, and the less formal education you possessed, the more 
likely you were to vote Leave. Curtice concludes that the country ended up ‘divided 
                                            
3 Curtice, J (2017) ‘Why Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 55(S1), p 16 
4 As Curtice, ‘Why Leave Won’, p 7, notes, polling ‘persistently suggested that voters were 
more inclined to believe what [Boris] Johnson said about Brexit than they were the 
utterances of any other politician, including the Prime Minister’. 
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between its young well-educated professionals who felt relatively comfortable with 
EU membership and older, less well-educated voters who have been characterised 
as “left-behind” by some of the economic and social changes that have occurred 
around them’.5 
 
What Has Happened Since the Referendum? 
 
The most immediate fallout from the referendum was Cameron’s resignation. 
Theresa May succeeded him and promptly handed some of the key ministerial 
positions involved in delivering Brexit to MPs who campaigned to leave (e.g. Boris 
Johnson became the new foreign secretary, David Davis was appointed as Brexit 
secretary). May set up new UK government departments – the Department for 
Exiting the European Union and the Department for International Trade – to handle 
Brexit. This has created issues within Whitehall as rival power bases emerge and the 
Prime Minister’s grip becomes looser. Within the civil service it had been expected 
that a minister would be appointed to handle Brexit but that the Cabinet Office – the 
central coordinating department in government – would manage it bureaucratically, 
keeping it within the prime minister’s sphere.6 
 
May herself formally backed Remain but kept a low profile during the campaign. In 
her first months in office she offered ambiguity, refusing to say with any precision 
what her government’s vision of Brexit involved. At the Conservative conference in 
2016 and in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017, she began to set out a 
vision for Brexit. The UK, she said, would leave the single market and probably the 
customs union, would ‘take back control of its immigration policy’, end the jurisdiction 
of the EU’s Court of Justice in the UK, and not stay in ‘bits of the EU’. 
 
The terminology of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Brexit has emerged in British political 
discourse to distinguish between Brexits that envision continued membership of the 
single market and/or customs union (soft) and Brexits that envision a sharp break 
with the EU, with perhaps no more than a Canada-style free trade agreement taking 
the place of membership (hard). Given the variety of possible outcomes, the 
simplistic terminology is less than useful. The vision set out by Theresa May is 
incompatible with so-called ‘softer’ forms of Brexit. 
 
May’s stance is, in part, dictated by party politics. Like her predecessors, she heads 
a divided party. Hard-line Eurosceptics fear any attempt to water down Brexit by, for 
example, seeking UK membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) – 
alongside Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland – that would allow for continued 
membership of the single market, or seeking to remain within the EU’s customs 
union, which would inhibit the UK’s ability to negotiate its own trade deals. Many 
Conservative MPs who voted to remain have not yet given up hope that a ‘soft’ form 
of Brexit might be achieved. The cabinet remains divided. A broad spectrum of 
opinion spans those who seek a clean break from the EU as soon as possible, to 
those who recognise the need for a long transition period and continued close 
economic cooperation. 
 
May commenced the formal process of Brexit – triggering Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union – with a letter to the president of the European Council on 29 March 
                                            
5 Curtice, ‘Why Leave Won’, quotes from pp 13, 14 and 16 
6 Interviews conducted by the author with senior civil servants in the Cabinet Office, Foreign 
Office and Department for Exiting the EU 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 3 | The Vote to Leave the EU: Why Did It Happen and What Has Happened Since?
 21 
2017, meaning the UK will leave the EU at the end of March 2019, barring a 
dramatic policy reversal by the UK government (debate continues about whether 
Article 50 is, in fact, reversible but, if the 27 other EU Member States accepted a 
reversal, then it is hard politically to see what the obstacle would be). 
 
Following a calamitous general election campaign in 2017 – in which May gambled 
and lost her parliamentary majority and ended up surviving through a parliamentary 
deal with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party – the prime minister is 
weakened and unable to offer the leadership necessary to bring together the 
disparate perspectives within her cabinet and her party. At the time of writing, it 
remains unclear precisely how the new parliamentary dynamics will impact Brexit, 
and indeed how long May will survive as prime minister. The UK civil service remains 
underprepared for the task of negotiating Brexit and is struggling with a lack of clear 
political direction from ministers. Senior officials on both sides – the UK and the EU – 
agree that a comprehensive Brexit cannot be negotiated and ratified by the end of 
March 2019 and that some form of transition deal will be required, perhaps spanning 
several years.7 
 
Closer to home in Scotland – where 62% of those voting opted not to leave the EU – 
first minister Nicola Sturgeon has attempted to build support for a so-called 
‘differentiated Brexit’. This would involve Scotland – and perhaps Wales and/or 
Northern Ireland – establishing relationships with the EU after Brexit that are different 
to those of England. Specifically, Sturgeon has expressed a preference for Scotland 
to remain within the single market – via membership of or affiliation to the EEA – and 
to receive sweeping new powers over immigration and the economy. Although such 
proposals seem practically unworkable, it remains the case that Brexit presents a 
significant challenge to the UK’s already fragile political union, with especially acute 
problems in Northern Ireland which shares a land border with Ireland, a Member 
State of the EU. 
 
*** 
Understanding the path to the UK’s EU referendum in 2016 requires a familiarity with 
the internal dynamics of the Conservative party. David Cameron ultimately boxed 
himself into a corner and ended up having to fight a referendum that neither he, nor 
the country, had a particular appetite for. The referendum itself laid bare significant 
divisions within UK society, geographically and socially. Since 23 June 2016 a new 
government, and a new prime minister, have struggled to translate the wish of the 
UK public to leave the EU into a coherent policy vision. 
 
An unnecessary general election in 2017 has left the UK with a weak government, 
led by a weak prime minister grappling with the same divisions that have 
characterised the Conservative party for three decades. With Article 50 triggered, the 
clock is ticking. Senior UK civil servants privately admit that the government lacks a 
clear plan and that there is not sufficient time before March 2019 to resolve all of the 
outstanding issues. One of the few things that are clear at the time of writing is that a 
referendum that was supposed to ‘settle’ the issue of the UK’s relationship to the EU 
has thrown the country into uncertainty, with no clear sense of just precisely where 
we are headed. 
 
 
                                            
7 Interviews conducted by the author with senior civil servants in the Cabinet Office, 
Department for Exiting the EU, and officials in the European Council 
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Chapter 4 
 
Constitutional Law 
 
Aileen McHarg  University of Strathclyde 
 
The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the 
Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA) – the means by which EU membership was given 
effect within the UK – as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it 
provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in 
the UK, it also fundamentally changed the UK’s system of government and the way 
in which we think about the location and exercise of public power. 
 
The key constitutional change was the shift from what was understood in 1972 (at 
least outside Northern Ireland) as a unitary constitutional order, with a single 
legislative body and single source of sovereign authority (the UK parliament) to a 
multi-level system in which governmental power is divided and shared between 
different geographical tiers. Not only did EU law act as a constraint upon the 
legislative competence of the UK parliament – and later also upon the devolved 
legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – but the EU was itself a limited 
legal order, bound by its own constitutional framework as laid down in the treaties. 
 
EU membership has therefore been a significant driver of the movement away from 
the UK’s traditionally political constitution, in which democratic accountability was 
regarded as the major guarantee against abuse of governmental power, towards a 
more legally-constrained constitution, with a greater role for the courts as a check on 
public bodies. Its impact has been both direct and indirect. In direct terms, EU law 
itself has proved to be a fertile source of grounds of challenge to government action. 
Individuals and organisations who think that their rights under EU law have been 
breached by public bodies have been able to bring actions before the UK courts, 
often securing better remedies than would have been available under purely 
domestic law. Indirectly, the broader shifts in constitutional thinking engendered by 
EU membership – about the dividing and sharing of governmental power, and about 
the role of law in constraining the state – may have paved the way for later 
developments, such as devolution and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which 
have also enhanced the constitutional role of the courts. 
 
The most obvious constitutional impact of EU membership has been on the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty. In the famous case of R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, the House of Lords, for the first 
time since the Glorious Revolution, ‘disapplied’ an Act of the UK parliament so as to 
give priority to a directly effective principle of EU law. Constitutional scholars 
continue to argue about the basis for the Factortame decision, and the extent to 
which it modified the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. But there is no doubt that 
the ECA achieved what the orthodox (Diceyan) version of sovereignty said was 
impossible: the parliament of 1972 succeeded in binding its successor parliaments to 
give primacy to EU law (at least while the ECA remains on the statute book). 
 
Moreover, the modification of the sovereignty rule has not been limited to compliance 
with EU law. Sir John Laws’ rationalisation of the Factortame decision in Thoburn v 
Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151 introduced the idea that the domestic legal order 
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recognises a hierarchy of statutes. Whereas Dicey had famously claimed that the 
Acts of Union of 1706-1707 were of no greater legal authority than the Dentists Act 
1878, it is now accepted that ‘constitutional statutes’ such as the ECA, but also the 
HRA, the devolution statutes, the Representation of the People Acts and so on, 
enjoy a special legal status which immunises them from implied repeal.8 
 
However, the constitutional effects of EU membership are by no means limited to 
parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Denning’s famous metaphor of EU law being ‘like an 
incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers’9 applies as much in 
relation to constitutional law as in other areas. General principles of EU law, such as 
proportionality, certainty, transparency and respect for fundamental rights, have 
influenced the way in which UK domestic courts approach the task of controlling 
public power, and have altered specific legal doctrines, such as eroding the 
privileges of the Crown in litigation10 or imposing state liability for unlawful acts.11 
 
As well as shifting the balance of power between the courts and parliament, EU 
membership has also affected the separation of powers between the executive and 
the legislature. In general, its effect has been to empower government ministers, 
who have an important law-making role in the EU via the Council of Ministers and 
extensive powers to implement European obligations via secondary legislation, at 
the expense of parliament. In addition, EU membership has been a conduit for the 
influence of constitutional ideas from our European neighbours – for instance, the 
requirement to use a system of proportional representation for European Parliament 
elections or the use of constitutional referendums as a means of checking further 
European integration.12 
 
The overarching legal framework provided by EU law has also fulfilled certain 
constitutional functions which are less easily performed within the domestic legal 
order. In relation to devolution, for instance, EU law has acted as a centralising 
influence, counteracting the potentially disintegrative forces unleashed by the 
creation of sub-state legislatures. More specifically, in Northern Ireland, the UK and 
the Irish Republic’s common membership of the EU was one of the factors that 
facilitated the Good Friday Agreement, which ended 30 years of conflict by enabling 
the sharing of sovereignty across the Irish border without threatening Northern 
Ireland’s place within the UK. EU membership has also entrenched certain 
commitments, for instance to environmental protection, or gender equality, or the 
maintenance of open markets, which cannot be guaranteed in domestic law because 
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
EU membership has thus had both deep and pervasive effects on the UK 
constitution, and leaving the EU will therefore amount to another fundamental 
constitutional change. Moreover, whereas the decision to join the EU was primarily 
motivated by economic considerations, the impetus for Brexit has been primarily 
constitutional – the desire to ‘take back control’, by restoring sovereignty to domestic 
institutions and breaking free of a set of supranational institutions that, as Theresa 
                                            
8 See also H v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24; 2012 SC (UKSC) 308; R (HS2 Action 
Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3 
9 HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418 
10 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603; Miller & 
Bryce v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1997 SLT 1000 
11 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66 
12 See Referendum Act 1975; European Union Act 2011, Pt 1; European Union Referendum 
Act 2015 
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May put it in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017, ‘sit very uneasily in 
relation to our political history and way of life.’ The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
will therefore repeal the ECA and related provisions in the devolution statutes, 
thereby ending the UK’s domestic obligations to implement and comply with EU law, 
and will ‘repatriate’ decision-making competences currently exercised at EU level to 
the UK and (perhaps) devolved parliaments. 
 
However, it would be a mistake to think that we can turn the constitutional clock back 
to 31 December 1972. The idea of constrained and divided constitutional power, 
which was such a novelty when the UK joined the EU, has since become the 
constitutional norm. For instance, the existence of devolved legislatures significantly 
complicates the process of withdrawing from the EU. Difficult issues as to the 
implications of Brexit for the future division of competences between the UK and 
devolved levels – and in relation to both Scotland and Northern Ireland (both of 
which voted to remain in the EU) – have reopened questions about the survival of 
the UK state. It also seems unlikely that the constitutional role of the courts will 
shrink back to what it was prior to joining the EU. One lasting legacy of EU 
membership is likely to be a permanently emboldened UK judiciary still willing to use 
at least some of the legal tools bequeathed to it by EU law to constrain the exercise 
of public power. 
 
EU membership will also leave a lasting imprint on the UK constitutional order in the 
form of a new category of ‘retained EU law’, to be created by the domestication of 
currently directly effective or directly applicable EU laws via the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. 
These will continue to have a superior status to other domestic laws, as well as 
continue to bind the devolved legislatures, and could persist for years, if not 
decades, until they are finally replaced by domestic legislation. The precise 
implications of this new legal category are complex and unclear, and are likely to 
create problems for lawyers, judges and government actors for a long time to come. 
 
In other respects, however, the constitutional change brought about by Brexit may be 
greater. New or enlarged institutions may need to be created to carry out the 
governmental tasks currently performed at EU level, such as emissions trading or 
trade negotiations, and new capacities developed for scrutinising legislation and 
policy in these areas. Removing the obligation to comply with EU law may also 
create opportunities for greater policy and institutional experimentation than might 
otherwise have been possible – for instance a return to a significant role for public 
ownership or a reversal of the trend towards the creation of independent regulatory 
agencies. 
 
On the other hand, international legal constraints (particularly international trade laws 
and any future UK-EU trade deal) are likely to take on a greater significance as a 
constraint on government action, and may require a constitutional response. Of 
immediate concern are the extensive proposed ‘Henry VIII powers’ conferred on 
ministers by the EU Withdrawal Bill to implement the EU withdrawal agreement and 
secure compliance with international obligations, which will allow them to make 
extensive changes to domestic law, subject to only limited parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
In short, Brexit notwithstanding, lawyers will continue to have to grapple with the 
impact of EU membership on the UK’s constitution, as well as with the reality, in an 
increasingly globalised world, of the need to share governmental power within and 
beyond the boundaries of the state. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Free Movement of Goods 
 
Andrew Farrer  University of Edinburgh 
 
The free movement of goods in the European Single Market is a foundational 
economic principle of the European Union. Considered together with the free 
movement of labour, services and capital, the free movement of goods is one of the 
four freedoms of the Single Market. The aim of a single market in goods was the 
creation of an economic space in which goods would move freely across borders 
without hindrance – the removal of all tariffs, customs checks and technical 
restrictions. The provisions for the free movement of goods apply not only to goods 
manufactured within the EU, but also to goods imported into the EU from third party 
states. Once inside the single market, imports are subject to the same rules as are 
applied to goods of EU origin. 
 
The main treaty articles dealing with free movement of goods are: customs barriers 
(Articles 28-30 TFEU) and non-tariff and technical barriers (Articles 34-36 TFEU). 
The principles governing the operation of the free movement of goods can be 
summarised as: harmonisation, non-discrimination and mutual recognition. These 
principles underpin the substantive provisions on the free movement of goods in 
order to ensure that goods can circulate freely between the Member States. 
 
The principle of harmonisation, Article 26 TFEU, requires that the EU adopt legal 
measures designed to harmonise the functioning of the market and technical 
measures which bring domestic regulations and practice in the Member States into a 
greater degree of coordination. This harmonisation covers two principle areas; firstly, 
the requirements of health and safety, and secondly, product standardisation. 
 
Non-discrimination is a fundamental constitutional rule of the EU and Article 18 
TFEU states: ‘any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. In 
effect, this provision requires that all goods produced in the Member States must be 
treated equally within the single market and may not be discriminated against on 
grounds of origin. 
 
The principle of mutual recognition, or equivalence (which was famously established 
in the Cassis de Dijon case), provides that any product produced and marketed 
lawfully in one state may be marketed and sold in any other state, even if it does not 
conform fully to the technical standards of that state. This provision is subject to 
qualifications on the grounds of health and safety, consumer protection and so on. 
 
Articles 28-30 TFEU 
 
Articles 28-30 address the abolition of customs duties and charges having an effect 
equivalent to that of a customs duty. The prohibition on customs duties and charges 
having equivalent effect, applies between Member States (Article 30), and between 
the Member States and third party states (Article 28). The establishment of the 
Customs Union and the prohibition on tariffs between Member States was an early 
aim of the Community. 
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The foundational Van Gend en Loos case in 1963 established the principle of the 
direct effect of Community law. At issue was whether the Netherlands government 
was entitled to increase a tariff on imports from Germany when such an increase 
was strictly prohibited by the treaty. The Court held that the treaty prohibited the 
Netherlands from imposing a tariff, and established the principle of the direct effect of 
Community law on the Member States and the rights of individual citizens to rely in 
their national courts upon Community law against the Member State in breach. 
 
Non-Tariff Barriers: Articles 34-36 TFEU 
 
Non-tariff barriers are those measures that have an effect equivalent to that of tariff 
barriers, but do not involve a monetary charge or tax. Examples are quotas and the 
much broader category of technical restrictions which apply in each domestic 
market, known as measures having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction 
(MEQRs). A quantitative restriction has the effect of restricting the movement of a 
good either partially or totally. The imposition by a state of a criminal penalty on trade 
in a given product would amount to a quantitative restriction (QRs). MEQRs are 
those measures imposed by Member States that are less obvious than QRs, but 
have a similarly restrictive effect on the movement of goods. 
 
The key case in which the Court defined the formula to be applied is Procureur du 
Roi v Dassonville; that formula being: ‘All trading rules enacted by Member States 
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.’ 
 
The effects of Articles 34 (imports) and Article 35 (exports) are extensive and cover a 
vast range of circumstances, including those where Member States wish to retain 
restrictions as a matter of policy. The treaty recognised the need to provide states 
with policy exceptions to Article 34 and 35, and Article 36 TFEU provides those 
exceptions. The list of allowable exceptions contained in Article 36 is a closed one – 
only matters covered by the contents of the article are considered permissible 
grounds for an exception to Articles 34 and 35. The list includes, inter alia, ‘public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants’. 
 
An example of a permissible exception under Article 36 would be a ban on imports of 
livestock or meat from a state suffering from disease in the agricultural sector such 
as foot and mouth disease or BSE. In addition, measures not protected by Article 36 
exceptions may nonetheless be protected. In the landmark Cassis de Dijon, case the 
Court formulated the ‘mandatory requirements’ doctrine. Mandatory requirements 
are obstacles to the free movement of goods that, according to the Court, are 
necessary to ensure, for example, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the 
protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions or the defence of 
the consumer. 
 
The range of mandatory requirements acceptable to the Court is not limited and has 
expanded in the years since Cassis to include working conditions, protection of local 
or regional culture, protection of biodiversity and the exercise of fundamental rights. 
However, mandatory requirements can only be used to justify obstacles to the free 
movement of goods if they apply on a non-discriminatory basis to domestic and 
imported products. 
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Brexit and Free Movement of Goods 
 
The effect of EU free movement of goods in the UK has been to ensure that all 
products legally manufactured in other EU states, or legally imported into the EU and 
meeting EU requirements, may be sold in the UK. No tariffs are applied and non-
tariff barriers – the technical standards which can vary between national industries – 
are managed through EU harmonisation and regulation. This open trading 
environment for manufactured goods has had a significant and positive impact on 
UK trade, although it should be said that, among the larger EU Member States, the 
UK has a low level of economic reliance on manufacturing and is therefore less 
vulnerable to changes in product markets than other major EU states such as 
Germany, Italy and France. The Cassis ruling and the market liberalisation facilitated 
by the Single European Act (1986) served to erode many non-tariff barriers to trade 
in manufactured goods between EU states. 
 
The practical impact of the harmonisation of technical standards can be seen across 
the UK economy, but perhaps most clearly in the automotive industry. The 
interconnected nature of the European economy, modern transport and supply 
logistics allows the automotive sector in the UK to exploit the economies of scale 
now available across the EU single market. In the years prior to the completion of the 
single market, the UK automotive industry had been in something of a crisis – 
production was in decline and the industry was riven by industrial relations problems. 
 
International car manufacturers, particularly Japanese firms such as Nissan, were 
encouraged after the Single European Act to see the UK as an ideal base within 
Europe for manufacturing operations. The UK offered a skilled workforce, good 
transport links and tariff- and customs-free access to the European market. The 
Japanese firms have been followed by German firms such as BMW, manufacturing 
the new Mini in the UK. The customs union and single market allow access to the 
entire EU market from a UK base without any tariff cost within the EU. 
 
The contemporary automotive manufacturing process involves the transit of parts 
between several EU states in the process of manufacture. A good example of this 
cross-border process is the travels of a BMW Mini crankshaft between France, the 
UK and Germany, before final assembly in the UK. Car manufacturing logistics 
systems run to very tight schedules – in some instances, parts are scheduled to 
arrive for assembly as little as 15 minutes prior to being required. Any disruption to 
this free flow of parts and manufactures into and out of the UK will impact on the 
industry. The supply lines of manufacturers in the UK, highly integrated with the EU, 
depend upon the ‘frictionless’ movement of goods across borders as illustrated by 
the Mini crankshaft. 
 
Negotiation of a post-Brexit free trade deal is likely to focus on avoiding tariff 
barriers, but more difficult and complex are the non-tariff barriers. Continued export 
into the EU without tariffs may be possible, but this will require continued cooperation 
on the elimination of non-tariff barriers, the harmonisation of legislation and 
standards to enable UK manufactures to be accepted in the EU. In addition, the 
customs union is an essential aspect of the current logistic system – any delays or 
blockages in the system due to customs checks will jeopardise finely balanced 
delivery and manufacturing schedules. 
 
The UK government’s legislative mechanism for leaving the EU, the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill, envisages the transfer of existing EU standards into UK law post-
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Brexit. Difficulties will arise should the UK in future either fail to remain compliant 
with EU regulations or diverge from those regulations, as following them will be a 
requirement if the UK wishes to continue trading into the single market. Any political 
pressure to ‘free’ UK industry from EU standards or to remove from the UK statute 
book the imported EU regulations would create problems. 
 
Manufacturers would not wish to make the same product to two different standards. 
This is the key to non-tariff barriers. On Day One after the UK leaves the EU, all of 
the existing EU standards will remain in play, but should parliament begin tinkering 
with the inheritance of EU law, or fail to ensure UK law remains harmonised with EU 
law, then difficulty will arise. It must be said that around 80% of EU product 
standards are voluntary, adopted by manufacturers in order to standardise across 
the single market. 
 
The UK government interpreted the referendum result on 23 June 2016 as a 
mandate to negotiate Britain’s exit from the EU, including the single market and the 
customs union. The government has indicated that it wishes to negotiate a free trade 
agreement with the EU to replace single market membership. In respect of free 
movement of goods, such a negotiation would imply reaching agreement across all 
of the product sectors presently covered by the single market. 
 
Should the UK government fail to reach a comprehensive free trade agreement with 
the EU by March 2019, then two possibilities arise. First, the UK and EU agree an 
interim deal to operate until a complete deal is agreed. Such an interim deal may 
require the UK to retain present commitments to free movement of goods. The 
second possibility is that there is no comprehensive agreement and the UK leaves 
the EU without a free trade deal in place. In this circumstance, the EU and the UK 
would have to reach agreement under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. Under 
the WTO’s most favoured nation principle (MFN principle), all members are obliged 
to offer the same terms of trade to all others. Applying the MFN principle to the 
automotive industry would mean that UK automotive exports to the EU would face 
the standard EU automotive tariff for third party states, currently 10%. 
 
The most likely outcome is that the EU and the UK are able to reach a partial free 
trade agreement on manufactures and some agreement on customs. Any deal on 
customs will have to take account of harmonised standards. That is to say that the 
current EU standards applying to manufactured goods, and which apply in the UK, 
will have to prevail after Brexit in order for UK exports to be permitted access to EU 
markets. This may be partially addressed through the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, which 
proposes transposing current EU law in to UK law, thus preserving the current 
harmonisation of standards. 
 
However, any such agreement will have to provide for the updating of standards, the 
UK accepting changes in EU standards and ensuring UK manufactures are 
compliant. More complex will be the status of goods imported into the UK post-Brexit 
from third party states, such as India, Brazil and the USA. The EU will require 
assurances that these products comply with EU standards and may demand 
customs checks on origin to be introduced. The EU will seek to protect any trade 
deal with, for example, Brazil, against the possibility of a deal between the UK and 
Brazil which undercuts or diverges from the EU deal. 
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Conclusion 
 
The high profile of and importance attached to manufacturing has led to considerable 
speculation on the post-Brexit position of UK manufacturing. It is probable that a deal 
with the EU on manufactured goods will be done. More complex will be the customs 
arrangements to protect supply chains and prevent the emergence of non-tariff 
barriers. Free movement of goods as it has operated in the UK during EU 
membership will no longer be possible, but something very similar may emerge. The 
short term needs of the manufacturing sector, in particular high-profile sectors such 
as automotive and aerospace, will most probably be met by the UK-EU deal. In the 
medium to long term, a complex series of agreements will be required in order to 
manage non-tariff barriers and to ensure that the UK is able to trade freely both with 
the EU and with third party states. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Free Movement of Services and 
Freedom of Establishment 
 
Justin Borg-Barthet  University of Aberdeen 
 
The internal market consists of four economic freedoms (free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital). This chapter considers the free movement of 
services, as well as the freedom of natural and legal persons to establish themselves 
in the territory of other Member States. It provides a brief overview of the general 
structure of EU law and its effects on the legal systems of the United Kingdom, as 
well as considering possible models which may be used to address the regulation of 
these aspects of the law in post-Brexit UK-EU relations. 
 
Freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment are often regulated in 
tandem, since service providers may seek to establish a permanent presence in the 
Member State in which the service is provided. Establishment of an economic 
presence is contingent on being granted access to the services market. 
Consequently, there is significant overlap in the law and literature concerning these 
two freedoms, and this is likely to be reflected in negotiations concerning future UK-
EU relations. 
 
While EU law has had significant effects on the substantive law of the United 
Kingdom, this is not as pervasive as in the context of the free movement of goods, 
where product requirements are often standardised (see the Free Movement of 
Goods chapter). Regulation of services and establishment is especially evident in 
the financial services sector, where the laws of the UK have been amended to 
conform to harmonised standards, particularly concerning transparency and 
safeguards against abuse. Similarly, in the context of freedom of establishment, 
minimum standards have been introduced in company law, for example, in order to 
ensure that creditors and other stakeholders are able to extend credit and contract 
on a cross-border basis with confidence, to safeguard employee participation in 
certain companies, to protect shareholder rights, and to facilitate and regulate 
corporate reorganisations. 
 
These substantive changes are important and have had a transformative effect in 
some areas of legal practice, but perhaps the most significant change is to rules 
concerning the recognition of ‘foreign’ legal acts. The basic rule, as in all 
fundamental freedoms, is that that which is lawful in one Member State must be 
recognised as lawful in every other Member State, subject only to limited restrictions 
in the public interest. Accordingly, EU law requires the UK to recognise, for example, 
a company established under the laws of another Member State, or qualifications 
granted by institutions in other Member States. Equally, other member states are 
required to recognise that which is lawful in the UK, thereby facilitating the 
establishment of the United Kingdom as a jurisdiction of choice for corporate and 
financial services. 
 
Brexit negotiations concerning freedom to provide services and freedom of 
establishment will therefore need to address both the substantive regulation of these 
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sectors, and the extent to which UK legal acts will be recognised in the European 
Union, and vice versa.  
 
Free Movement of Services 
 
Article 56 TFEU provides that restrictions to freedom to provide services shall be 
prohibited within the European Union. This enables undertakings in the United 
Kingdom to provide services in other Member States of the European Union, and 
businesses and persons in the UK to receive services from other Member States. 
Article 56 TFEU is mirrored in the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, as 
well as, albeit limitedly, ad hoc agreements with Switzerland. Consequently, the 
freedom presently regulates the relationship between the UK, the 27 other members 
of the EU, as well as Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and, to an extent, Switzerland. 
 
Services account for two-thirds of the EU economy, with non-financial services alone 
accounting for 32% of all UK exports. Accordingly, the treatment of trade in services 
will be an important aspect of the negotiations concerning future trade arrangements 
between the UK and the EU. Unlike trade in goods, international trade in services is 
not especially encumbered by tariffs. This does not mean, however, that trade is 
unrestricted. Restrictions to cross-border trade in services are usually of a technical 
nature. These include, in particular, rules which restrict cross-border services 
outright, or which do so as a consequence of divergent standards. 
 
In order to address these barriers, the EU legislator has adopted common standards 
through positive harmonisation measures, while the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has delivered a number of judgments that curtail the ability of Member 
States to adopt restrictions which are unjustified in internal market law. The main 
legislative instrument is the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) which governs 
services generally. The Services Directive requires Member States to abolish 
restrictions and discriminatory practices. It also provides protections for consumers 
and other recipients of services. The net effect of the legislation and case law is a 
presumption that market access should not be curtailed, save if justified by the 
Gebhard test. 
 
The Services Directive does not address all services, but excludes sectors which 
required specific attention. There are therefore some specialised instruments 
addressing, for example, insurance and financial services. Other sectors, such as 
cross-border gambling, have not been regulated through common legislation as 
agreement was not forthcoming. There are, however, judgments of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, such as Liga Portuguesa, which outline the extent to 
which restrictions may be justified in the internal market. 
 
Posted Workers 
 
The provision of services on a cross-border basis results in the intermixing of 
national labour markets. Questions arise, then, as to which Member State is 
empowered to regulate employment relations for staff whose permanent employment 
base is outwith the state in which they are providing services from time to time. EU 
law has resolved many relevant questions through the Posted Workers Directive 
(96/71/EC), as well as a series of judgments of the CJEU, including that in Viking. 
 
Post-Brexit, however, it is not clear how posted workers will be treated as between 
the EU and the UK. The difficulty is partly attributable to the fact that, as a 
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consequence of the evolution of citizens’ rights, the free movement of persons is 
subject to similar principles in EU law whether the freedom is exercised only for 
short-term provision of services or for more long-term employment. The matter is 
further complicated by the political import of freedom of movement of natural persons 
in the UK. 
 
Freedom of Establishment 
 
Article 49 TFEU provides that obstacles to freedom of establishment shall be 
prohibited within the European Union. Freedom of establishment includes ‘the right 
to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage 
undertakings’. Essentially, then, it means that the self-employed and legal persons 
are also entitled to establish an economic presence in Member States other than that 
of their nationality. 
 
Free Movement of Legal Persons 
 
Companies and other legal persons established under the laws of any Member State 
of the EU must be recognised in other Member States. They may also, under certain 
conditions, merge with entities from other states, and thus reorganise their corporate 
architecture. Furthermore, legal persons established under the laws of one state may 
be transformed into entities organised under the laws of another member state. This 
allows a degree of flexibility in corporate organisation. 
 
At present, the UK is the primary jurisdiction of choice of company law in the EU. 
This may be affected by Brexit in that – absenting EU law obligations – some 
Member States may choose not to recognise a company established under UK 
company law, if they take the view that these companies should be organised under 
their own laws. This may occur where a company’s headquarters is physically 
located in another Member State but is governed by UK laws for reasons of 
efficiency or convenience. 
 
Possible Models for Future UK-EU Trade Relations 
 
International trade agreements between the EU and third countries include a number 
of potential models for an agreement concerning trade in services and 
establishment. To varying degrees, they use three main tools – namely, mutual 
recognition, negative integration and the adoption of common standards. 
 
Common standards are deployed in the EEA Agreement because the internal market 
extends to EEA states. There is no overt requirement to adopt EU law in other trade 
agreements, although the Swiss legislator employs a system of so-called ‘voluntary’ 
compliance with EU law in order to facilitate the close cooperation between 
Switzerland and the EU. The United Kingdom presently adheres to those common 
standards as a member of both the EU and EEA. The interpretation of agreed 
standards is entrusted primarily to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
EFTA Court is then required to interpret EEA law in accordance with the authoritative 
interpretation of EU law provided by the CJEU. UK government policy excludes 
membership of the EU or EEA, but it may be possible to adopt a principle of 
voluntary compliance, as is the case in Switzerland. This would establish an 
unenforceable obligation to adopt legislation which mirrors developments in EU law, 
thereby ensuring equal standards to facilitate mutual recognition and market access. 
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In the absence of common standards, mutual recognition is less easily attained. This 
is because, without agreement to adopt common minimum regulatory protections, it 
is far harder to presume that foreign standards are acceptable. Accordingly, the EU 
agreements with Canada and South Korea, for example, provide for the 
development of a future framework for mutual recognition, but do not include a 
default assumption that mutual recognition is part of the agreement. 
 
Equally, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) agreement, does not presently include a presumption of mutual 
recognition, but provides a framework for further negotiation on the matter. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, mutual recognition would be relatively unproblematic 
from a legal perspective for as long as common standards are retained. Politically, 
however, it may be more difficult to secure mutual recognition without firm 
commitments to retain those common standards in future by having the laws of the 
United Kingdom shadow legal developments in the European Union. 
 
In addition to the identification of suitable future long-term arrangements, UK-EU 
negotiations will likely account for transitional measures. By way of example, 
companies established under the laws of the United Kingdom are currently required 
to be recognised throughout the European Union. These UK companies may, in 
reality, be British only in that they are formally established under the UK Companies 
Act 2006. In the absence of EU law, other Member States would not be required to 
recognise these companies since their residual private international law rules might 
provide that they should be established under laws with which they have a closer 
connection. It is arguable, however, that legitimate expectations have been 
established which would require the continued safeguarding of acquired rights in 
future. Negotiators will have to consider whether – and, if so, how – existing rights, 
lawfully acquired while the UK was a member of the EU, could be retained post-
Brexit. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Competition Law and Policy 
 
Arianna Andreangeli  University of Edinburgh 
 
Siobhan Kahmann  Covington & Burling LLP 
 
Introduction 
 
The UK’s June 2016 referendum to leave the EU is expected to have material 
consequences for national competition law. The exact shape the UK competition 
regime will take is subject to various factors – which will likely be clarified both before 
and after the UK’s exit, currently scheduled for the end of March 2019. 
 
Competition law concerns intervention in a market where there is ‘market failure’: 
either through the action of a monopolist, an anti-competitive agreement, or through 
a merger. The purpose of competition laws is to protect competition and to deal with 
market imperfections arising in a free market economy (e.g. where firms collude to 
keep prices artificially low or high). 
 
According to the European Commission, the goal of competition law is ‘to protect 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.’ In order for the EU to maintain a 
functioning single market, it was seen as necessary to introduce a number of 
provisions in the field of competition law in the original Treaty of Rome and in 
subsequent treaties. The main provisions can be found in Article 101 TFEU and 
Article 102 TFEU. Article 101 prohibits restrictive agreements between undertakings, 
while Article 102 prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position held within a substantial part of the internal market, in so far as it may affect 
trade between Member States. 
 
There are also rules prohibiting state aid (Article 106 TFEU) and rules which control 
mergers of undertakings (Regulation 139/2004). The primary UK domestic 
competition law rules are the Competition Act 1998, Chapter 1 and 2 prohibitions, 
modelled directly on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and with a requirement under s60 of 
the act for them to be interpreted consistently with EU jurisprudence on Articles 101 
and 102. 
 
Articles 101 and 102 both apply to ‘undertakings’, which the Court of Justice has 
defined in Case C-41/90 Höfner broadly as encompassing ‘every entity engaged in 
an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which 
it is financed.’ Entities include natural persons, legal persons and even states. To fall 
within the scope of Articles 101 and 102, agreements or conduct by undertakings 
must have a minimum level of cross-border effects on trade between Member 
States. The Court clarified in Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax that this means that it 
must be possible to foresee with a ‘sufficient degree of probability, …, that [such 
agreements or conduct] have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on 
the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way as to cause concern that 
they might hinder the attainment of a single market between Member States.’ 
 
There are a number of exclusions from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which can be 
found in certain Treaty provisions (e.g. Article 346(1)(b) TFEU), the case law of the 
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Court (see Case C-67/96 Albany, where it was held that collective agreements 
between trade unions and employers were not subject to competition rules) or EU 
regulations. The case law of the Court has played a hugely significant role in putting 
flesh on the bones of Articles 101 and 102. Most widely known is perhaps the case 
against Microsoft which resulted in record fines being imposed. 
 
Competition law is currently regulated and enforced at both EU and national Member 
State level by a network of competition authorities (European Competition Network – 
ECN), comprised of the European Commission and the national competition 
authorities (NCAs) of the Member States (in the UK, this is the Competition and 
Markets Authority – CMA), as well as by private litigants through civil courts. The 
choice of which regulator (UK or EU) takes ownership of a case is usually dependent 
on the size of a transaction and the relevant Member States with turnover for 
mergers (i.e. corporate acquisitions), and where the effects of certain anti-
competitive behaviour will be felt. For the latter, examples include cartels (i.e. anti-
competitive arrangements between competitors), abuse of dominance (i.e. an 
undertaking with significant market power taking advantage of competitors on the 
market, to the detriment of consumers), and the regulation of illegal state aid (i.e. a 
form of government subsidies which have not been given approval, and which are 
anti-competitive). 
 
Much of UK competition is harmonised with EU competition law: The UK’s CMA is 
currently subject to the ‘governing principle’ under UK competition law, according to 
which it must follow EU level competition decisions and precedent for anti-
competitive agreements, and abuse of dominance. The European Commission 
similarly holds enforcement jurisdiction in the UK, including its power of pre-emption, 
which allows it to adopt a case over the CMA under Regulation 1/2003 – the 
Modernisation Regulation, which aims to attain greater competition convergence at 
national level. The CMA is also part of the European Competition Network, through 
which it benefits from integrated cooperation with other EU competition regulators, 
including the exchange of information, re-allocation of cases, and coordination of 
dawn-raids. The review of EU level mergers is currently subject to the one-stop-shop 
filing mechanism with DG Competition under the EU Merger Regulation. 
 
The CMA has therefore benefitted from invaluable guidance from the EU, and in 
particular DG Competition, which has been dealing directly with resource intensive 
cases, such as the recent EU Google abuse infringement decision (and record fine) 
which took over seven years to conclude. For cartels, DG Competition has taken the 
lead on investigating pan-European anti-competitive arrangements, raiding and 
otherwise manning large-scale cartel cases, and ultimately imposing infringement 
decisions and significant fines. 
 
From a merger control perspective, the EU Merger Regulation imposes an EU level 
compulsory filing mechanism for mergers when the EU thresholds are met – 
providing a streamlined procedure for both merging parties, and in doing so has 
taken the bigger and more complex cases off the desks of the CMA. Regarding state 
aid, Europe has fully-fledged state aid review mechanisms in place at an EU level, 
and DG Competition has been actively investigating multinational corporations – like 
Starbucks in the UK – benefitting from selective tax advantages, ultimately 
demanding significant sums to be repaid. 
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Brexit: What Are the Immediate Consequences? 
 
From a practical perspective, if the UK leaves the single market (a ‘hard’ Brexit), it 
will be imperative that cut-off dates are agreed and established as regards the 
ownership of a case by DG Competition or the CMA. Ownership might depend on 
which competition regulator initiated the investigation or merger proceedings, or 
whether the relevant behaviour occurred pre- or post-Brexit, or straddled Brexit Day. 
While important to allow merging parties to know where to notify their merger, clarity 
is also vital for longer-standing investigations. Workable mechanisms will also be 
needed for leniency applications and the monitoring of behavioural commitments. 
Concerning merger control, it will be particularly important to determine the 
ownership of cases that are mid-review at the time that Brexit takes effect. 
 
Looking to the established guidance provided by the EU Competition Block 
Exemptions and Guidelines, which essentially provide legal ‘safe harbours’ for 
companies to self-assess strictly defined arrangements in distribution, R&D and 
Tech – a practical solution could be to retain the same rules under UK law for now. 
This should provide companies with legal certainty that their EU-compliant 
agreements will continue to be UK-compliant. Further, an agreement on parties’ 
rights of appeal, and the appropriately recognised court for the case – whether a 
European or UK court – will also need to be hammered out to protect parties’ 
procedural entitlements and legal certainty. 
 
It is likely that the CMA will initially suffer from a significantly increased workload, and 
as a result will swiftly need to increase staff numbers significantly, and potentially 
even streamline its decision-making processes to make efficiency gains. The CMA 
will need to ensure that the merger control directorate is sufficiently manned with 
experienced staff to deal with the expected immediate upsurge in merger 
notifications (including more complex and larger deals) while retaining enough staff 
in the enforcement directorate to sufficiently investigate and punish behavioural 
infringements. 
 
If the CMA is no longer part of the European Competition Network, then it will also 
lose access to EU-wide information sharing mechanisms. The ECN is a significant 
strength of the EU competition regime, and will represent loss both regarding co-
ordination of cases and intelligence (unless another co-operative solution is agreed). 
A ‘hard’ Brexit will also have an impact on solicitors involved in competition law 
cases. Undertakings must continue to be assured of their lawyers’ cross-
jurisdictional legal professional privilege, which could negatively affect UK-qualified 
lawyers post-Brexit, since they may not be recognised within the EU system. 
 
Finally, there is some danger that dual systems of enforcement could quickly emerge 
across aspects of competition law vis-à-vis the UK and the EU, which would pose a 
problem for businesses active in the UK and Europe, having to comply with differing 
rules and procedures. Similarly, an increased risk of double jeopardy may arise for 
pan EU-UK cartelists, as a result of potentially double investigations and increased 
total fines. 
 
Options for the Future 
 
Going forward, it is likely that we will see further movement towards bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Reaching potential multilateral arrangements 
with groups such as the EU and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian 
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Nations) competition regulators may represent one approach, in addition to bilateral 
deals with other individual leading competition regulators, such as those in the US 
and Australia. 
 
In line with a more streamlined process within the CMA, different procedures and 
rules may develop over time. From a merger control perspective, this could 
realistically involve an increase of the UK merger filing thresholds, to cut down on the 
number of filings made to the CMA, while retaining its voluntary filing system. The 
recently increased de minimis market threshold could also be further raised in a bid 
to exclude further minor cases from the CMA’s ambit. 
 
As for cartels, the above multilateral and bilateral arrangements should ultimately 
aim to reward the CMA with an enlarged form of cooperation between competition 
authorities, ideally incorporating investigations, and the ability to exchange 
information with each other (although it would likely not encapsulate the close-knit 
efficiency of the current ECN model). Cooperation will continue to be important given 
the fact that while EU competition law will not apply in the UK, it will still apply to UK 
companies whose agreements and conduct affect EU markets, and the same is true 
for the application of UK competition law to EU companies. 
 
Looking to the UK’s previous notification and exemption system for certain types of 
agreements between competitors and non-competitors, the CMA may consider 
reintroducing a new and improved voluntary notification system. This could represent 
a potential benefit, given the national regulator’s traditionally strict approach to the 
enforcement of vertical restrictions like resale-price-maintenance – namely, imposing 
a re-sale price to be sold at down the supply chain (which DG Competition has not 
had much involvement with until very recently in the context of the e-Commerce 
Inquiry). 
 
A combination of a purely voluntary notification system, with a reasonable fee per 
notification, would provide parties who wished for confirmation with the possibility of 
obtaining legal certainty in a post-Brexit UK, at a non-prohibitive cost, while ensuring 
the CMA is given the means to fund such a mechanism. In such circumstances, UK 
laws would ideally need to remain either stricter than, or close enough to the position 
in EU competition law, to avoid issues nevertheless being examined by DG 
Competition. 
 
Unattached to EU competition restraints, the CMA could also significantly increase 
its ability to enforce the UK competition regime going forward by unilaterally 
amending the fine calculation mechanisms to increase fines for behavioural 
infringements, and at the same time enhance its criminal cartel regime. Such 
measures could, in turn, result in an extremely deterrent and effective regime. An 
increase in fines (and filing fees) could in turn help the regulator to fund likely needed 
increases in staff levels to deal with the enlarged caseload which it will inevitably 
face. 
 
One potential concern is whether a hard Brexit will encourage the UK to introduce a 
more politicised competition system in the longer term – for instance, where the 
application of the public interest test in merger control may be widened past its 
current ambit. This also brings up the question as to whether the UK would have the 
opportunity to support specific industries by awarding subsidies without checks. 
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Thanks to, among other factors, reliable, efficient courts and relatively generous and 
flexible rules on the discovery of evidence, the UK has also become something of a 
magnet for competition damages claims, with clear benefits for the UK legal services’ 
industry. Instrumental to this degree of success is the possibility for claimants to rely 
on the well-established rules provided by the Brussels Regulation (see the EU 
Private International Law chapter), in respect to both the establishment of 
jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments within the EU. The advantages of the 
current jurisdictional regime are especially visible in respect of multi-defendant cartel 
cases where claimants have been able to ‘concentrate’ a potentially significant 
number of claims before one forum, thereby avoiding parallel proceedings and 
inconsistent adjudication. 
 
Brexit stands to change all of this by making the rules of the Brussels Regulation no 
longer applicable, with clear drawbacks for competition law litigants. Will English 
courts be able, once again, to rely on the forum non conveniens doctrine to decline 
jurisdiction in favour of another court where the same case may be ‘justly tried’? It 
could be argued that returning to this doctrine may be a way for English courts to 
‘regain control’ over the scope of their adjudicatory powers, thereby remaining 
consistent with one of the key tenets of the Brexit campaign. However, it would also 
come at a high cost for litigants and for the UK legal services’ industry. 
 
In respect of the mutual recognition of judgments, it has been suggested that courts 
in other Member States could continue to be ‘willing’ to recognise and enforce UK 
judgments. Nonetheless, it may be foreseen that the ‘simplified’ procedure enshrined 
in the Brussels Regulation would become inapplicable and therefore this issue would 
be governed by the law in force in the Member State where a victorious party seeks 
to enforce these judicial decisions, thus adding complexity, length and costs. 
 
Can the exit from the EU be managed in a way that minimises some of these risks? 
Could the UK parliament, for instance, unilaterally legislate to introduce rules that 
reproduce the status quo? What about ‘old international instruments’ that, up to the 
UK’s accession to the EEC, had allowed for a degree of mutual recognition of 
judgments and of judicial cooperation on jurisdictional matters? It has been 
suggested that agreements such as the Lugano or Rome Conventions could usefully 
be ‘resurrected’, since they had been regulating these issues until the Brussels 
Convention was stipulated. Nonetheless, this outcome appears very uncertain, since 
the EU Court of Justice could take the view that the process leading to the Brussels 
regime, of which these instruments could be regarded as being necessary steps, 
may be a ‘one-way street’. 
 
It is acknowledged that, come the actual withdrawal of the UK from the EU, greater 
clarity should have been achieved as regards this and other issues arising from the 
event. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that until such time as practical 
arrangements are in place, litigants, courts and legal services providers will be 
exposed to significant uncertainty and potentially to a downgrading of their access to 
justice rights. 
 
What Does Brexit Mean for Scotland? 
 
A further aspect that merits a short discussion is what impact the UK’s exit from the 
EU will have for the competence in competition policy that has been conferred to the 
Scottish government through the Scotland Act 2016, as a result of the debate 
engendered by the Smith Commission. According to Section 63 of the act, which 
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amended Section 132(5) of the Enterprise Act 2002, the Scottish ministers enjoy the 
power to ask a member of the UK government to make a reference to the CMA if 
they are either dissatisfied with the CMA’s decision not to make a reference or is 
‘satisfied that the CMA is aware of whatever evidence has led the “appropriate 
Minister” to form a suspicion and is not likely to reach a decision as to whether or not 
to launch a market study (to determine whether a reference is appropriate) within a 
reasonable period of time’. Thus, this power is to be exercised jointly by the 
competent ministers sitting in, respectively, the Scottish and the UK governments. 
 
After Brexit, as the CMA will acquire a far more burdensome case log, due to the 
intervening lack of the European Commission as a ‘central’, EU-wide enforcer and to 
the inability to rely on the existing cooperation framework provided by the ECN, it 
could be legitimately questioned whether making a case for the CMA to investigate a 
‘Scottish case’ may become harder. Further issues are likely to arise in respect of 
merger control. As was illustrated earlier, Brexit could lead to more frequent recourse 
to the ‘public interest exception’, thus allowing UK ministers to intervene in the 
scrutiny of individual transactions. However, this is not an avenue that is open to 
Scottish ministers in respect of concentrations having a projected impact on Scottish 
markets, thus complicating, even more, the already foggy approach to the 
competition policy competence that they enjoy jointly with UK ministers. 
 
The intervening lack of a system for the scrutiny of state aid may also potentially 
jeopardise the effectiveness of devolution – albeit to the admittedly limited degree 
achieved in 2016 – in this area. It will not be possible for the Scottish authorities to 
assess (either directly, due to the limitations of Section 132 of the Enterprise Act, or 
through the intervention of another agency) whether financial intervention by the UK 
government could have anti-competitive effects in Scottish markets. 
 
Further Reading 
 
Ahmed, M and Beaumont, P (2017) ‘Exclusive choice of court agreements: some 
issues on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and its relationship 
with the Brussels I Recast especially anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings 
and the implications of Brexit’, Journal of Private International Law, 13(2), 386-410 
 
Andreangeli, A (2017) ‘The consequences of Brexit for competition litigation: An end 
to a success story?’, European Competition Law Review, 38(5), 226-233 
 
Brexit Competition Law Working Group (BCLWG) 
 
Barnard, C and Peers, S (eds) (2017) European Union Law (2nd Edition, Oxford 
University Press) –Chapters 17 
 
Competition Section Brexit Priorities, Law Society of England and Wales 
 
Kluwer Competition Law Blog 
 
Jones, A and Sufrin, B (2016) EU Competition Law (6th Edition, Oxford University 
Press) 
 
Riley, A (2017) ‘Making the most of an antitrust Brexit’, Competition Law Insight, 
16(5) 
 
Schonberg, M (2017) ‘Continuity or change? State aid control in a post-Brexit United 
Kingdom’, Competition Law Journal, 2017(1), 47-57 
 
Whish, R and Bailey, D (2015) Competition Law (8th Edition, Oxford University 
Press) 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 8 | Free Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship 43 
Chapter 8 
 
Free Movement of Persons and EU 
Citizenship 
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The free movement of persons, along with the free of movement of goods, capital 
and services, comprise the four fundamental freedoms of the EU Single Market. The 
right of free movement began as free movement for workers (Articles 45-48 TFEU), 
self-employed persons (Articles 49-55 TFEU), or providers or receivers of services 
(Articles 56-62 TFEU). This economic core of the right to movement pertains today 
and workers’ rights are supplemented by EU secondary legislation – for instance 
Regulation 492/2011, which guarantees host state nationals and their family 
members the right to enjoy work, working conditions, access to housing and 
education on an equal footing with home state nationals. 
 
The EU has also made significant efforts to create an environment conducive to 
worker mobility, including for instance by coordinating social security schemes 
across the EU (see Regulation 883/2004). The right to free movement for these 
economically active natural persons also applies to nationals of the EEA states 
(Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland). 
 
Since the Maastricht Treaty (1993), all nationals of an EU Member State are also 
European Union citizens (Article 20 TFEU) with rights to move and reside freely in 
the EU subject to the limits laid down by EU law. For those who are not 
‘economically active’, this status appeared to offer them potential for greater 
protection under EU law than they had enjoyed previously. The case law of the 
CJEU has been particularly interesting and, although over time it has adopted a 
generally expansive and ‘rights-enhancing’ interpretation of EU citizenship, it has 
more recently adopted a more restrictive approach, enabling host states to prevent 
non-economically active EU citizens from claiming social benefits (see for instance 
Case C-333/13 Dano). For those who are economically active, the citizenship 
provisions have not added much to their EU rights. 
 
For all EU citizens moving to another Member State, the key piece of legislation 
outlining the scope of rights is, since 2004, Directive 2004/38/EC, also known as the 
‘Citizens’ Rights Directive’ or ‘Free Movement Directive’ (although note that EU 
citizen migrant workers would also receive the additional benefits outlined in 
Regulation 492/2011.) 
 
The Citizens’ Rights Directive sets out that free movement and residence can be 
enjoyed, in effect unconditionally, in another Member State for a period of up to three 
months – the only trade-off being that the host Member State can restrict access to 
state benefits during this time. To enjoy residence in another Member State beyond 
three months, persons must be a national of a Member State (nationality is a matter 
for Member State’s own law), and be either a worker, a self-employed person, an 
economically self-sufficient person (with health insurance cover – this category, for 
example, enables retired people to enjoy free movement), a student (with health 
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insurance cover and sufficient resources to support themselves), or a jobseeker who 
has a genuine chance of being engaged (with some limits to equal treatment in 
terms of access to social assistance until they become employed). Overall, these 
categories demonstrate that rights of free movement and residence are focused 
primarily on those who are economically active or economically self-sufficient. 
 
If an EU citizen meets these qualifying criteria, they enjoy a range of rights including 
rights: to enter, reside, leave; to protect them from expulsion; to work, including the 
coordination of social security; to bring certain family members; to equal treatment 
on the basis of nationality; and, finally, to accrue ‘permanent residence’ status in the 
host Member State after five years of lawful residence. 
 
EU law does permit a Member State to derogate from the treaty freedoms on specific 
grounds – public policy, public security or public health (Article 45(3) TFEU and 
Article 52 TFEU and Chapter VI, Citizen’s Rights Directive). A few specific 
exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality also apply 
– for instance, in relation to access to jobs and professions that require specific 
linguistic capability (Article 3, Regulation 492/2011) or are in the public service 
(Article 45(4) TFEU). However, exceptions to individual’s rights on public policy, 
security and health grounds have been interpreted narrowly by the CJEU. Extensive 
procedural safeguards are provided for parties seeking to assert EU law-derived 
rights and a stricter test applies to the application of derogations in relation to minors, 
those who have a right of permanent residence or those who have ten years’ 
residence. 
 
 
Brexit – What is at Stake? 
 
At the time of writing, the Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK are under 
way but the final terms of Brexit are still unknown. The UK government has indicated 
that taking back control of UK borders and immigration is central to a Brexit deal. It 
has confirmed its intention to exit from the single market which signals the end of 
free movement of persons rights, at least in their current form. 
 
Immigration was undoubtedly the most sensitive issue in the period leading up to the 
referendum and it remains so following the vote to leave. For some, leaving the EU 
and the single market (of which free movement of persons is a central plank) is the 
only way to ‘take back control’ of the UK’s borders. Migrant EU citizens, are accused 
of being ‘welfare tourists’, putting the UK’s benefits system under undue pressure, 
and at the same time are blamed for taking up jobs and undercutting national wage 
rates. However, research suggests otherwise. Evidence indicates that the principal 
driver for migration of EU citizens to the UK is work. 
 
Research on the impact of EU immigration to the UK has detected no negative 
effects on the average wages of UK-born workers and in fact shows that EU 
immigrants have contributed positively to the UK’s fiscal budget – putting in more by 
way of taxes than they receive in benefits. This is perhaps not surprising given that, 
on average, incoming EU citizens are younger, more likely to be in work and less 
likely to be on benefits than UK citizens. The UK government’s position looks rather 
odd in light of this research. It announced in July 2017 that it was commissioning the 
independent Migration Advisory Committee to carry out a detailed analysis of the 
economic and social contributions and costs of EU citizens in the UK. Quite how it 
will react to the findings is unclear. 
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What is undisputed is that EU law is currently a hugely important source of rights for 
significant numbers of people – enabling them to carry on their lives in a particular 
way. There are an estimated three million EU nationals living in the UK. And of 
course, free movement rights are not limited to EU citizens living in the UK. It is 
thought that there are over one million UK nationals living in other EU Member 
States, based on EU law. 
 
It is perhaps no surprise then that the question of what happens to UK citizens in the 
EU and EU citizens in UK after Brexit, is a matter of absolute priority for both sides 
as withdrawal negotiations begin. The need to avoid disruption in people’s lives as 
EU law disappears as a direct source of rights in the UK on Brexit day is paramount 
– and the UK government will also be acutely aware that data on the economy 
shows, that without inward EU migration, the UK may face labour shortages – 
certainly within sectors of the economy with a large presence of EU migrant workers. 
 
With this in mind, it had been suggested that, in implementing a new scheme for 
immigration of EU/EEA citizens into the UK, the UK government should enable free 
movement rights to continue in a limited way – such as only to those who already 
have secured jobs. While we see no hint that this is the preferred approach of the UK 
government at the time of writing, we do see an expressed desire to give the rights 
of EU citizens and their families, who are exercising EU rights at the time of a 
specified Brexit cut-off date, a special status in UK law.  
 
The devil will most certainly be in the detail. As has been shown above, the free 
movement of persons framework includes far more than simply the right to reside 
and work. It covers entitlements to benefits and pensions, rights of access to public 
services, rights to run a business, as well as the ability to be joined by family 
members and extended family members (including family members who are not 
themselves EU citizens), and it includes the ability to accrue or acquire rights – 
ultimately the right of ‘permanent residence’ following a period of five years’ lawful 
residence. 
 
It will need to be addressed whether such accrual of rights will still be possible for EU 
citizens who are resident in the UK at an agreed cut-off date and, whether their 
family members may also continue to accrue their rights, including the children and 
future children of EU citizens.  It will also be important – but extremely challenging - 
to devise a system that enables people who will have rights ‘on paper’ to be able to 
effectively access them.  
 
 
Negotiating Positions of the UK and EU 
 
The European Council announced that the first priority of the negotiations would be 
to agree guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived from EU law of EU 
citizens and their families affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the Union. The EU’s 
position was published in a position paper on 12 June 2017 and the UK’s position 
was published in response on 26 June 2017. The stated objective of the UK 
Government’s position is ‘to ensure continuity in the immigration status of EU 
citizens and their family members resident in the UK before [the UK’s] departure 
from the EU (including their ability to access benefits and services)’ (Para 15). The 
details of whatever will replace EU free movement law will be laid out in due course 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 8 | Free Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship 46 
in an Immigration Bill, one of a whole raft of UK legislation anticipated to deal with 
Brexit. 
 
At the time of writing, as negotiations are beginning, there is some distance between 
the first stated positions of the EU and the UK. Both sides emphasise the need for a 
‘reciprocal’ deal, so that whatever guarantees are put in place to secure the rights of 
EU citizens resident in the UK, equivalent guarantees are in place for UK nationals in 
the EU. 
 
The EU insists on the automatic and same level of protection, as set out in EU law at 
the date of withdrawal, of EU27 citizens in the UK and of UK nationals in EU27, 
including the right to change status and to accumulate periods leading to rights 
pursuant to Union law during the period of protection of the withdrawal agreement. 
For instance, a student can still become an ‘EU worker’ after completing their studies 
without having to comply with domestic immigration rules applicable to third-country 
nationals; and a person who has resided legally in the UK for less than five years by 
the date of the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement can continue to 
accumulate the necessary five years’ residence, giving access to permanent 
residence rights. 
 
The UK’s position is less generous. It promises to create new rights in UK law for 
qualifying EU citizens resident in the country on a cut-off date (which would be 
subject to discussion, but no earlier than the triggering of Article 50 TEU and no later 
than Brexit Day (currently anticipated as 29 March 2019). Therefore, from that date, 
the right of EU citizens to live, work and continue to enjoy economic and other rights 
in the UK would not be automatic. Instead, an application – promised to be ‘user-
friendly and streamlined’ – would have to be made to the Home Office to attain 
‘settled status’, which would grant its beneficiaries rights (to work, benefits, pensions, 
healthcare) that are identical to those of UK nationals. 
 
Settled status would be open to any EU citizen who has been living in the UK for five 
years at the time of the cut-off date, and EU citizens with fewer than five years 
residence on that date will be given time (how long is unclear) to stay until they have 
the five years of residence to obtain settled status. Although not mentioned, for those 
who do not or cannot acquire settled status, they will presumably be deemed to be in 
the UK illegally and therefore subject to rules on deportation and removal.   
 
According to the current UK position, EU citizens would be deprived of their right to 
bring future family members in the UK under the conditions that they enjoy currently. 
This is a significant change in their position, as rules imposing income tests and 
language requirements as per current UK immigration law would apply. 
 
Another significant clash relates to the appropriate framework of legal enforcement, 
with Brussels insisting that the rights be upheld by the EU Court, while the UK 
position insists that ‘those rights will be enforceable in the UK legal system and will 
provide legal guarantees for these EU citizens…. [t]he Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) will not have jurisdiction in the UK.’ This matter is a political 
hot potato but will need to be resolved, mindful of the need to ensure reciprocity of 
rights and clear avenues of access to justice. 
 
As the status of EU citizens in the UK is one of the issues on which ‘sufficient 
progress’ must be made for Brexit negotiations to proceed to the next phase, more 
clarity and compromise should be expected to emerge before too long. What seems 
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to be emerging is the direction of travel the UK intends to take, which includes 
ending the more generous rights-based regime and bringing EU citizens and their 
family members within the much more restrictive, permission-based immigration 
regime. 
 
Scotland 
 
Immigration is currently a matter reserved to Westminster in the devolution 
settlement, and therefore, formally, Edinburgh would not have legal authority in 
relation to the entry and residence rights of EU citizens into the UK post-Brexit. The 
picture is more nuanced when one considers that devolved powers exist in relation 
to matters that will affect the lives of most EU citizens resident in Scotland 
(education, healthcare), and when one considers the particular importance of EU 
free movement to sectors of the Scottish economy and the demographic challenge of 
a declining population facing parts of Scotland. 
 
The House of Lords July 2017 Report on Brexit and Devolution acknowledged that 
‘views on EU migration vary widely across the UK, and the reliance upon EU 
workers, both to satisfy the needs of the labour market and to cope with 
demographic change, is particularly acute in the devolved nations.’ Against this 
backdrop, the report notes the precedents for differentiated arrangements within the 
UK in this field and calls on the UK government, in bringing forward its forthcoming 
Immigration Bill, to ‘look for opportunities to enhance the role of the devolved 
institutions in managing EU migration. Local and regional economic and 
demographic needs, rather than central targets, should drive decision-making.’ While 
a wholesale conferral of powers upon devolved administrations to manage their own 
immigration policies post-Brexit is not envisaged (at least by the UK government), 
there are a growing number of voices pushing for differentiated arrangements to be 
established. It is just too early to predict what will happen here. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the earliest days of the UK’s membership of the EEC, the impact of EU law on 
the UK’s system of equality law has been considerable. Equality and non-
discrimination are fundamental principles of EU law and have been acknowledged as 
such by decisions of the CJEU (e.g. Case 13/94 P v S and Cornwall County 
Council). The UK’s lack of a written constitutional guarantee of equality means that 
its realisation depends on a system of rights provided by primary and secondary 
domestic legislation. The EU has played an important role in this context by 
‘protecting equality rights against erosion and in pushing forward expansion’ 
(Fredman et al 2016, Para 8). 
 
The UK’s obligations arising through its EU membership have compelled the 
government of the day to implement directives by way of domestic law and to take 
account of decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The CJEU’s 
jurisprudence has become part of UK law and has had a profound effect in this 
context (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena). In addition, the EU’s social and 
economic agendas have helped to ensure that changing equality concerns are 
acknowledged and acted on through accompanying policy and soft law measures in 
related areas such as childcare and the challenges of caring for an aging population. 
 
Given this book’s focus on Scotland, it should be noted that ‘Equal opportunities’, 
and therefore equality law, with some limited exceptions, is essentially reserved. The 
key European rights are therefore implemented almost exclusively through UK legal 
sources, and in particular the Equality Act 2010 (EA). For a detailed discussion of the 
exceptions and scope for the future development of a distinctive Scottish approach 
to equality law, see Muriel Robison’s SULNE Position Paper. 
 
Development and Provision of EU Equality Law 
 
The EU’s founding treaties contain equality guarantees, now incorporated in the 
amended and consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU), which sets out the 
aims and objectives of the EU as being ‘founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights......[which] are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men prevail’ (Article 2 TEU). 
 
The consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains 
a number of articles relevant to equality and non-discrimination, in particular Article 
18 (nationality), Article 19 (equal treatment), Article 45 (free movement of workers) 
and Article 157 (equal pay). 
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Gender Equality 
 
One of the most important articles which was included in the founding treaty is Article 
157 TFEU (equal pay), requiring Member States to ensure that the principle of equal 
pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied. 
The inclusion of this provision in the original founding treaty provided the legal base 
for secondary legislation (directives) addressing discrimination in pay and equality of 
treatment between women and men in employment and training. 
 
Between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, there was considerable legislative activity in 
the EU equality context, resulting in the introduction of four major directives on 
gender equality, all of which have been subsequently amended: 
 
 Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC) – requires equal pay between women and 
men 
 Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) – requires equal treatment in 
employment and occupation 
 Directive on Occupational Social Security Schemes (86/378/EEC) 
 Burden of Proof Directive (97/80/EC) – shifts the burden of proof where a 
suspicion or inference of discrimination is raised 
 
These have been consolidated and updated in the Equal Treatment Directive 
(Recast) (2006/54/EC). This Recast Gender Directive is now the key directive setting 
out the requirement for equal treatment between women and men in the employment 
context, and is now implemented in the UK through Parts 2, 5, 9 and 10 of the 
Equality Act 2010. 
 
There are a number of other EU measures relevant to gender equality in particular, 
which have been implemented through other treaty provisions, and which have 
required amendments to domestic law (see the Employment Law chapter): 
 
 Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC) (PWD) – addresses the treatment of 
pregnant women at work (including provisions for maternity leave, breastfeeding, 
time off for ante natal care, risk assessments and the prohibition of dismissal). 
Despite its obvious relationship with gender equality, the PWD was primarily 
enacted as a health and safety measure through Directive 89/391 and (what is 
now) Article 154 TFEU. However, the Recast Directive does make specific 
reference to it. In the UK, the PWD is implemented largely through the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), and related regulations, in particular the 
Maternity and Parental Leave etc Regulations 1999 (MAPLE), the relevant 
regulations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, as well as the EA 
2010 The Parental Leave Directive (originally 94/34/EC, now replaced by 
2010/18/EU) which provides for parental leave on birth or adoption, and for time 
off for family emergencies. This is implemented through the ERA and MAPLE 
 Part-time Workers Directive (97/81/EC) – requires pro rata treatment of part-time 
workers, implemented through the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less 
Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
 Fixed-Term Workers Directive (99/70/EC) – limits the scope of fixed term 
contracts, implemented through the Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention of Less 
Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 
 Temporary Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC) – provides that basic 
working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers should be at 
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least those that would apply if they had been recruited directly to the same job, 
implemented through the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 
 
Other potentially relevant directives are applicable in the employment context (see 
the Employment Law chapter) and include the Young Workers Directive (94/33/EC) 
and the Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC and 2014/67/EU). 
 
Beyond Gender and Nationality 
 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam extended the competence of the EU to deal with 
discrimination beyond gender and nationality. Article 19 TFEU gives the Council the 
power to take action to combat discrimination, which ‘acting unanimously... [with the] 
consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation’. This article provides the legal base for a number of important 
directives, namely: 
 
 Race Directive (2000/43/EC) – covers race discrimination in employment, goods 
and services, housing, education and social protection 
 Framework Directive (2007/78/EC) – covers sexual orientation, disability, age, 
religion and belief discrimination in the employment context 
 Gender Directive 2004/113/EC (covering gender discrimination in the provision of 
goods and services) 
 
These are all now implemented into domestic law through the EA 2010. The Race 
and Recast Gender Directives require the establishment of a body for the promotion 
of equal treatment on grounds of race and sex. This requirement is currently fulfilled 
by the establishment of the Equality and Human Rights Commission under the EA 
2006. 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
The TEU has the effect of incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFR) into the EU’s constitutional law, so that it has binding effect 
and the same status as the TFEU and TEU. The CFR sets out the full range of civil, 
political, economic and social rights of EU citizens and of all persons resident in the 
EU. Although it is part of the EU’s constitutional law, the CFR does not in itself 
guarantee any key rights, but reaffirms those provisions which exist elsewhere in EU 
law and which originate from a range of sources, including ‘the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (CFR Preamble, Para 5). 
 
The CFR’s scope is extremely broad: it contains fifty substantive articles, organised 
into six chapters: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and 
Justice. Each article covers at least one – and many several – rights and freedoms. 
Whilst it incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights, and must be 
interpreted in the same manner (see Article 52(3) CFR), its scope is broader and its 
provisions update the rights contained therein in line with changing social and 
economic circumstances. Furthermore, the CFR contains some additional 
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protections – for example, in the broad area of social rights and, more specifically, in 
relation to non-discrimination (see Article 21 CFR). 
 
With the addition of the CFR to the pre-existing framework of rights and duties, 
equality and the protection of human rights (see the Human Rights Law chapter) 
can be said to constitute primary goals of the EU – see Article 6(1) TEU. 
 
Impact of EU Law on UK Equality Law 
 
It is evident from the wide scope and specific provision of EU equality law that its 
impact on the UK’s equality and non-discrimination framework has been 
considerable. Alongside its extensive application in the employment field (see the 
Employment Law chapter), EU equality law has impacted on the provision of goods 
and services, housing, education and associated areas of social protection. The 
underpinning guarantee of equality provided by EU law’s application in these areas 
has provided an effective substitute for the written constitutional provision of other 
jurisdictions. As Fredman et al have stated (at Para 8):  
 
The absence of a codified constitution in the UK means that a constitutional equality 
guarantee is lacking. Instead, anti-discrimination and equality law in the UK has 
developed on a statutory basis culminating in the EA 2010. Throughout this 
development, EU law has played a powerful role in protecting equality rights against 
erosion and in pushing forward expansion. 
 
As well as the expansion of the UK’s statutory framework through the 
implementation of EU directives, EU membership has enabled UK citizens to claim 
rights available under EU law which have not been adequately implemented in 
domestic law through the principle of direct effect (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v 
Sabena). Furthermore, the ability of courts and tribunals in the UK to refer cases to 
the CJEU for preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU law under Article 267 
TFEU has been used to clarify and extend equality laws in the UK. 
 
Examples include the removal of the upper limit for compensation for discrimination 
(Case C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton Health Authority), the broadening of the 
scope of sex discrimination to include transgender people (Case C-13/94 P v. S and 
Cornwall County Council), and the introduction of discrimination by association into 
UK law (Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law) – now covered by the definition of 
direct discrimination in s. 13, EA 2010. The European Commission’s powers to bring 
infringement proceedings against Member States for non-compliance with EU law 
under Article 258 TFEU has led to direct improvements in UK equality law (e.g. in 
equal pay law, see Case C-61/81 Commission v United Kingdom). 
 
Brexit and UK Equality Law 
 
There is unlikely to be a tidal wave of change in the scope or provision of equality 
law at the time of the UK’s exit from the EU. The protections currently provided by 
the EA 2010 are fairly extensive and, even where such provisions are underpinned 
by EU law, their application on Exit Day is intended to be guaranteed by the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (EUWB) (Clauses 2, 3 and 4). Of course, this by 
no means guarantees the preservation of the scope and level of current protections 
beyond Exit Day and the so-called Henry VIII clauses contained in Clauses 7-9 of 
the EUWB raise particular concerns that EU-derived equality laws contained in 
secondary legislation will be vulnerable to amendment with little or no parliamentary 
scrutiny. 
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The potential risks to equality law are likely to emerge over time and can be 
categorised as arising from two distinct, yet inter-related, areas: current gaps in 
domestic provision and the loss of future developments arising under EU law, each 
of which will be considered below. 
 
Current Gaps in Domestic Provision 
 
The EA 2010 is a self-standing Act of Parliament which is not reliant on the 
European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) and will remain in force following the repeal 
of the ECA and the UK’s departure from the EU. However, the EUWB which 
provides that the ECA ‘is repealed on Exit Day’ (Clause 1) empowers UK ministers to 
repeal or amend primary legislation in order to decouple UK law from EU law 
(Clauses 7, 8 and 9). This could put the provisions of the EA 2010 at risk, in the 
absence of the guarantees currently offered by EU law. Fredman et al (at Para 12) 
have expressed concern about the potential for equality to be undermined once EU 
law is no longer applicable in the UK: 
 
Even without express repeal of the EA 2010, there is a risk of further undermining 
equality through such devices as increasing the number and scope of exceptions, 
loosening justifications for discriminatory behaviour, restricting the scope of equality 
protections, imposing caps on compensation, increasing qualifying periods and 
narrowing the definition of worker. 
 
Even with the enhanced protections provided by EU law, UK equality law contains 
some potential gaps in protection which may be easier to exploit following Brexit. 
Colm O’Cinneide has recently raised concerns about the lack of protection against 
discriminatory legislation offered by the EA 2010: 
 
…the requirements of the 2010 Act do not make anything unlawful which is 
authorised by other primary or secondary legislation. This means that UK anti-
discrimination legislation does not place many obstacles in the way of Parliament or 
ministers choosing to enact discriminatory legislation. Nor does it require existing 
legislation to be interpreted in an equality-friendly manner. 
 
As O’Cinneide points out, this gap in legal protection which has to date been filled by 
the UK’s international human rights obligations, combined with EU equality law, will 
not easily be plugged post-Brexit as ‘the common law has historically provided little 
or no protection against discrimination’. 
 
EU law aside, the UK’s own equality framework does contain some opportunities for 
enhancement, particularly in the context of further devolution. The Public Sector 
Equality Duty (PSED) provided by s. 149 of the EA 2010, which requires public 
authorities to take action to promote equality of opportunity, although largely 
procedural in nature, offers some scope for improvement. For further detail on the 
PSED and Scottish specific duties and Brexit, see Muriel Robison’s SULNE Position 
Paper. 
 
The PSED does not extend to socio-economic inequalities. Although s. 1 of the EA 
2010 provides for a further duty which would have compelled public authorities to 
give due regard in strategic decision-making as to how to exercise their functions in 
a way that reduces socio-economic inequalities, this provision was never enacted by 
the UK government. The Scottish government is currently consulting on how best to 
implement this duty in respect of its devolved functions. 
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Loss of the Future Development of EU Law 
 
It is obviously difficult to identify and measure the effect of potential improvements in 
EU equality law which will be lost to the UK following Brexit. However, two obvious 
channels for future development are the CFR, which is still at a fledgling stage, and 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU, which has already had considerable influence on the 
UK’s equality law framework. 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
The CFR, which remains largely untested due to its relative youth, is likely to be the 
source of further development. In giving evidence to the UK parliament’s Women 
and Equalities Select Committee’s (WESC) inquiry on equality law and Brexit, 
Sandra Fredman (at Para 37) pointed out that the list of personal characteristics 
protected under Chapter 1 of the EA 2010 is limited to nine specified grounds, 
whereas the scope for expanding such protection under the CFR is unrestricted and 
could be extended to include a greater number of grounds – for example, class, 
caste, background and carer status, in line with judicialisation and in response to 
social progression. 
 
However, despite the political assurances that all current protections arising from EU 
law will be preserved at the date of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (see the Repeal 
Bill White Paper, 1.24), Clause 5(4) of the EUWB provides that ‘The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day’. This is of 
concern because, as stated above, the CFR contains rights which go beyond those 
of the ECHR, and includes important protections in evolving areas concerning social 
and workers’ rights. 
 
As well as the potential for a diminution in existing rights, the loss of the CFR will 
contribute to the uncertainty regarding the future protection of equality and human 
rights standards in the UK and their interpretation by the courts, particularly given 
recent discussions about a British Bill of Rights and the removal of European 
jurisprudential influence on British legal institutions. 
 
In Scotland, the devolved nature of human rights means that there is some potential 
for divergence in this context (see the Human Rights Law chapter), particularly 
given the Scottish government’s commitment to fulfil its international obligations. 
However, unlike EU law, international law does not guarantee specific rights, and so 
any resulting development is likely to be weaker in substance and effectiveness than 
that which might emerge by way of the CFR.  
 
Jurisprudence of the CJEU 
 
At the time of writing, it is impossible to predict what the future relationship between 
the CJEU and the domestic courts will be. If the CJEU does not have jurisdiction in 
the UK following the UK’s departure from the EU, individuals in the UK will not be 
able to claim direct effect of EU equality law, courts and tribunals will not be able to 
refer cases to the CJEU for preliminary references or to disapply law found to be 
incompatible with EU law – although it is unlikely that they will be prevented from 
referring to EU case law, given its international status. 
 
One obvious effect of the loss of the CJEU’s direct influence is the potential for the 
erosion of effective and accessible remedies for breaches of equality and human 
rights law, particularly as the Human Rights Act 1998 does not incorporate Article 13 
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ECHR, which requires an effective remedy before a national authority. Fredman et al 
(at Para 12) have identified what they call ‘a crucial need for a statutory principle of 
effective remedies’ to be incorporated into UK law following Brexit. 
 
Referring to the loss of the CJEU’s function as ‘an arbiter of incompatibility with the 
principles of equality’, the WESC Brexit report (at Para 40) called for additional 
action to be taken to preserve the present situation as closely as possible so that the 
government can ‘achieve its objectives of fundamental protection for equality rights’. 
However, in its written submission to the WESC inquiry, the UK government stated: 
 
We are not leaving the European Union only to return to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice….the Equality Act 2010 incorporates relevant existing 
CJEU judgments and Government will continue to monitor such judgments being 
made by the European Court for any implications these may have for the Act until the 
point when EU law ceases to apply. 
 
At the time of writing, the UK government appears to holding on to this ‘red line’ in 
the Brexit negotiations, despite criticisms from academic commentators, a former UK 
judge at the CJEU, and the former head of the Government Legal Department. 
However, it might well be the case that the jurisprudence of the CJEU cannot be 
easily excluded and that the Court’s influence may continue to be felt following 
Brexit, albeit indirectly. As Karen Monaghan QC explained in her evidence to the 
WESC inquiry, at Para 45: 
 
When we do cases here, we typically ask the court to consider cases from Canada or 
South Africa – countries whose legal systems, social norms or broad political 
commitments are fairly similar – because we learn from them. It is likely that there 
would be some drawing on the Court of Justice case law, even if we were not 
formally bound by it, but of course it would not have directly effective impact; it would 
not require our courts to comply with any judgments, but it is likely to inform them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that EU law and policy have had a major influence on the UK’s equality 
framework. The main concerns regarding the UK’s exit from the EU in the current 
context revolve around the potential diminution or reduction in equality protections, 
which will be felt over time, without the guarantee of non-regression (see the 
suggestions for draft equality clauses for overcoming this contained in the WESC 
report), and the continuing influence of the EU’s constitutional provisions and 
jurisprudence of the CJEU. 
 
Despite the fact that the UK has comprehensively implemented all main EU 
provisions in the EA 2010, there is still much at stake and it is impossible to predict 
at this stage how developments will unfold with regard to this important area of law. 
As Colm O’Cinneide puts it: 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that EU law has been the engine that has hauled the 
development of UK anti-discrimination law along in its wake: without its influence, 
British legal standards would be much weaker than they currently are. Post-Brexit, it 
remains to be seen how UK courts will interpret the provisions of the 2010 Act, and 
how they will apply previous precedents which have regularly been decided by 
reference to the requirements of EU law. 
 
 
 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 9 | Equality Law  56 
Further Reading 
 
Busby, N (2016) The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Brexit, SULNE Position 
Paper 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (2017) What does Brexit mean for equality 
and human rights in the UK? 
 
Ford, M (2016) ‘The Impact of Brexit on UK Labour Law’, International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 32(4), 473-495 
 
Fredman, S, Davies, A, Freedland, M, Fudge, J and Campbell, M (2016) The 
Potential Challenges to Equality Law in the UK, Oxford Human Rights Hub 
 
Georghiou, N and Evans, A (2016) Brexit: the impact on equalities and human rights, 
Scottish Parliament SPICe Briefing, No 16/82 
 
Jolly, S (2017) ‘Scared about your human rights after Brexit? You should be’, The 
Guardian, 14 July 
 
McCrudden, C and Prechal, S (2009) The Concepts of Equality and Non-
Discrimination in Europe: A Practical Approach, European Commission  
 
O’Cinneide, C (2016) ‘Equality rights in a post-Brexit United Kingdom’, Bright Blue, 
29 July 
 
Parker, G and Barker, A (2017) ‘UK government concedes transitional role for ECJ 
after Brexit’, Financial Times, 10 July 
 
Robison, M (2016) Equality and Non-Discrimination and Brexit, SULNE Position 
Paper 
 
UK Parliament (2017) Ensuring strong equalities legislation after the EU exit, House 
of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, 2016-2017 HC 799 
 
Wintemute, R (2016) ‘Goodbye EU Anti-Discrimination Law? Hello Repeal of the 
Equality Act 2010?’, King’s Law Journal, 27(3), 387-397 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 10 | Employment Law  57 
Chapter 10 
 
Employment Law 
 
Rebecca Zahn  University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
 
EU-derived employment laws (which together are often referred to as ‘European 
labour law’) cover a patchwork of laws within the UK. Apart from the provisions in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which enable the EU 
institutions to act in order to facilitate the free movement of workers (see Article 45 
TFEU and the Free Movement of Persons chapter), there is limited additional EU 
competence to legislate in employment matters (mainly contained in Article 153 
TFEU). 
 
What Effect Has the EU Had on UK Employment Law? 
 
The ‘European labour law’ which has evolved since the foundation of the European 
Communities is characterised by a variety of common strategies adopted at different 
moments. 
 
The earliest strategy is that which characterised the founding of the European 
Union’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951: 
active labour market policy and labour involvement in regulation. In complete 
contrast, the following period was characterised by a strategy of neo-liberal laissez-
faire, reflected in the almost total absence of social policy and labour law provisions 
in the EEC’s founding treaty (1957). Labour law was initially excluded from EU 
competence on the basis that: 
 
So long as we confine our attention to international differences in the general level of 
costs per unit of labour time, we do not consider it necessary or practicable that 
special measures to ‘harmonise’ social policies or social conditions should precede 
or accompany measures to promote greater freedom of international trade. 
 
Social policy was in essence to remain within the regulatory domain of the nation 
state. As a result, European social policy in the founding Treaty of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was limited to the free movement of workers, equal pay 
and cooperation in the area of social security. The treaty also made provisions for 
cooperation between the EEC and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and it 
was hoped that ILO Conventions could be used to ‘solve certain of the social 
problems connected with closer European economic cooperation’. However, 
effective cooperation between the two organisations has proved to be sporadic. 
Within the EU, any attempts which have been made to introduce a comprehensive 
labour or social policy have been dependent on the effective accommodation of 
political interests. 
 
The accession to the EEC of the UK in 1973 coincided with the beginning of a period 
of unprecedented legislative activity in the EEC under the framework of a Social 
Action Programme. A number of equality directives (equal pay, equal treatment, 
social security) (see the Equality Law chapter) and directives on collective 
dismissals, acquired rights upon transfers of undertakings, and protection of workers 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 10 | Employment Law  58 
in insolvency were mostly approved by the Council of Ministers during the period of 
the UK Labour governments of 1974-1979. Their impact on domestic labour and 
social law has been profound. 
 
Following the election of Margaret Thatcher’s government, the principal EEC 
legislative activity on labour policy was confined to the sphere of health and safety at 
work. Otherwise, EEC legislative activity in the labour field largely halted in the face 
of the UK government’s rejection of almost all proposals from the Commission, and 
their consequent failure to achieve the necessary unanimous approval in the Council 
of Ministers. This abrupt change in policy led the then European Commission 
President, Jacques Delors, to (successfully) search for a non-legislative strategy to 
develop a European social dimension. In addition, the 1992 objective of the 
European Single Market led to pressures for a strategy to achieve a social dimension 
through fundamental social and economic rights. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that particularly following the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the European Commission together with the ‘social 
partners’ (trade unions and employer representatives) through a process called 
‘social dialogue’ (developed in 1985), took advantage of the treaty provisions in 
actively pursuing a social policy in order to adopt a floor of workers’ rights, and 
legislated for measures covering a wide range of equality rights (see the Equality 
Law chapter), some individual employment rights, limited collective rights, and 
comprehensive health and safety rights. A full overview of current UK legislation 
which is derived from EU law is available from the SULNE Position Papers (also see 
the Equality Law chapter). 
 
This period, when the terms ‘social Europe’ and ‘European labour law’ were coined 
and which introduced a wide range of workers’ rights in the UK at a time when a UK 
(Conservative) government was pursuing a deregulatory employment agenda at 
domestic level, is widely regarded as positive for the development and advancement 
of workers’ rights in British labour law. 
 
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have, however, 
been characterised by a period of legislative stagnation in the social policy sphere at 
EU level. Instead of ‘hard law’ (legislation), the Commission turned to a new modus 
operandi for pursuing a ‘social Europe’. Since the turn of the century, the emphasis 
has been on soft law mechanisms through the European Employment Strategy, such 
as framework agreements, joint declarations and guidelines and codes of conduct, in 
order to achieve some sort of harmonisation in the sphere of social policy. A number 
of reasons have been put forward for this shift in preference from hard law to soft law 
mechanisms. The most common reason cited in the academic employment law 
literature is the lack of enthusiasm for social measures within the European 
Commission, which is charged with pursuing a neo-liberal agenda when it comes to 
workers’ rights. 
 
In addition to the legislation, and regardless of the Commission’s preference for 
regulation, EU law is underpinned by general principles which have been used by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to progressively widen the scope 
of protections and rights granted to workers under EU law (see, for example, Case 
C-555/07 Kücükdeveci). Examples of the CJEU’s progressive jurisprudence include 
the case law around the Working Time Directive (such as Case C-155/10 Wiliams), 
which has extended the definition of ‘working time’ and decisions on equal pay, sex 
discrimination or parental leave. The CJEU’s case law can be contrasted with the 
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approach of UK courts, which have tended to give a narrow interpretation of 
employment rights. 
 
EU-derived employment laws are also underpinned by a framework of rules which 
give effect to them. Thus, EU law takes primacy over national law and operates as a 
limitation on parliament’s sovereign powers (see Case 6/64 Costa v Enel and the 
Constitutional Law chapter). Domestic courts must give direct effect to those rights 
which are sufficiently clear (Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena) and have an obligation 
to interpret national law in accordance with EU law (Case C-106/89 Marleasing). 
Infringement proceedings can be brought against the UK government in cases of 
non-compliance with EU law. Finally, EU law provisions (such as Article 19 TEU) 
require Member States to provide effective procedures and remedies for the 
enforcement of employment rights. 
 
Overall, therefore, EU-derived employment laws cover a patchwork of rights in the 
UK. Although it is difficult to predict what would have happened if the UK had never 
joined the EU, it is likely that some of these rights would have been enacted 
regardless of the country’s EU membership and, in some instances, the UK has 
gone further than required under EU law. This is often referred to as ‘gold-plating’. 
Examples include minimum holiday or maternity leave entitlements. In other cases, 
EU rules have introduced rights into UK employment law, such as rules on 
information and consultation within businesses, which sit uneasily with the British 
system of industrial relations and their effect has therefore been limited. 
 
Yet all of this does not negate the largely positive effect that EU membership has 
had on UK employment law. The overall framework created by EU law which 
includes not only positive rights in legislation and case law, but also rights to 
enforcement and effective remedies, constrains government action and creates a 
minimum floor of rights for workers in one of the least-regulated labour markets 
amongst OECD countries. According to the OECD’s employment protection index, 
the UK comes in at 31st out of 34 rich countries. 
 
Brexit’s Potential Impact 
 
The impact of Brexit on employment law is, for obvious reasons, difficult to predict. 
Much depends on the future relationship between the EU and the UK. Potential 
options that have been discussed include (continued) membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and/or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA); a series 
of bilateral deals with the EU; or a ‘hard’ Brexit (i.e. an exit from both the single 
market and the customs union). 
 
Should the UK negotiate (continued) membership of the EEA, then most EU laws on 
workers’ rights would continue to apply and future EU laws in this area would need to 
be implemented by the UK government, and would therefore apply in Scotland. The 
case law of both the EFTA Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
would be of relevance. The ‘bilateral’ option is often referred to as either the 
‘Switzerland’ or ‘Turkey’ model. Under this scenario, the UK would negotiate a series 
of bilateral deals with the EU in order to gain enhanced access to the single market. 
 
It is likely, in this case, that the UK will continue to have to abide by EU employment 
laws, so as to prevent distortions of competition. Regardless of the eventual future 
relationship between the UK and the EU, a transition period after the UK exits the EU 
is likely, during which the UK’s rights and obligations as an EU Member State are 
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phased out. EU law may therefore continue to apply to pending employment 
disputes which began before UK withdrawal from the EU. 
 
Leaving the EU will entail the amendment and probable repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA – the national legal basis of the UK’s membership of 
the EU). This would have consequences for the majority of EU employment laws 
which have been implemented into UK law by virtue of secondary legislation made 
under the framework of the 1972 Act. An example can be found in the Agency 
Worker Regulations 2010. Repeal of the act would leave the status of these 
regulations unclear because they depend on the act – the primary legislation – for 
their effect. The 2017 Queen’s Speech outlined a number of bills, of which eight 
wholly concern measures around Brexit, including the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill (often referred to as the ‘Great Repeal Bill’) the primary objective of which will be 
to repeal the (ECA) on Brexit Day and to preserve the massive amount of EU-
inspired law in the UK. 
 
However, in the area of employment law, it is not as simple as a ‘copy-and-paste’ 
exercise. For example, the remedies and state accountability checks which EU law 
offers will likely fall away after Brexit. An example of where an EU principle was 
successfully used was the high-profile Supreme Court decision in R (on the 
application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor, where the Court ruled, in part in reliance 
on the EU law principle of access to justice, to find the imposition of employment 
tribunal fees to be unlawful. In addition, leaving the EU will remove the mechanisms 
for enforcing EU-derived rights from domestic law. Thus, workers will no longer be 
able to rely on the principle of direct effect, the interpretive obligation imposed on 
national courts will eventually fall away and there will (presumably) be no access to 
the Court of Justice. Similarly, there are a number of EU-wide bodies set up to 
coordinate health and safety as well as technical standards across the EU which will 
need to be replicated in the UK (or an arrangement reached for future UK 
participation in these bodies). 
 
The UK government is likely, post-Brexit, to embark on a lengthy and costly review 
exercise of employment law, with a view to deciding whether to repeal, adjust or 
preserve it. The EU (Withdrawal) Bill therefore proposes to delegate statutory 
powers for a limited period of time to enable ministers to make changes, by 
administrative regulation, to give effect to the outcome of the negotiations with the 
EU (see Clauses 7-9). Corresponding powers are also conferred on devolved 
institutions (see Clause 10 and Schedule 2). These so-called ‘Henry VIII clauses’ 
cause concern, as they would allow the government to circumvent the full legislative 
process, which the executive would otherwise need to use in order to enact primary 
legislation. In the case of employment laws, it would facilitate the amendment or 
repeal of those rights to which the government is particularly opposed without 
adequate parliamentary oversight. 
 
Separately – and subject to whatever post-Brexit relationship is concluded – the UK 
government, parliament and courts might wish to consider (unilaterally) whether EU 
law developments in a given policy field might be usefully borrowed and incorporated 
into future UK legal and policy developments in the same field. Of course, the UK 
government and parliament would be free to apply – in the sense of mirroring in UK 
law and practice – any future EU laws where it agrees on its content. 
 
In the event of a ‘hard’ Brexit and in the absence of an obligation to abide by 
harmonised EU rules, the UK could seek competitive advantages by implementing 
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labour standards that are less onerous for employers than those required of 
their counterparts in the European Union. Based on long-standing opposition of 
some past UK governments to certain EU social rights, one independent legal 
opinion commissioned by the TUC in the run-up to the referendum vote identified a 
number of EU-derived employment laws which would be especially vulnerable to 
repeal and/or amendment. These include laws on information and consultation on 
collective redundancies; rules on working time; some of the EU-derived health and 
safety regulations; parts of the regulations which protect workers in the event of a 
transfer of undertaking; legislation protecting agency workers; and some elements of 
discrimination law to which businesses most strongly object, such as liability for 
equal pay. However, one must also question the extent to which a future government 
will actually repeal existing rights once given the chance, especially as the UK’s 
labour market is already one of the least regulated in the EU. 
 
The main causes of concern for employers and trade unions when it comes to 
workers’ rights do not have a direct EU origin. Employers complain about the new 
higher minimum wage (the so-called ‘living wage’), the ‘apprenticeship levy’, 
restrictions on skilled migrant workers, and the requirement for large companies to 
publish their gender pay gaps. At a legislative level, trade unions are concerned 
about the introduction of the Trade Union Act 2016 which places severe restrictions 
on the right to take industrial action. All of these developments stem from UK 
governments, rather than from the EU legislature. 
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Chapter 11 
 
Environmental Protection and Law 
 
Miranda Geelhoed  University of Strathclyde 
 
Mara Ntona  University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
 
Environmental protection has been held to be a ‘wall breaker’ for the EU,13 as already 
in the 1970s it pushed the EU project beyond its economic foundations to include 
broader concerns of human wellbeing. Since then, over 200 secondary legislative 
instruments on a wide range of environmental topics have been adopted.14 
Additionally, the EU has increasingly integrated environmental considerations into 
other areas of EU law. It is estimated that nowadays 70-80% of national environmental 
legislation in the Member States is of EU origin.15 
 
This chapter will first briefly introduce the fundamental elements of EU environmental 
law (and its basis in the Treaties). It will then discuss three different aspects of EU 
environmental regulation, which have made significant contributions to environmental 
protection in the UK: nature conservation, environmental integration and procedural 
environmental rights. It will, in particular, use the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Common Fisheries Policy, two frameworks of sectoral legislation with great relevance 
to the environment, as illustrative examples. Against this backdrop, it will discuss the 
implications of Brexit for environmental protection in the UK and Scotland, concluding 
that despite risks of lowering protection levels, there are also opportunities for more 
ambitious approaches and for the recognition of local needs. 
 
Basics and Basis of EU Environmental Law 
 
Since the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the EU has an explicit 
legislative basis for autonomous environmental policy making. Article 191 TFEU lists 
the following objectives: preserving, protecting, and improving the quality of the 
environment; protecting human health; prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources; and promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change. The 
article thus leaves the EU with ample flexibility to tackle emerging environmental 
issues. However, the exercise of EU competence in environmental matters is restricted 
by the principle of subsidiarity: the EU shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States themselves 
(Article 5 TEU). 
 
Moreover, EU law provides for minimum environmental harmonisation only, thus 
allowing Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent environmental 
                                            
13 Sadeleer, N (2014) EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market (Oxford University 
Press), p. v 
14 Morgera, E ‘Environmental Law’ in Barnard, C and Peers, S (eds) (2017) European Union 
Law, (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press), p 657 
15 Kramer, L ‘Regional Economic International Organizations: The European Union as an 
Example’ in Bodansky, D, Brunnée, J and Hey, E (eds) (2007) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press) 
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measures (Article 193 TFEU). Various principles of EU environmental policy, 
furthermore, govern any action taken in this field. These include, amongst others, the 
principle of a ‘high level of environmental protection’ (Article 3(3) TEU); the integration 
principle (Article 11 TFEU), the precautionary, prevention, and polluter pays principles 
(Article 191(2) TFEU). 
 
Contribution of EU Law to Nature Protection in the UK 
 
EU law on nature protection was at the forefront of EU environmental action, with its 
two pieces of flagship legislation, the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive, dating 
back to the 1970s and early 1990s. The directives provide for a network of protected 
areas – Special Protected Areas (SPAs) under the Birds Directive and Special Areas 
of Conservation (SACs) under the Habitats Directive, together known as Natura 2000 
sites. Additionally, the directives provide for direct species protection, through 
prohibitions of activities directly harmful to a protected species, or by imposing 
monitoring and reporting obligations regarding their status. 
 
The directives have led to an increase in the level of protection previously offered 
under UK law for Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Increased protection is 
not only important for ecological reasons, but also for human wellbeing. Internationally 
and within the EU, it is increasingly recognised that the effective exercise of human 
rights greatly depends on the maintenance of healthy ecosystems. In 2016, the UK 
committed internationally to consider relevant linkages between health and 
biodiversity, in recognition of biodiversity as a source of nutrition, medicines, heating, 
clothes, clean water and shelter. 
 
The implementation of the EU’s directives is still considered inadequate in the UK, with 
only 8.53% of the national land area covered by Natura 2000 sites, and 71% of 
protected habitats considered to be of an unfavourable-bad status. The European 
Commission has used both softer (progress reporting requirements, deadlines) and 
harder (infringement proceedings) instruments to direct Member States, including the 
UK, towards better implementation. The EU’s nature framework has been considered 
a ‘clear and logical framework of rules’ and it has been held that ‘investing in Natura 
2000 makes good economic sense’, considering its relevance for the environment, 
people and the economy and its very low cost-benefit ratio. 
 
Beyond Environmental Legislation: The Value of Integration 
 
As a general principle of EU law, environmental integration (Article 11 TFEU) is framed 
in mandatory wording. It allows environmental measures to be adopted under non-
environmental policies and for environmental principles to be applied in a non-
environmental context. This has resulted in an ‘integrationist’ approach in the 
development of EU environmental law (e.g. by promoting reliance on environmental 
impact assessment), as well as ‘greening’ other areas of EU law, such as the Common 
Agricultural and Fisheries Policies. 
 
Although the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) initially primarily aimed at increasing 
productivity, the current CAP 2014-2020 integrates various environmental measures. 
These include cross-compliance obligations for basic payments (Regulation 
1306/2013) and mandatory greening payments (Regulation 1307/2013). Additionally, 
the CAP’s Rural Development Fund seeks to contribute to environmentally-balanced 
and climate-friendly development of rural economies, whilst providing Member States 
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with considerable leeway to decide on the particular needs of their regions (Regulation 
1305/2013). 
 
Similarly, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has shifted away from its initial focus on 
commercially valuable species, towards a more holistic approach encompassing non-
target organisms and sensitive habitats. The overarching objectives of the CFP now 
include the long-term sustainability of fisheries activities, the application of the 
precautionary and ecosystem-based approaches, and the achievement of coherence 
with EU marine environmental policy. Moreover, funding under the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of fishing and 
contribute to the protection and restoration of aquatic biodiversity and ecosystems 
(Regulation 508/2014). Nevertheless, while significant progress has been achieved in 
greening the CAP and the CFP, there remains ample scope for further enhancing the 
environmental sustainability of the agriculture and fisheries sectors. 
 
The principle of environmental integration has also allowed for the mainstreaming of 
environmental considerations into a wide range of sectoral policies at the national 
level, as it is binding not only on the institutions and agencies of the EU, but also on 
those of the Member States when they are interpreting and implementing Union law 
(Article 52(5) EU Charter). An example is the cross-compliance rules under the CAP, 
which cross-reference 13 legislative standards in the field of environment, food safety, 
animal and plant health and animal welfare. In the context of Brexit, this means that 
integration could complicate the elimination of a piece of EU environmental law from 
the UK legal system, as it is likely to ‘unravel’ other connected environmental 
legislation and related sectoral and cross-sectoral legislation. 
 
Procedural Rights and the Implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention 
 
EU law protects certain key human rights of relevance to the environment, which are 
predominantly procedural in nature: namely, access to environmental information, 
public participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters. In addition to being the subject of a dedicated EU directive, the 
right of all natural and legal persons to access environmental information held by 
public authorities has been enshrined in several EU legislative instruments across a 
range of environmental policy sectors (e.g. Article 19 of the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive). Similarly, provisions on public participation are found in sectoral 
pieces of EU environmental legislation (e.g. the Water Framework Directive), as well 
as in legislation relating to the assessment of the environmental effects of public and 
private projects, the strategic environmental assessment of plans and programmes, 
and permitting processes regarding industrial installations. 
 
Even though the European Commission has been unsuccessful in introducing a 
directive on access to justice in environmental matters, the EU judiciary has indicated 
that relevant national regulations must be interpreted in such a manner as to avoid 
making the exercise of the right impossible, or excessively difficult, in practice. 
Moreover, Articles 2, 6(1), 8, 10, and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) have been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as 
incorporating procedural as well as substantive environmental rights. The relevant 
case law informs the interpretation of analogous provisions of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Articles 2, 7, 11, 17, 42 and 47 CFR), which has been endowed 
with the status of primary EU law (Article 6(1) TEU). 
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EU law on procedural environmental rights is inextricably linked with the 
implementation of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
which was elaborated under the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). All 
EU Member States are individually parties to the convention, and the EU is also a 
party in its own right. Even though the UK will continue to be bound by the obligations 
enshrined in the Aarhus Convention after Brexit, challenges may arise from the loss of 
the ‘hard, enforceable edge’ that EU law has conferred on this international treaty by 
providing a basis for the European Commission and the EU judiciary to monitor its 
implementation by the Member States.16 
 
The judgments issued by the Court of Justice of the EU in the context of a preliminary 
reference submitted by the UK Supreme Court and an infringement action brought 
against the UK by the European Commission in relation to the prohibitive effect of 
litigation costs on access to justice in environmental matters were among the catalysts 
of a broad-ranging reform of the England and Wales costs regime in 2013.17 By 
capping the cost of judicial proceedings for certain categories of environmental cases, 
this reform was an important step forward in eliminating some of the procedural 
hurdles that hindered access to justice for many individuals, communities and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which are the actors most likely to bring cases for 
judicial review. 
 
Post-Brexit, UK compliance with the Aarhus Convention will continue to be monitored 
by a body established under the convention, namely, the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee (ACCC). An important feature of the ACCC is that it allows 
individuals and NGOs to submit complaints regarding the noncompliance of state 
parties with the provisions of the convention. Even though the direct involvement of 
civil society promotes legitimacy and justice, the ACCC nevertheless lacks the ‘hard 
enforcement’ infrastructure provided by the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the EU, as it is only able to issue non-binding recommendations. On the 
other hand, once they have been endorsed by the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus 
Convention, the recommendations of the ACCC are considered authoritative 
interpretations of the treaty provisions, which must be taken into account by domestic 
authorities and courts in the interpretation and implementation of the convention. 
 
Implications of Brexit for Environmental Protection in the UK 
 
At least two basic scenarios may be envisaged regarding the future relationship of the 
UK with the EU. Under the first scenario, the UK could preserve its close ties with the 
EU by, for instance, maintaining its membership in the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Among other privileges, this scenario would provide the UK with preferential 
access to the Single Market. As a condition of access, the UK would be subject to a 
range of EU laws, as well as some enforcement procedures and bilaterally negotiated 
financial obligations. It should, however, be noted that EEA membership entails only a 
‘patchwork’ of legal obligations in connection to the environment, as it does not cover 
                                            
16 Lee, M (2014) EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Hart 
Publishing), p 160 
17 Jaffey, B and Mehta, R (2013) ‘Reigning in the “Prohibitive Expense” of Environmental 
Litigation: Edwards v Environment Agency’, Judicial Review, 18(4) 403-415; Westaway, N 
(2013) ‘The Ritz Reformed? Costs in Environmental and Public Interest Cases’, Judicial 
Review, 18(4) 
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the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies or nature conservation, but does 
address aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products, as well as invasive species. 
 
On the other hand, EEA membership would allow the UK to act jointly with EU Member 
States in various areas of environmental policy (e.g. climate change). Under the 
second scenario, the UK would remain outside the EU and the EEA. Even so, it is 
highly probable that the UK, like any other country wishing to export to the Union, 
would face pressure to align with European environmental law, at least in areas that 
are closely associated with access to the Single Market (e.g. compliance with energy 
efficiency requirements). 
 
By any account, Brexit presents significant challenges for environmental protection in 
the UK, particularly with regard to the loss of scrutiny and enforcement powers 
associated with the operation of EU law and institutions; the loss of the long-term 
policy horizon and transparency provided by EU law; the restriction of opportunities for 
funding and cooperation; and the potential repositioning of the UK in international and 
regional environmental governance fora. Additional challenges arise for the devolved 
administrations, whose ability to engage in international cooperation on environmental 
matters is limited by their lack of international legal capacity. Moreover, in 
environmental policy areas where EU processes and institutions play a prominent role 
(e.g. the regulation of chemicals, waste, CO2 emissions from cars), the repatriation of 
powers to the UK post-Brexit raises questions about the allocation of competence 
between the UK’s central and devolved administrations. 
 
On the other hand, the loss of the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms provided 
by EU law may to a certain extent be mitigated through enhanced private enforcement. 
To this end, Scotland and England and Wales could seek to further strengthen 
procedural environmental rights, allowing individuals and civil society to be more 
involved in the implementation of environmental law. In addition, the UK may pursue 
environmental standards akin to those of the EU, thus building upon EU-level guidance 
and resource pooling. The devolved administrations may also use their competence in 
the environmental field to develop standards that are even more ambitious than those 
of the EU, focusing on the protection of ecosystem services and ecosystem 
restoration, and taking into account local environmental, socioeconomic and cultural 
features. 
 
More broadly, the UK can work towards implementing international obligations relating 
to the ecosystem approach, in acknowledgment of the crucial contribution of 
ecosystems to the protection of substantive human rights and the realisation of 
sustainable development objectives (e.g. the UN Sustainable Development Goals). 
This is particularly relevant to the agriculture and fisheries sectors, which, as 
mentioned above, are still facing considerable shortcomings in terms of environmental 
integration and the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach, despite being 
heavily reliant on ecosystem services for their sustainable development. In light of 
weakened accountability systems post-Brexit and the resulting increased importance 
of national and local enforcement mechanisms, opportunities for continued 
participation in relevant EU networks should also be explored (e.g. the European 
Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law – 
IMPEL). 
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Conclusion 
 
The EU’s regulatory activities in the environmental field have led to a broad and 
diverse environmental acquis and increased environmental integration across the EU’s 
sectoral and cross-sectoral laws and policies. Although the EU has shown more 
ambition in some areas than others, its impacts on national environmental laws can be 
considered substantial. This chapter has highlighted some particular topics of 
consideration when safeguarding the environment from the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU – namely, nature protection, environmental integration and procedural 
environmental rights. As the EU has driven progress in these areas, there is a risk that 
Brexit could hinder further progress within the UK or even lead to a lowering of the 
level of environmental protection. However, there are also opportunities to pursue 
similar or even higher level of environmental protection, which are better catered to the 
local environmental and socio-economic conditions in the UK’s regions. 
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Chapter 12 
 
Energy Law 
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Development of EU Energy Law 
 
Although two out of the three founding treaties of what is now the European Union 
(EU) – the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (which expired in 2002) 
and the 1957 European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty – had energy 
at their heart, EU energy law was limited in its scope and impact until the 1990s, with 
early interventions largely focused on (nuclear) safety and maintaining security of 
supply. In general, with energy security being regarded as closely linked to national 
security, Member States jealously guarded their sovereignty in relation to energy 
policy, and energy industries were mostly organised on national lines, often as 
publicly-owned monopolies. 
 
Things began to change in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of two pressures. 
First, the desire to complete the EU internal market, by addressing indirect 
distortions to competition such as energy costs, coincided with a worldwide shift in 
energy policy away from public ownership and monopolisation towards privatisation 
and liberalisation. Relying on general competition law and free movement powers, 
the Commission moved to liberalise downstream gas and electricity markets, initially 
via a litigation strategy and subsequently through three successive waves of 
legislation (in 1996/98, 2003, and 2009). 
 
Second, increasing awareness of the adverse environmental impacts of energy 
production and consumption, and the cross-border nature of issues such as air 
pollution and climate change, led the EU to become increasingly active in regulating 
the environmental performance of the energy industries and the efficient use of 
energy. Although it was not until 2009, with the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, that the EU acquired an express general legal competence in energy policy, 
this was in effect a belated de jure recognition of the EU’s de facto position as a 
major policy actor on the European energy stage. 
 
What is now Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
gives the EU institutions shared competence with Member States to adopt measures 
to ‘(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.’ Member State sovereignty over the exploitation 
of primary energy sources, their energy mix, and the general structure of their energy 
supply, including the ownership of national energy companies,18 is expressly 
preserved. In practice, however, the requirements of both liberalisation and 
environmental policies increasingly constrain Member States’ freedom. 
 
This is a trend which seems likely to continue. In 2015, the Commission launched its 
Framework Strategy for an Energy Union, with the aim of creating a genuinely cross-
border internal market in energy in order to achieve secure, sustainable, competitive 
                                            
18 EU law is technically neutral on questions of property ownership – Article 345 TFEU 
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and affordable energy supplies for European consumers. Considerable work is 
already under way to secure the technical compatibility of domestic energy markets 
and in late 2016 the Commission proposed another package of legislative measures 
(the so-called ‘winter package’) which would further harmonise Member States’ 
energy policies. 
 
Impact of EU Law on UK Energy Policy 
 
Unlike some other Member States, the UK’s energy policy has not been 
fundamentally shaped by EU energy law. Not only has there been close alignment 
between the goals of UK and EU energy policy, but the UK has been in the vanguard 
of European – and indeed global – energy reform since the 1980s, both as regards 
the liberalisation of energy markets and subsequently in the transition to low-carbon 
energy systems. In general, therefore, the UK has been a strong supporter – and 
indeed influential driver – of EU energy policy. 
 
This is not to say that EU law has not sometimes had an impact. For instance, EU 
state aid law has shaped government support for renewables and, in particular, 
nuclear generation.19 The use of so-called ‘golden shares’ as a means of 
government intervention in privatised energy companies has been severely restricted 
by the CJEU’s finding that they constitute a restriction on free movement of capital 
and the right of free establishment. EU air quality legislation has largely been 
responsible for the decline of coal-fired power generation. The imposition of binding 
national targets for renewable energy consumption has also significantly accelerated 
the deployment of renewable energy sources in the UK, particularly in the electricity 
sector. Overall, though, it is fair to say that EU law has been a constraint upon, 
rather than a major determinant of, UK energy policy. 
 
However, this does not mean that the role of EU energy law has been unimportant. It 
has performed two major functions, both of which would be more difficult to replicate 
outside of the EU. The first is to facilitate trade between, and integration of, 
European energy systems. Of course, trade would not be impossible outside the EU. 
Oil, gas and coal are all traded on global markets, subject only to World Trade 
Organisation rules. But matters are more difficult for electricity and (downstream) gas 
supply, both of which are networked industries. This means that they depend upon 
the existence of an extensive infrastructure of wires and pipes to deliver energy from 
producers to consumers. In the case of electricity in particular, they also require 
detailed technical regulation to ensure the safe, reliable and efficient operation of the 
energy system. The EU’s institutional framework thus provides a means of reducing 
transaction costs and technical barriers to trade in gas and electricity by promoting 
harmonisation of national regulatory frameworks and facilitating common projects, 
such as the Single (wholesale) Electricity Market (SEM) between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, or the proposed North Sea offshore electricity grid. 
 
As already noted, the EU is actively promoting the integration of European energy 
markets via the Energy Union, and the UK’s hitherto rather isolated energy systems 
are now increasingly physically integrated with other European markets, through the 
development of interconnectors. Integration makes sense in energy policy terms as a 
means of ensuring security of supply, in order to increase competitiveness and 
therefore reduce prices, and to facilitate the deployment of intermittent renewable 
                                            
19 Financial subsidy for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is currently the subject of a 
dispute before the ECJ 
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energy sources (by enabling intermittency to be balanced by imports).20 Given that 
the UK is a net importer of energy, and the UK government’s low carbon ambitions, it 
has been a strong supporter of market integration within the EU, and this is likely to 
continue to make sense unless its energy policy objectives change substantially. 
 
The second important function performed by EU energy law is to ‘lock in’ energy 
policy goals, by limiting the extent to which policy can change through unilateral 
Member State action. This has the effect of promoting policy stability – a particularly 
important concern in relation to the energy industries, which are highly capital-
intensive industries operating over long time horizons. In a period, such as the 
present, of high capital demand – where investment is required both to replace aging 
energy infrastructure and to facilitate the low carbon transition – policy stability is 
essential to promote investor confidence. But it is difficult to achieve on a purely 
domestic basis, given the UK’s highly flexible constitutional arrangements and 
adversarial political system. 
 
The external constraint provided by EU law is also valuable for internal policy actors. 
For instance, the devolved Scottish government has high ambitions to exploit 
Scotland’s vast renewable energy potential, but limited policy competence within the 
current devolution settlement to enable it to achieve those ambitions. The policy 
support provided by EU law therefore gives some guarantee that regulatory powers 
retained at the UK level will continue to be exercised in a way that supports 
renewables expansion, as well as, for instance, enables access to EU-level funding 
for low-carbon investment, and research and development. 
 
Of course, both of these functions performed by EU energy law have their 
downsides. For instance, as market integration has advanced, regulatory decision-
making, particularly in relation to technical market and network operation, has to 
some extent shifted from domestic to EU-level regulators – ACER (the Agency for 
the Co-operation of Energy Regulators), ENTSO-E and ENTSOG (European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and for Gas), which were 
set up as part of the 2009 liberalisation package. Although UK regulators and 
network operators are powerful players in these decision-making fora, they are 
difficult to subject to wider democratic and public accountability at the domestic level 
(although they are subject to oversight by the European Parliament). Accordingly, 
the shift of regulatory capacity to the European level may have had the effect of 
undermining hard-won gains in the accountability of domestic regulators, which were 
the subject of intense debate in the 1990s. 
 
In addition, while locking-in energy policy promotes stability, it also necessarily 
makes it more difficult to achieve policy change. This may therefore lock-in policy 
mistakes. For instance, VAT on domestic fuel was a policy – much criticised at the 
time – introduced by the Major government in 1993, but EU law meant that the 
subsequent Labour government was able only to reduce the VAT rate to 5% rather 
than to abolish it altogether. The UK’s reduced rate of VAT on some energy-saving 
products has also been held to be incompatible with EU tax law. More 
fundamentally, EU law locks-in a market-based energy system. Notwithstanding 
ongoing criticism of the UK’s liberalised energy markets, this therefore limits the 
extent to which new thinking about, for instance, the role of public or community 
                                            
20 For physical reasons, electricity supply and demand must be kept in balance at all times. 
On the current state of technological development, electricity also cannot easily be stored, 
hence keeping the electricity system in balance is a major challenge for energy regulators 
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ownership, the structure of energy markets, or the balance between markets and 
planning can be pursued. 
 
Brexit and UK Energy Policy 
 
Despite these criticisms, energy policy did not feature significantly in debates leading 
up to the EU referendum, nor has it done so subsequently. Given the close 
alignment of UK and EU energy policy, Brexit is unlikely to produce major changes in 
UK energy policy, at least in the short term, and existing EU-derived market and 
environmental rules will largely be given continuity of effect via the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill. Nevertheless, in addition to the potential general economic effects 
of Brexit in relation to free movement of workers, availability of investment capital 
and supply chain impacts, some energy-specific issues do require to be addressed. 
 
Euratom 
 
The issue here which has attracted greatest attention so far is the implications of 
Brexit for the nuclear industry. One apparently unanticipated consequence of Brexit 
is that, in its Article 50 notification, the UK government also gave notice of its 
intention to withdraw from Euratom, which now shares an institutional framework 
with the EU. Although legal opinion is divided on whether withdrawal is legally 
required, the prime minister’s insistence on ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU over 
the UK makes it politically inevitable. 
 
Euratom currently provides the legal framework for the safe and secure operation of 
civil nuclear power generation and nuclear waste disposal in the UK, as well as 
governing the supply of nuclear materials for power generation and other (for 
example, medical) uses into and out of the Community, the free movement of 
nuclear workers and co-operation in nuclear research and development. It is 
therefore essential that a replacement regulatory framework is put in place before 
the UK leaves the EU in order to comply with international non-proliferation 
obligations, and to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to operate. 
 
A new Nuclear Safeguards Bill was announced in the 2017 Queen’s Speech, which 
will transfer regulatory responsibility for safety and security to the (existing) Office for 
Nuclear Regulation. In addition, the UK government’s negotiating position states its 
intention to maintain close co-operation with Euratom, as well as to sign new nuclear 
co-operation agreements with other key nuclear states. However, there remains 
some doubt as to whether suitable arrangements can be put in place in time. 
 
 
Internal Energy Market 
 
A second key issue concerns the UK’s continued participation in the EU’s Internal 
Energy Market (IEM). The general consensus is that continued participation would 
make sense for the reasons discussed above, and in particular to secure the future 
of Ireland’s SEM and to avoid disruption and inefficiencies in the operation of 
interconnectors – a view apparently shared by the Energy Secretary. The EU27 may 
also favour continued UK participation in the IEM, given that it is already seeking to 
extend the Energy Union beyond the EU’s borders. For instance, Norway currently 
participates fully in the IEM via the EEA, as do a number of EU candidate countries 
in south east Europe via the Energy Community Treaty, and Switzerland (in some 
respects) via a bilateral agreement. 
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Nevertheless, there are potential obstacles and disadvantages to continued UK 
participation in the IEM. As regards the former, the UK government’s ‘red lines’ in 
respect of free movement and CJEU jurisdiction may prove to be insurmountable 
obstacles, as might be the European Parliament’s insistence that there should be no 
preferential access to the single market for particular sectors. As regards the latter, 
continued participation in the IEM from outside the EU would almost certainly mean 
a loss of influence for the UK in EU regulatory decision-making, making it a rule-
taker, rather than a rule-maker. Moreover, the loss of UK influence might change the 
future direction of EU energy policy in ways which UK governments and regulators 
might find unpalatable. 
 
Green Energy 
 
If the UK remains part of the IEM, it will continue to be bound by most EU green 
energy laws, including new obligations in relation to energy efficiency and renewable 
energy contained in the Commission’s winter package. Nevertheless, decisions 
require to be made on whether to seek to continue to participate in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (which includes major power generators) and on how to replace EU 
research and investment schemes for low-carbon energy. 
 
However, if the UK leaves the IEM, green energy is the area in which policy change 
seems most likely. The current Conservative government is no fan of EU energy 
efficiency and renewable energy targets, and has already (prior to the EU 
referendum) withdrawn a range of subsidy and support schemes. Even post-Brexit, 
the UK will remain subject to domestic and international climate change obligations, 
as well as internal pressures from the devolved governments. But it is unclear how 
effective these will be in ensuring the low carbon energy transition remains on track. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The desire to ‘take back control’ which motivated the decision to leave the EU is one 
which seems to make little sense in the energy sector. Not only has the UK been a 
stronger influence over EU energy law and policy than vice versa, but there are 
persuasive arguments in favour of continued energy market integration. At a time 
when policy stability is particularly important to the energy industries, Brexit therefore 
seems like a distraction. However, it remains to be seen how far ‘business as usual’ 
will be possible post-Brexit, or alternatively how any new policy flexibility will be used 
in practice. 
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Legal Background 
 
The provisions concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters are 
included in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
This part of the treaty is devoted to the Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(AFSJ), which consists of rules on judicial cooperation in civil justice, asylum and 
immigration, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCCM). PJCCM is 
included in Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V. 
 
On the basis of these provisions, and the corresponding ones in previous treaties, 
the EU has adopted many instruments, mainly in the following areas: 
 
1. Approximation of rules of substantive and procedural criminal law; 
2. Instruments of “mutual recognition”, a cornerstone principle of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters within the EU. Mutual recognition in criminal matters means that a 
judicial order issued by Member State (MS) A and addressed to MS B, must be 
recognised and executed in MS B without further formality, except when grounds for 
refusal apply; 
3. Police cooperation. Measures in this area can be grouped into two main clusters: 
information exchange (such as the Decision on exchange of information to prevent 
terrorist offences) and operational cooperation (such as the Framework Decision 
regulating the setting up of Joint Investigation Teams); 
4. Establishment of specialised EU agencies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust). 
 
In order to understand how Brexit impacts on the UK – also taking account of the 
devolution settlement – it is helpful to divide the above categories of EU instruments 
into two types: static and dynamic instruments. Static instruments are those that do 
not involve interaction with other Member States or participation in multilateral 
agreements. In other words, they are instruments that must be given effect within 
individual domestic legal systems. Examples of static instruments (falling under 
Category 1 above) are directives which define certain criminal activity and attached 
penalties (e.g. Directive 2011/93/EU on the sexual exploitation of children) and 
directives which outline elements of criminal procedure to be implemented by 
Member States (e.g. Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal 
proceedings). 
 
Dynamic instrument are those that do entail some form of interaction with other 
Member States or participation in multilateral arrangements or agreements. A classic 
example of this would be the flagship EU criminal justice (mutual recognition) 
instrument known as the European Arrest Warrant (Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA), but other examples include the legislation establishing agencies 
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such as Europol and Eurojust. All dynamic instruments are built around some form of 
agreed co-operation across borders. 
 
The UK’s Place in EU Police and Judicial Cooperation 
 
All of the above measures form part of an integrated system to tackle crime in and 
across the EU, but the UK does not participate fully in PJCCM. The UK currently 
retains a very distinctive and privileged position that allows it to pick and choose 
which instruments to adopt from a default opt-out position. In light of transitional 
arrangements applicable to the AFSJ agenda as defined in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), 
a distinction must be drawn between PJCCM instruments adopted before and after 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
In December 2014, the UK exercised its bespoke right to opt out en masse from all 
of the 130 PJCCM pre-Lisbon instruments it had previously signed up to. It then had 
a right to opt back in to any individual instruments, and it did so in relation to 35 of 
them. Although this number may seem small, among these are the legal instruments 
widely regarded as key instruments within the agenda, including the Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. As for the instruments adopted after the 
Lisbon Treaty, the default position is that the UK does not take part in the measures 
concerning police and judicial cooperation, but it can opt-into any of these measures 
on a case-by-case basis, either at proposal stage or after their adoption. 
 
The UK has opted in to quite a number of these since 2009 – and even since the 
Brexit referendum! - , such as the directive on the European investigation order and 
the 2016 Europol Regulation. Some PJCCM measures are also agreed within the 
EU’s Schengen framework and, while the UK does not participate in the Schengen 
area, it may request to take part in some or in all of the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis. In general, the UK participates in those parts of the Schengen acquis relating 
to crime and policing. See this summary of the legally-binding protocols detailing the 
UK’s special position and the current state of play in terms of opt-out and opt-ins). 
 
It is clear from the above that the UK’s position vis-à-vis EU police and judicial 
cooperation is peculiar. Although it does not participate fully in this agenda, it has 
chosen to participate in very many key elements of it, clearly judging it to be in the 
national interest to do so. Certainly, withdrawal from the EU does not lessen the 
security threats faced by the EU or the UK – in fact, it might increase them if the UK 
is not a partner in operational cooperation mechanisms, including, for instance, intra-
EU sharing of data. It is hardly surprising therefore to see the UK government 
expressing the desire to continue to work with the EU to preserve UK and EU 
security, and to fight terrorism and uphold justice across Europe (see the Brexit 
White Paper, from p 61). Precisely what this means in terms of which PJCCM 
measures and initiatives it will seek to continue to participate in – and how those 
requests will be received by the EU27 – remains to be seen. 
 
As the UK government grapples with the impact of Brexit on this agenda and 
considers its negotiating strategy with the EU, it should be mindful of the current 
domestic arrangements in relation to some of these issues. An added layer of legal 
(and consequently, operational) complexity – not to be forgotten – exists as a 
consequence of the independent system of criminal justice in Scotland and the 
devolution settlement. In Scotland, in broad terms, criminal law and enforcement 
(policing) are devolved competences. However, some aspects of this are specifically 
reserved under the Scotland Act, including: misuse of drugs, data protection, 
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national security, interception of communications, official secrets and terrorism and 
extradition. So, essentially, implementing aspects of EU law on crime and policing in 
the UK might involve action by authorities south or north of the border or, in some 
cases, both. 
 
Combatting terrorism is a good example of an EU objective that demands specific 
actions from authorities north and south of the border and also cooperation between 
them. Terrorism is a wide and transversal category that includes many crimes and 
police powers. It is clear that a range of competences are engaged, some of which 
are reserved and some of which are devolved. Counterterrorism policy and 
legislation is reserved to the UK government, but many aspects of preparation, 
prevention and dealing with the consequences of a terrorist act in Scotland would be 
managed and controlled by the Scottish government and local agencies. Practical 
cooperation north and south of the border on these matters has been good to date – 
for instance, the Scottish government is engaged in a range of activities to address 
the threat, which integrate with the UK government’s overarching counterterrorism 
strategy, known as ‘CONTEST’. 
 
Given the different policing and criminal justice systems north and south of the 
border, mechanisms of operational cooperation have been established to ensure that 
criminals cannot take advantage of these differences as they enjoy internal free 
movement within the UK. For instance, in relation to matters of international mutual 
assistance (which engages both devolved and reserved matters) and in the interests 
of ensuring a consistent approach and effective operational cooperation across the 
whole of the UK, the Scottish Parliament passed authority back to the Westminster 
Parliament to legislate on behalf of the entire UK – for instance, with the Crime 
(International Cooperation) Act 2003. 
 
It could legitimately be argued that EU law has brought a framework and obligations 
of international cooperation in the fight against crime to the UK, which to some extent 
makes domestic and internal cooperation an imperative. In the absence of this EU 
framework, it remains to be seen what impact, if any, there will be on the degree of 
cooperation and convergence on crime and policing matters north and south of the 
border post-Brexit. 
 
Looking more closely at the EU legal acquis on PJCCM, the distinction between 
static and dynamic EU instruments mentioned earlier will help us to understand how 
leaving the EU impacts on Scotland and the UK. Static instruments are those that do 
not involve – directly or indirectly – interaction with other Member States or 
participation in multilateral agreements – so upon implementation, they become 
domestic law, and they can at least in principle, remain so, after Brexit. For Scotland, 
it is then important to see if any of these static instruments have been implemented 
in Scots law, because they relate to a devolved matter. Pursuant to the proposed 
provisions of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, such implementing devolved legislation would 
be retained on Brexit day but repatriated to Westminster, at least until a further 
decision is made by UK  government ministers to effectively  ‘re-devolve’ them. The 
latter decision should happen, as one could make a strong argument that ‘common 
UK frameworks’ do not need to be devised in relation to such static criminal justice 
measures. They have not existed to date; where co-operation north and south of the 
border is needed, it has been forthcoming. The following examples are illustrative: 
Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime, is implemented in Scots law by amendments to Victims 
and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 and Scottish Statutory Instrument 2015 No 444 – 
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The Victims’ Rights (Scotland) Regulations 2015. In basic terms, static instruments 
can be identified in the police and judicial cooperation categories set out of 
substantive criminal law (i.e. definitions of crimes) and criminal procedure. 
 
What then, of the more numerous and wide-ranging ‘dynamic’ instruments? Such 
measures are predicated on some level of cross-border/international cooperation 
and so domestic political will or legislation alone is not enough to make them work. 
On Brexit day, they might technically be ‘retained’ under the terms of the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bills but they simply cannot work properly unless other Member States 
also agree to continue to commit to them. Of the broad categories of EU police and 
judicial cooperation identified at the outset, mutual recognition, exchange of 
information and participation in EU agencies necessarily require some cooperation 
with other states.  
 
What then is at stake? In short, a great deal! Unless agreed otherwise as part of 
negotiations on the future relationship between the EU and UK, Brexit will have the 
concrete consequence of the UK being excluded from the whole raft of EU 
cooperative mechanisms on criminal justice and policing and surveillance – all of 
which the UK has specifically chosen to participate in. Indeed, the March 2017 
House of Commons Justice Committee report, Implications of Brexit for the Justice 
System, emphasises the importance of the UK’s close involvement with the EU in 
criminal justice matters to security and safety of citizens of both the UK and the rest 
of the EU. It concludes that continued criminal justice cooperation is a critical priority 
for the Brexit negotiations, particularly in three areas: extradition agreements, 
investigative resources, and information sharing. 
 
It is noteworthy that EU databases and laws that enable the exchange of information 
between EU member states and between the third countries – and which relate to 
(suspected) criminal activity – are predicated on compliance with EU data protection 
rules. The UK has signed up to such databases and rules to date and, if it wishes to 
continue to reap the security benefits of EU co-operation after Brexit, it is likely that 
compliance with EU fundamental rights protection, part of which it is currently at 
liberty to disregard under its opt-outs as an EU Member State, will be required. 
 
While domestic legislation derived from EU ‘static’ instruments could in principle be 
retained (or amended or repealed) following Brexit, again, unless agreed otherwise, 
EU law would no longer be an enforceable source of law in the domestic legal 
system after Brexit, and access to the EU law remedies would not be available. 
 
 
Possible Perspectives 
 
There are, as yet, no definitive answers on what life after Brexit in Scotland or the 
UK will be. In order to understand better Scotland’s scope to retain current EU law in 
this field, one might usefully identify the EU measure at stake as either static or 
dynamic. In the latter case, the UK Government will need to negotiate some form of 
agreement with the EU to enable continued operation of such instruments. Scotland 
has a stake in this given its independent criminal justice system and should be ready 
and able to cooperate with the UK on this, in order to feed into the UK negotiations. 
If, however, the measure is a static one, on might consider whether it falls squarely 
into a reserved or devolved matter or whether it touches on both – in which case, the 
need for cooperation (legal and operational) is obvious, if loopholes are not to be 
exploited by criminals and protections are to be fully enjoyed. 
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A good example of this possible overlap between reserved and devolved matters is 
the regulations whereby the Scottish parliament implemented the EU directive on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings – Scottish Statutory Instrument 2014 No 
159 – The Right to Information (Suspects and Accused Persons) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2014. These regulations apply to Police Scotland, but do not apply to 
those authorities carrying out reserved functions. Since revenue and customs are 
reserved matters, people arrested by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in 
Scotland fall outside the scope of The Right to Information Regulations. 
 
In order to ensure effective application of EU law across the UK, the UK government 
therefore issued a code of practice regarding (HMRC) criminal justice working 
practices for suspects in Scotland only, concerning the right to information in criminal 
proceedings. Such examples of competence overlap, which create the need for 
operational cooperation north and south of the border to ensure effective crime 
fighting, criminal justice and the appropriate enforcement of rights, are not likely to 
disappear when the UK leaves the EU. 
 
In terms of possible developments, Brexit could result in significant regression for 
both the UK and the EU. The current dynamic instruments will have to be amended 
and substituted. This will require negotiation. While Scotland’s margin for 
autonomous action is limited, it could surely have a say in terms of promoting 
possible priorities and negotiating positions for the UK – this would also facilitate 
continued good relations in terms of internal cooperation in relation to crime and 
security. 
 
There are three possible legal scenarios concerning the UK’s relationship with the 
EU in the field of criminal justice after Brexit: 
 
1. The establishment of EU-UK agreements on various aspects of the agenda. There 
are at present EU-third countries agreements on judicial and police cooperation, 
agencies, databases; 
2. The conclusion of bilateral agreement between the UK and individual EU member 
states; 
3. ‘Back to Square 1’ option. In the absence of agreements outlined in (1) or (2), the UK 
could fall back on relevant instruments adopted within the Council of Europe (CoE), 
to the extent that they exist (largely in relation to mutual recognition – i.e. not 
operational policing or data exchange). 
 
It should be noted, first, that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Second, it 
should be made clear that with each of the scenarios come pitfalls. There are limited 
existing examples of the EU negotiating treaties with third countries on specific 
matters (e.g. a form of the European Arrest Warrant for Norway and Iceland, 
although not yet in force, and an extradition treaty with the USA), but no such 
treaties have been agreed with any non-EU countries on the large majority of EU 
criminal law mutual recognition measures. Of the treaties which have been agreed, 
not a single one goes as far as the relevant EU legislation in force. By definition, 
bilateral agreements are limited in the context of transnational crime: the criminal 
and his or her assets are not always in the state that you think they are, so gaps will 
necessarily arise in inter alia intelligence and operational capabilities. Where CoE 
instruments exist, they are less detailed and often less effective. 
 
It will continue to be in the mutual interests of the UK and the remaining EU Member 
States to cooperate in criminal justice and security matters post-Brexit, but the 
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mechanisms and forms available for such cooperation are likely to be reduced. It is 
difficult to see how a more favourable arrangement than currently exists is possible, 
with the consequent risks to safety and security for all of us. 
 
Further Reading 
 
Dawson, J (2017) Brexit: Implications for policing and criminal justice cooperation, 
House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No CBP-7650 
 
European Parliament (2017) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
Contribution on the UK withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) 
 
Fletcher, M and Mancano, L (2016) Criminal Justice, SULNE Position Papers 
 
Mitsilegas, V (2017) ‘European Criminal Law after Brexit’, Criminal Law Forum, 
28(2), 219-250 
 
Peers, S (2016) ‘EU Referendum Brief 5: How would Brexit impact the UK’s 
involvement in EU policing and criminal law?’, EU Law Analysis, 21 June 
 
Woodhouse, J and Lang, A (2017) Brexit and data protection, House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper, No CBP-7838 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 14 | Human Rights Law  81 
Chapter 14 
 
Human Rights Law 
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The European Union’s original focus was on economic integration among the six 
founding Member States. The task of securing human rights at a supranational level 
had been entrusted to the Council of Europe, which oversees and operates the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its associated Court, the 
European Court of Human Rights, situated in Strasbourg. The ECHR remains the 
key instrument in Europe for the protection of human rights. At the same time, the 
EU has, over time, developed a framework for the protection of human rights which, 
in part, overlaps with the ECHR but also differs in significant ways. 
 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
From its inception in 1950, the ECHR has been the central instrument, and the 
Council of Europe the central body, for the promotion and protection of human rights 
in Europe. The rights in the ECHR include the right to respect for private and family 
life, the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of assembly, and the right to 
freedom of speech. The ECHR is incorporated into UK primary legislation by virtue of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), whose provisions are binding on all acts of 
‘public authorities’ (s. 6(1)). 
 
Where an Act of Parliament (UK) is contrary to the provisions of the HRA, higher 
courts can make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ under s. 4. This leaves the Act of 
Parliament intact, but serves the purpose of pointing out that the legislation is 
problematic in human rights terms and gives parliament the opportunity to rectify 
this. The HRA (s.10) also provides for a fast-track procedure to remove the 
incompatibility by way of a remedial (ministerial) order if there are compelling 
reasons for this. Section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that an Act of 
Parliament (Scotland) which is contrary to the provisions of the HRA is considered to 
be invalid and not law. The same applies to legislation from the other devolved 
parliaments. 
 
EU Human Rights Framework 
 
In 2000, the EU adopted the initially non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR). The CFR entered into legal force in 2009. Article 51(1) of the Charter 
addresses its provisions to the institutions and bodies of the EU, with due regard for 
the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law. This has been interpreted broadly by the CJEU to mean 
‘acting within the scope of EU law’. Where domestic law, including Acts of 
Parliament, is found to be incompatible with the charter it should be ‘disapplied’. An 
example of where this has happened can be found in the recent case of 
Benkharbouche v Embassy of Sudan. 
 
The CFR sets out the full range of civil, political, economic and social rights of EU 
citizens and of all persons resident in the EU. As part of the EU’s constitutional law, 
the CFR reaffirms those provisions which exist elsewhere in EU law and which 
originate from a range of sources, including the general principles of EU law, the 
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constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States 
and the ECHR’s provisions. As a result, the CFR is broader than the ECHR in terms 
of the rights that it protects. For example, the charter features an express right to 
data protection, which under the ECHR can only be protected as part of the right to 
private life. In addition, the charter contains important additional protections, in 
particular in the field of anti-discrimination law, with its stand-alone anti-
discrimination provision, and in the area of social rights. 
 
The EU’s Accession to the ECHR 
 
Under Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the EU is legally bound to 
accede to the ECHR. This is to enable the establishment of a coherent framework of 
human rights protection throughout Europe. In April 2013, the 47 Member States of 
the Council of Europe and the EU finalised a draft Accession Agreement of the EU to 
the ECHR. However, in fulfilling its obligation under Article 218(11) TFEU to deliver 
an opinion on the draft agreement’s compatibility with EU law, the European Court of 
Justice, in its Opinion 2/13, found that the draft agreement did not provide sufficient 
protection of the EU’s specific legal arrangements and the Court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
 
At the time of writing, no new agreement has been drafted, but both the Parliament 
and the Commission continue to promote the need for EU accession. If and when a 
new draft agreement is negotiated, EU accession will depend on ratification, not only 
by EU Member States, but also the states party to the convention, as well as the 
consent of the European Parliament under Article 218(6) TFEU. In its current work 
programme for 2017, the Commission announced that it will continue its work on 
accession, taking ‘full account’ of the Court’s opinion. 
 
Impact of Brexit on Human Rights in the UK 
 
Human rights law in the UK stems primarily from the ECHR, which has been written 
into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that the 
fundamental rights protected by these laws will not change upon exiting the EU, in 
whichever form that may take. Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill in its 
current form, the charter will be explicitly removed from UK law on Exit Day. This has 
been criticised on the basis that it weakens substantive human rights protections for 
those living in the UK, particularly where their protections would not be available 
under the ECHR. However, retaining the charter in domestic law would not be 
straightforward as, if Brexit results in the UK leaving the EU legal order so that EU 
law no longer applies, it would be difficult to see how the charter could have any 
direct impact if EU law was no longer enforced or enforceable, particularly as its 
application is limited to when Member States are implementing EU law. 
 
Following this, human rights protections in the UK would be solely rooted in the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act. Although many rights can currently be enforced 
under the ECHR/Human Rights Act provisions, there is evidence that charter rights 
can be used more effectively in certain cases, particularly those in which the ECHR 
would not have any impact. The Benkharbouche case provides an example of the 
negligible impact that the ECHR would have in such circumstances in the UK. The 
Human Rights Act does not contain the right to an effective remedy, and so the right 
could not be enforced before the domestic courts. In situations where the charter 
would apply, such as in this case, the strength of the charter is greater than the 
Studying EU Law in Scotland during and after Brexit 
Chapter 14 | Human Rights Law  83 
ECHR, because the rights under the charter could be applied in preference to 
domestic law. 
 
However, this is restricted to particular circumstances: the issue would need to 
concern the enforcement of EU law and a charter right would need to be engaged. 
As many human rights issues, such as the right for prisoners to vote, do not concern 
EU law, the charter would not provide any greater or more effective protection than 
the ECHR. Because of this, the loss of the charter would only mean the loss of 
certain rights which could be enforced more effectively in particular circumstances. 
 
Scotland and Human Rights 
 
In contrast with equality, which remains largely reserved (see the Equality Law 
chapter) under the current devolution settlement, human rights are a devolved area 
and are given legal effect by the Scotland Act 1998, section 57(2) of which provides, 
‘A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate 
legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with 
any of the Convention rights’. This ensures that Scottish-specific provision cannot fall 
below the minimum standards guaranteed by the ECHR, although it is possible to go 
beyond those standards. 
 
In order to fully understand the protection of human rights in Scotland, the relevant 
provisions of the Scotland Act must be read alongside the Human Rights Act 1998 
with its application across the UK. However, it is worth noting that the human rights 
provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, which entered into force before the HRA, go 
beyond that act in protecting convention rights. Section 29(2)(d) provides that an Act 
of the Scottish Parliament is outside its competence if it is incompatible with the 
convention rights. Therefore, although the courts cannot invalidate Acts of the UK 
Parliament, they can invalidate Acts of the Scottish Parliament. The Scotland Act 
also gives the courts more power over Executive action. 
 
Scotland has its own National Human Rights Institution, the Scottish Human Rights 
Commission (SHRC), which is charged with promoting and protecting human rights 
for everyone in Scotland. In December 2013, the Scottish government, in partnership 
with the SHRC, launched Scotland’s National Action Plan for Human Rights (SNAP). 
SNAP, which is independently monitored, brings together civil society, the Scottish 
government and public bodies in a collaborative programme of action to build a 
stronger human rights culture in Scotland. 
 
In its current policy on human rights, the Scottish government makes a number of 
pledges, including opposing the UK government’s proposals to replace the Human 
Rights Act with a ‘British Bill of Rights’, promoting human rights internationally by 
working with other countries and fulfilling its international obligations. As the 
negotiations on Brexit develop, it is possible that Scotland might seek to be 
distinctive in this respect, through the promotion of its international commitments. 
The redrafting of a renewed strategy in 2017 offered by the end of SNAP’s current 
lifecycle might provide added impetus in this regard. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The effect of Brexit on human rights law in the UK can concern only the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as the ECHR is governed by a body distinct from the EU. The 
rights within the CFR mirror many fundamental rights as contained within the ECHR, 
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and go beyond the ECHR in the areas of social, economic, and labour rights. The 
reach and use of the CFR in the UK is restricted to the application of EU law. 
However, given the influence that EU law has had on British law, removal of the CFR 
will undoubtedly weaken human rights law in the UK in certain areas. The current 
devolution arrangements could offer the Scottish government the opportunity to 
develop a distinctive policy programme for Scotland in this context. 
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Chapter 15 
 
EU External Relations 
 
Paul James Cardwell  University of Strathclyde 
 
Lorna Gillies  University of Strathclyde 
 
The European Union has extensive competences to engage with the world beyond 
its borders. Therefore, the UK’s own relationships with non-EU countries are deeply 
embedded in the EU institutional framework, and the process of Brexit will require 
substantial legal reform in the UK. The term ‘external relations’ in fact covers an 
extremely wide set of policies which rely on a diverse set of legal competences. For 
this reason, we tend not to use the term ‘foreign policy’ unless this refers to the 
‘political’ as opposed to ‘economic’ aspects, though even these are not always easily 
separated. 
 
‘External relations’ is taken to cover the Common Commercial Policy, the powers of 
the EU to make agreements with ‘third’ – i.e. non-EU – countries, neighbourhood 
policy, development policy, relations with international institutions and what is known 
as the ‘external dimension of internal policies’. The latter refers to a long-standing 
legal principle set out by the Court of Justice in Case 22-70 AETR, under which the 
EU has implied external competence where it enjoys internal competence. In 
addition to the wide variety of external competences which are scattered throughout 
the treaties, the legal instruments and institutional arrangements which apply across 
these areas are not the same throughout. This makes external relations a particularly 
complex area which the UK will need to extract itself from. We will address two of the 
main focal points of EU external relations: the CCP and the CFSP. 
 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
 
Introduction 
 
The EU Internal Market is premised on a common customs union aided by the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital (see the (External) Trade Law 
chapter). Whilst there is no single EU commercial law,21 the CCP (found in Articles 
206-207 TFEU) is an example of exclusive competence (Article 3(1)(e) TFEU), 
meaning that the UK and the other Member States are precluded from making 
individual agreements outside the EU framework. The Preamble to the original 
Treaty of Rome stated that the Contracting States ‘desir[ed] to contribute, by a 
means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade.’ The process of making international agreements is in Article 218 
TFEU. After the Treaty of Lisbon, investment is now included in the scope of the 
CCP. 
 
Scope 
 
The EU’s Common Commercial Policy is now contained in Article 206 and Article 
207 TFEU. Article 3(1)(e) explicitly confirms the exclusive competence of the EU, 
codifying the consistent case law of the CJEU to this effect. Article 206 confirms that 
                                            
21 The closest being the European Commission’s Proposal for a Common European Sales 
Law, COM (2011) 635 final 
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the European Union’s contribution vis-à-vis world trade through: the ‘progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment and, 
and the lowering of customs and other barriers’. In practice, the European 
Parliament and Council ‘authorise’ negotiations, whilst the European Commission is 
responsible for ‘conduct[ing]’ negotiations for such agreements (Article 207(3), Paras 
2-3, TFEU). The European Council has an important role in the negotiations where 
such agreements impact upon internal rules relating to a range of services which 
may affect Member States’ cultural diversity or where trade arrangements affect the 
delivery of essential services (Article 207 TFEU). 
 
Objective 
 
The Common Commercial Policy equips the EU with competence to negotiate 
services and enter into international investments with countries external to the EU. 
The Common Commercial Policy broadly focusses on international trade 
agreements between the EU and third states, and agreements on foreign direct 
investment. The Policy covers a range of commercial areas. These include rules 
governing anti-dumping, import and export controls, foreign direct investment, 
procurement, the export and most recently the import of cultural goods. The Policy is 
a key driver towards the EU establishing international investment agreements in the 
future. The Policy has a political as well as an economic objective. In response, the 
EU institutions recognise that action under the Common Commercial Policy must 
take account of security in exports, human rights, environmental standards and 
climate change, and corporate social responsibility. 
 
Future 
 
The EU will continue to develop and implement its Common Commercial Policy with 
third states. However, the future success of the CCP will depend on a combination of 
three things. First, Brexit – the consequences for the UK in leaving the EU, and with 
it the CCP, are considered below. However, for the EU, the negotiations for the UK’s 
departure will provide an insight as to how the EU will treat the UK as a third state in 
future. The EU continues to stress that a future trade arrangement or agreement with 
the UK is dependent on the latter retaining internal market and customs union 
membership, if the UK wishes to enjoy the benefits of these. This also means 
maintaining the adjudicative authority of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The 
UK is seeking to secure bilateral trade arrangements with the EU and third states, 
including agreement on binding arbitration. However, at the time of writing, any 
agreements between the UK and the EU on free trade will not be considered by EU 
negotiators until the UK has left the EU.  
 
Second, the process of implementation of the EU’s recent free trade agreements 
with Canada and Singapore may provide an indication as to the extent – perceived 
or actual – of the EU’s future influence on free trade, foreign direct investment and 
investment arbitration agreements. This point is particularly pertinent given the 
apparent rise in protectionism promoted by President Donald Trump in the US, and 
the interpretation in many parts of the globe that the UK (via the Brexit vote) has 
turned away from its traditional emphasis on free trade. Third, the political ambitions 
of the EU in furtherance of internal financial integration and enlargement will be 
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important.22 The ability of the EU to undertake bilateral treaties on behalf of its 
Member States is crucial to supporting further enlargement through increasing 
market access to new accession states and vice versa. 
 
Common Commercial Policy and Brexit 
 
The CCP was possibly the only area of external relations which was prominent in the 
referendum debate, generally characterised as the rights of the EU institutions to 
make ‘trade deals’ on behalf of the EU as a whole. The CCP had been strongly 
supported by successive UK governments, given the collective weight of the EU 
acting as a whole. It is therefore surprising that the CCP was portrayed in a rather 
negative light in the referendum campaign and the subsequent negotiations. The EU 
institutions, particularly the Commission, have developed extensive expertise in 
trade negotiations. The Member States, including the UK, have ‘fed into’ the process 
of negotiations to ensure that the EU position reflects national positions. Brexit 
therefore means that the UK will no longer be part of the agreements – or the 
negotiations. 
 
As with other dimensions of EU law, the institutional competences are not always 
straightforward. For many years, questions have been raised about agreements with 
third countries which go beyond the parameters set out in the CCP. These are 
termed ‘mixed agreements’. Since the Brexit vote, the CJEU gave an opinion on the 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and Singapore which stated that 
where aspects of agreements are based on shared competences, then the Member 
States need to be involved. This matters for Brexit, since future agreements with the 
EU will straddle a variety of competences. 
 
The best known recent examples of agreements under CCP competences are the 
EU-Canada agreement (‘CETA’) and the EU-US agreement (‘TTIP’) neither of which 
is in force and both of which have proved controversial. Whilst leaving the EU would, 
in theory, free the UK from the often cumbersome procedures of negotiating an 
agreement with another country that has to satisfy 28 Member States, the UK would 
nevertheless have to discuss terms with the other party. 
 
An analysis by the Financial Times suggests that there are an estimated 759 
agreements which are currently operated by the EU and, though not all were 
concluded under the CCP, all will need to be renegotiated and replaced by the UK, 
simply to remain in the same position. These range from comprehensive free trade 
agreements with countries such as Vietnam, Mexico and South Korea, to technical, 
sectoral agreements with countries across the globe. Although the UK is a member 
of the WTO, it joined as a member of the EU and there is some debate about 
whether the transfer of competences would require the assent of the other WTO 
members. 
 
By leaving the EU and the single market, the UK will no longer be a party to these 
agreements. The UK government’s current approach is to try to ‘cut and paste’ EU 
agreements and replicate the text of the agreements with the respective third 
countries for agreement. But this is also dependent on the agreement of the third 
country and any domestic legal process they must go through. There are also major 
                                            
22 On enlargement, the accession of Croatia to the EU has resulted in a number of proposed 
Council Decisions for Economic Partnership Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements with third states: see COM (2017) 382, COM (2017) 81, COM (2017) 82 
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practical difficulties in negotiating agreements from scratch for the UK, which does 
not employ the number of specialists and negotiators needed. 
 
Once the UK has left the EU, it will be able to seek individual agreements with third 
states but, whilst it continues to be a member of the EU, it cannot formally start this 
process since it would be contrary to EU law. Although it is perhaps unlikely that the 
Commission (or other Member States) would seek to enforce EU law to prevent the 
UK doing so – the ability of the UK to, at the same time, negotiate with the EU on the 
exit agreement and enter into detailed discussions with states across the globe is a 
practical impossibility. 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
 
The CFSP was incorporated into the law of the EU by the Treaty on European Union 
in 1992. However, it has always had a ‘special’ character within the treaty 
arrangements. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, it was the second of three ‘pillars’ of the 
EU’s legal order: the first being the Community pillar, which contained the law on the 
single market, competition, and environment, and which used the familiar regulations 
and directives. Such legal instruments do not apply in the CFSP. It has generally 
been regarded as an area of ‘intergovernmental’ cooperation, rather than 
‘supranational’ integration. Although the Treaty points to the CFSP covering ‘all 
areas of foreign policy’, in reality there is not the same pooling of sovereignty as in 
other areas. 
 
Successive UK governments have resisted any attempts to allow the CFSP to 
become less intergovernmental. Partly this can be explained by the UK’s belief in the 
value of the EU as a trade-focused polity, which provided its motivation for eventually 
joining the club. But also because of the UK’s own long-standing place on the global 
stage, as demonstrated by its permanent UN Security Council seat, role in NATO 
and close alliance with the United States and, to a lesser and declining extent, 
countries of the Commonwealth. Unlike smaller EU states, the UK has seen no need 
to use the CFSP as a means of gaining visibility in international affairs (though this 
does not preclude the ability to use the CFSP to amplify national foreign policy, as 
discussed below). The UK has consistently expressed a constant fear from the 
outset that the institutionalisation of the CFSP would be used as a means of 
usurping national foreign policy. 
 
In Prime Minister Theresa May’s letter to European Council President Tusk which 
triggered Article 50 TEU of 29 March 2017, there was no mention of the words 
‘foreign policy’. However, the following extract gained significant attention: 
 
We want to make sure that Europe remains strong and prosperous and is capable of 
projecting its values, leading in the world, and defending itself from security threats. 
We want the United Kingdom, through a new deep and special partnership with a 
strong European Union, to play its full part in achieving these goals. We therefore 
believe it is necessary to agree the terms of our future partnership alongside those of 
our withdrawal from the European Union. 
 
These words were taken in some quarters as the UK using its relative military and 
security/intelligence strengths as a means of threatening the EU to offer a ‘good’ exit 
deal. The EU’s negotiating guidelines for Brexit note that, ‘The EU stands ready to 
establish partnerships in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against 
terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.’ 
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The framing of ‘areas unrelated to trade’ clearly demonstrates that the CFSP, 
including defence, are not likely to be the primary areas for discussion (or indeed 
difficulty) during the Brexit negotiations. Indeed, the categorisation of foreign policy 
here as the ‘other’ suggests that CFSP is not an area where the EU expects great 
attention to be devoted. 
 
In September 2017, the UK government published a position paper on Brexit’s 
implications for foreign policy, defence and development. In theory, this should be 
less problematic than in many other areas: since diplomatic missions, armed forces 
and even policy statements have remained separate from the CFSP and European 
External Action Service, the ‘extraction’ from the EU should not entail lengthy 
debates. The paper stresses the shared challenges the UK and EU face and the 
desire to work as closely together as possible after Brexit. 
 
There are nevertheless important and potentially complex issues to resolve and 
which, in addition to the points raised above, connect the CFSP to policies on aid 
and development, trade, sanctions, climate change, and energy, all of which rely on 
overlapping competences in the treaties. Therefore, whilst it might be debated what 
the ‘law’ in CFSP consists of, there is little doubt that the regular ‘law’ in other 
dimensions of integration will not make extraction from the CFSP straightforward in 
reality. 
 
A particular headache is the imposition of restrictive measures (sanctions), of which 
there are over 30 in place. These depend on measures taken under the CFSP, 
followed up by a regulation. They include measures placed by the EU on countries 
such as Russia and individuals suspected of funding terrorism. The UK will need to 
find a way to replicate these, which will also depend heavily on the relationship – 
should there be one – between the UK and EU single market and/or customs union, 
and whether this is a temporary or permanent solution. Restrictive measures are 
therefore one extremely diverse category which represents a highly complex legal 
issue to be resolved, in addition to the administrative, budgetary and operational 
issues of the CFSP. There is also a link between foreign policy and information 
sharing within the EU context which would require an agreement on cooperation to 
continue (see the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Justice chapter). 
 
The situation that the UK and the EU find themselves in is thus unprecedented. 
Furthermore, there is no obvious model upon which future EU-UK relations regarding 
the CFSP can easily be based. Much depends on the political will of the two sides to 
decide to work on areas of common interest, which would therefore provide an 
impetus to resolve the institutional questions. This is dependent of course on the 
UK’s own vision of a ‘Global Britain’. 
 
Whitman identifies three possible scenarios for the UK in the CFSP post-Brexit: as 
an ‘integrated player’, ‘associated partner’ or ‘detached observer’. In the first, the UK 
would have a bespoke, special status in which it would retain involvement in 
battlegroups, CSDP operations (as a ‘reverse Denmark position’) and participation in 
the Foreign Affairs Council for relevant matters. But, of course, it would be outside 
the mainstream fora for discussion and strategic direction. 
 
As an ‘associated partner’, its position would be closer to that of Norway, having no 
membership of the Foreign Affairs Council but a ‘dialogue’ on related issues. Whilst it 
would still have the opportunity to participate in battlegroups and the European 
Defence Agency via specific agreements, this would appear to be a functional 
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arrangement with little or no influence over policy-making. At the lowest end of the 
scale, a ‘detached observer’ would mean that the UK would not participate in any 
institutional formats and would probably be limited to participation in civilian missions 
on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In any of these scenarios, Brexit means that the UK would lack any capability to 
steer the direction of the CFSP. Even being free of the ‘political baggage’ of being 
too closely associated with EU missions in this area of closely guarded national 
sovereignty, we do not yet know to what extent the UK could conceivably play a 
constructive role and how receptive the rest of the EU27 will be. As Dijkstra has 
noted, the operational, technical and administrative implications cannot be fully 
considered until the ‘big picture’ political questions are settled. 
 
At the meta-level it might, in theory, be possibly for a joint dialogue between the UK 
and EU on an agreed strategic approach to foreign policy. However, this would seem 
to be counter-intuitive to the purpose of Brexit and the mantra of ‘taking back control’ 
which was so prominent in the referendum campaign. Since the effectiveness of 
placing resilience at the core of EU foreign relies on the coherence of the EU’s 
institutions, instruments and policies, an agreed approach with an outsider would not 
seem the opportune means to do this. 
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Chapter 16 
 
(External) Trade Law 
 
Tamara Hervey  University of Sheffield 
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From Internal Market Law to External Trade Law 
 
Thinking about the law in context here, it is important to remember that trade law 
means trade: that is, products and to some extent services, being bought and sold. 
Given the materiality of products, global trade patterns tend to coalesce around three 
large geographical blocks: Asia and the Pacific; the Americas; and Europe. The idea 
that the UK will easily replace trade within the European block with trade outside of 
that block has been said to ‘defy gravity’, though the models on which such 
predictions are based are contested. It is clear though that the UK will continue to 
trade with the EU post-Brexit. 
 
This means that what we now think of as internal market law – free movement of 
goods, freedom to provide and receive services, freedom of establishment, free 
movement of capital, and perhaps even some aspects of free movement of labour – 
will become trade law once the UK leaves the EU. External trade law may also cover 
some regulatory standards in fields such as product safety, recognition of 
qualifications, labour or environmental standards. 
 
In other words, trade between the UK and the EU will be governed by whatever 
agreements there are between the EU and the UK. These could include: 
 
 The Withdrawal Agreement 
 Any transition agreement(s) 
 Any future EU-UK trade agreement(s) – which could be of various types, such as: 
 EEA membership 
 Association Agreement 
 ‘Deep and Comprehensive’ Free Trade Agreement 
 Agreements about specific sectors of the economy 
 
Trade between the UK and EU could be based only on the residual position of World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) law. Trade between the UK and other (non-EU) countries 
will be governed by whatever trade agreements the UK (eventually) negotiates. 
Again, the residual position is WTO law. 
 
Key Components of Trade Agreements 
 
The essential idea behind a trade agreement is to remove barriers to trade. 
Removing barriers to trade is seen as good because in theory it promotes economic 
efficiency, through ‘comparative advantage’ (countries specialise in what they are 
good at producing). These barriers take different forms. EU law calls them: customs 
duties (Article 30 TFEU); quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent 
effect (Article 34 TFEU). Customs duties (tariffs or taxes paid when products cross a 
country’s border) increase the cost of cross-border trade. Quantitative restrictions or 
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quotas limit the number of a type of product that may be imported, usually to protect 
a sector of the domestic economy (see the Free Movement of Goods chapter). 
 
The biggest barriers to trade are indirect barriers – the host of rules that apply to 
products or services sold in a particular country. These rules can be related to the 
products/services themselves (e.g. a food safety standard) or to the process by 
which they are produced (e.g. labour law, environmental law, professional standards) 
or marketed (e.g. a prohibition from advertising prescription-only medicines). Where 
these rules differ between countries, they impede a company seeking to expand into 
new markets, for instance by imposing extra costs of compliance with more than one 
standard. If these rules can be harmonised, trade is no longer so impeded. EU law 
on these MEQRs is one of its most successful aspects. 
 
Trade agreements – broadly speaking – seek to remove or reduce customs duties 
and quantitative restrictions, and to go some (usually small) way to aligning indirect 
barriers to trade. They also seek to impose some kind of rule-enforcement process, 
to ensure that the states parties to the agreement are compliant. The extent to which 
trade agreements give rights to private individuals to enforce rights to access 
markets is highly controversial. In EU law, of course, the relevant law is directly 
effective and enforceable before national courts, with oversight by the CJEU. Some 
provisions of the EU’s trade agreements are directly effective. Apart from the EEA, 
no other trade agreement has its own court providing oversight. The WTO’s dispute 
settlement procedure looks ‘court-like’, but individuals cannot access it directly. 
Trade and investment agreements regularly involve investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) procedures, providing that disputes between a company investing in a foreign 
country and its government be resolved by private (and secret) arbitration. 
 
EU Law on Trade Agreements 
 
The type of trade agreement(s) that the UK is able to agree with the EU will depend 
on political considerations. But it will also depend on the law. The EU Member States 
are bound by obligations in EU law concerning their ability to enter into trade 
agreements with ‘third states’ (which the UK will be, once it has left the EU). This is 
the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (see the EU External Relations chapter). The 
CCP has changed over time, broadly to give the EU greater competence in external 
trade. It is now found in Articles 206-207 TFEU. 
 
The EU has exclusive competence to enter into trade agreements covering goods, 
services, intellectual property and many aspects of investment. Agreements that go 
beyond that (for instance, which include non-direct investment, or ISDS) must be 
entered into by both the EU and its Member States, and are known as ‘mixed 
agreements’. The latest statement from the CJEU on the EU’s competence in 
external trade law is in Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. 
The principles established here will apply to any trade agreement into which the EU 
enters with the UK post-Brexit. 
 
Leaving the EU means that the UK will no longer be part of the trade agreements 
entered into by the EU. Just to maintain the status quo, the UK will need to negotiate 
and finalise agreements with countries outside the EU separately. The Financial 
Times has estimated over 750 agreements in this category. The UK cannot do so 
until it has left the EU, as otherwise it will be in breach of EU law (although it is 
possible that the EU will permit this as part of a transitional period). The UK will 
remain a member of the WTO. As a member, it is a signatory of WTO agreements 
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such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). But it will need to renegotiate technical aspects of WTO 
agreements, such as its GATT schedules on tariffs and other barriers to trade. The 
WTO has a process for this. 
 
Possibilities for Future EU-UK Trade Agreements 
 
The TEU and TFEU are an example of the deepest type of trade agreement. 
Anything less than EU membership by definition means a less effective trade 
agreement. Trade between the EU and countries such as Norway is governed by the 
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. This requires free movement of the 
factors of production (including people) between the EU and the other EEA states 
(Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein). It creates an ‘internal market’ between those 
states. 
 
It does not include the EU’s customs union, or common policies in fisheries, 
agriculture or the regions. But it does make provision for the application of EU 
internal market legislation on goods, services, persons and capital in the states 
parties to the agreement. The agreement is based in international (not EU) law, but it 
does involve monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms and an independent 
institutional structure. There is some dispute as to whether it would be a suitable 
model for future EU-UK trade relations. In particular, the extent to which the UK 
would become a ‘taker’ rather than ‘maker’ of regulations, and the relationship 
between the EFTA Court and the CJEU are points of discussion. The current UK 
government appears to have ruled it out. 
 
Countries such as Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several Eastern European 
countries have Association Agreements with the EU. As part of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy, trade is linked with geopolitical stability. The EU uses 
international agreements, which include measures on gradual trade liberalisation, as 
part of a development package, including aid and technical assistance, aimed to 
secure economic development and thus security in such countries. 
 
The EU’s trade (and other) relationships with Switzerland are based on a 
(bewildering) array of bilateral agreements. The European External Action Service 
describes Switzerland as having ‘closer ties than with any country outside the EEA’. 
These ties are secured by multiple bilateral treaties, which fall short of the systemic 
approach associated with EEA law, and indeed with EU law itself. For instance, the 
EU’s free trade agreements with Switzerland cover many aspects of trade in 
products, including recognition of product standards, but do not extend to all market 
sectors (in particular to services). Some aspects of free movement of people 
between the EU and Switzerland are covered, including through Erasmus+. The EU 
is said to be dissatisfied with the model on which EU-Switzerland relations are 
based. Its components take a great deal of time and energy to be negotiated and 
renegotiated. 
 
The EU’s more recent trade agreements, with countries such as Singapore, Ukraine 
and Canada (yet to enter into force), are known as Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreements. These typically go beyond classic free trade areas, and can 
include cooperation in a broad range of sectors, such as energy, transport or 
environmental protection. They do not, however, involve the levels of economic 
integration involved in EU law, EEA law, or even EU-Switzerland relations and the 
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EU neighbourhood policy. The UK government seeks a future EU-UK relationship 
that differs from such agreements; the EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier said in 
October 2017 that this is the most likely future relationship, given the current UK 
government’s position. 
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Chapter 17 
 
EU Private International Law 
 
Lorna Gillies  University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
 
Private international law is that area of private law which applies when a foreign 
element, or issue, is present in the facts of a dispute between parties. The foreign 
element may concern one or more of the three core questions in private international 
law – where parties can litigate; what law applies; and where can judgments be 
recognised and enforced. This introduction focuses on the contribution of the EU to 
each of these three questions. Reference will be made, by example, to relevant EU 
instruments and refer to ‘gaps’ where national, residual laws still apply. 
 
Background 
 
This is a fast changing area of EU law, involving all of the EU institutions in 
proposing, amending, approving and interpreting of EU Private International Law 
(PIL).  Since the Treaty of Rome (1957), the EC Member States agreed that national 
rules which determined on what basis a judgment from a court in one EC state could 
be recognised and enforced in another EC state were too restrictive. The EC 
introduced a double convention, the Brussels Convention 1968, which applied in two 
key respects. First, it introduced reciprocal rules on jurisdiction which determined 
where a party from one EC state could sue in another EC state. Second, the 
convention introduced reciprocal rules which determined how a judgment from a 
court in one EC state could be recognised and enforced in another EC state. 
 
After the UK joined the EEC, the Brussels Convention 1968 came into force via the 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. The EC also agreed another convention, 
the Rome Convention 1980, which determines what law applies to cross-border 
disputes concerning contractual obligations. The Rome Convention was introduced 
into the UK by virtue of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. The most 
significant step-change in EU Private International Law was that introduced by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Article 65 TEC (now Article 81 TFEU) introduced a 
Chapter on Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters. This equipped the EU with 
competence to take measures in ‘civil matters… based on the principle of mutual 
recognition of judgments.’ Both the Brussels and Rome Conventions were 
subsequently converted into EU regulations. 
 
The EU moved forward with its objectives in the field of Justice and Home Affairs 
through related programmes (such as the Stockholm Programme 2010-2014) and 
strategic guidelines arising from EU summits (such Tampere in 1999 and The Hague 
in 2004). The current programme covers the period 2014-2020. Some EU Member 
States exercised an opt-out to these programmes and regulations or chose to opt in 
later. The most prominent example is Denmark, which opted out of the entire 
Chapter, but subsequently entered into an agreement with the EU to adopt the then 
Brussels I Regulation (44/2001). At the same time, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) also developed a prominent role in advancing this area of 
law. It has provided important decisions on the extent, scope and meaning of 
provisions contained in these EU regulations. 
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Today, EU Private International Law covers a wide range of areas within the 
competence conferred by Article 81 TFEU. The EU Council has introduced an 
increasing range of EU regulations in the field of EU PIL. These regulations focus on 
one or more elements of private international law – jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. The EU is also increasingly making use 
of its Enhanced Cooperation Procedure in topics of mutual interest to particular 
Member States.  
 
EU regulations apply to: cross-border civil and commercial jurisdiction; matrimonial 
matters and divorce jurisdiction; applicable law rules for contractual obligations; non-
contractual obligations; jurisdiction, applicable law and judgment recognition in 
insolvency proceedings; jurisdiction for maintenance proceedings; jurisdiction in 
matters relating to parental responsibility; recognition and enforcement in 
international child abduction; and applicable laws for cross-border divorce and cross-
border succession. A list of the key relevant EU regulations is provided at the end of 
this chapter. The following sections provide brief overviews of the three fundamental 
questions of (EU) private international law mentioned at the start. 
 
Jurisdiction: Where to Litigate? 
 
The most contentious issues in a cross-border dispute are where to litigate, or how 
to avoid litigation in the first place. Both of these issues raise the question of 
jurisdiction. These issues arise in both cross-border commercial and family matters. 
 
Example 1 
 
Two commercial parties (Company A and Company B) are domiciled in Country A 
and B respectively. The contract between them is to manufacture goods in Country C 
and deliver those goods in Country D. Payment of the contract is to be made in a 
currency of Country E to a branch of the Country E’s bank in Country F. The goods 
are not satisfactory and B does not pay for them. Meanwhile, Company A’s agent 
based in Country G fail to take care of employees and a tort occurs in a Country C 
causing injury to those employees and third parties. 
 
Key Questions 
 
· Is either party domiciled in an EU Member State? 
 
· What does the parties’ contract say? Is there an agreement on jurisdiction? 
 
· If the EU rules apply, which courts can hear the disputes concerned with (a) the 
contract and non-payment? (b) the actions of the agent? (c) the tort and the third 
parties’ claim? 
 
Each country is a separate legal system for private international law purposes. 
Parties may be situated in different countries based on their domicile, habitual 
residence or nationality. The EU rules reflect each of these alternative connections 
that a party may have with an EU Member State. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, 
the EU rules apply when one of the parties (usually the defendant) is domiciled in an 
EU Member State or the parties have agreed to the courts of an EU Member State 
having jurisdiction. 
 
Where the defendant is not domiciled in an EU Member State, Member States’ own 
laws currently prevail. In commercial disputes, parties should have regard to risks 
associated with the transaction and which court they can raise proceedings in the 
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event of a dispute. In this context, the question of jurisdiction is connected to parties’ 
‘litigation and transaction risk’.23 
 
Regulation 1215/2012, the Brussels I bis Regulation, determines international 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. EU Private International Law provides 
rules of international jurisdiction, which determine on what basis the courts of one 
Member State are competent to hear a dispute involving a party from another 
Member State. Regulation 1215/2012 is structured around general, special and 
exclusive jurisdiction. The regulation specifies those circumstances where 
jurisdiction is exclusive, including when parties enter into a jurisdiction agreement. 
As a general jurisdiction rule, the regulation applies the domicile of the 
defender/defendant. The regulation also provides special jurisdiction rules for a 
range of cross-disputes concerned with consumer, employment and insurance 
contracts; contracts including the sale of goods and supply of services; delicts/tort 
disputes; disputes involving multiple parties; claims for the return of cultural objects; 
and disputes involving the actions of a branch, agency or other establishment. 
 
In family matters, the question of jurisdiction is connected to a party’s ability to raise 
divorce proceedings, financial support, enforcement of parental rights or the return of 
a child to his/her habitual residence. The court must ensure that it is appropriate to 
hear proceedings concerned with the divorce of the parties and matters relating to 
children. 
 
Example 2 
 
Two parties (X and Y) marry in Country A, move to Country B and after an 
appreciable period of time establish a habitual residence through work and family 
connections. Two children to the marriage are born in Country B. After a time, the 
parties legally separate. Y leaves the matrimonial home to live and work in Country C 
and commences divorce proceedings there. X moves with the children to Country A, 
where maintenance proceedings and a custody order relating to both children are 
sought from Country A’s court. With X’s consent, Y takes the two children on a 
holiday to Country D but does not return the children at the agreed date, instead 
taking both children to Country C. The children start school in Country C and after a 
time express a view that they do not wish to return to Country A or be separated from 
each other. X seeks return of the children and maintenance payments from Y. 
 
Key Questions 
 
· Where are the Party X and Y domiciled/habitually resident? 
 
· On what basis does Country A have jurisdiction over a divorce? 
 
· On what basis does Country A have jurisdiction over maintenance proceedings? 
 
· Can X seek the return of the children not returned to Country A and would any 
defences apply? 
 
Regulation 2201/2003, the Brussels II bis Regulation, determines international 
jurisdiction relating to matrimonial matters and issues of parental responsibility. The 
regulation is structured around grounds of jurisdiction for divorce proceedings. It 
enables a party to raise divorce proceedings in another Member State, depending on 
the connection one or more of the parties has with an EU Member State. It also 
provides jurisdiction rules for proceedings concerned with parental responsibility, 
                                            
23 Fentiman, R (2015) International Commercial Litigation (Oxford University Press), p 3 
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such as custody and access, and child abduction (where a child is unlawfully 
removed to or retained in another country). This regulation does not apply to intra-
UK disputes (i.e. to disputes between parties situated in different parts of the United 
Kingdom). 
 
By contrast, Regulation 4/2009 is a cooperation measure for cross-border 
maintenance proceedings. It contains rules of jurisdiction, applicable law and 
recognition and enforcement of judgments concerned with maintenance obligations. 
Unlike jurisdiction in matters of divorce between different courts of the United 
Kingdom, the Maintenance Regulation does apply to disputes between parties in 
different parts of the United Kingdom.24 
 
Choice of Law: Which Law Applies? 
 
The second key issue in private international law is choice of law or the applicable 
law. The purpose of these rules is to determine which country’s substantive laws 
should apply to a cross-border dispute. 
 
Example 3 
 
Two commercial parties (A and B), enter into a contract for Party B to deliver goods 
in Country C and provide services in Countries C and D. A is to pay for the contract 
goods to a bank in Country E. B does not deliver goods or perform the services. The 
contract between the parties (a) states that the contract and any dispute is governed 
by the law of Country B; (b) in the alternative, contains no choice of law agreement. 
After the contract is concluded, a law is passed in Countries C and D making it illegal 
to provide the services characteristic of the above contract. 
 
Key Questions 
 
· What is the effect of the choice of law clause in (a) above? 
 
· How is the applicable law determined under (b) above? 
 
· What is the effect of the law passed in Countries C and D? 
 
As far as civil and commercial matters are concerned, EU applicable law rules are 
divided into two. Regulation 593/2008, the Rome I Regulation, provides applicable 
law rules for contractual obligations. The regulation is structured around the general 
rule of freedom to select the applicable law. Parties may select more than one law to 
govern their contract, provided that such choice does not provide inconsistent 
results. The regulation also determines what law applies in the absence of choice. It 
offers particular choice of law rules for certain categories of contracts, such as 
contracts of carriage, consumer contracts, individual contracts of employment and 
insurance contracts. Party choice may be subject to mandatory rules of the 
applicable law, or of the forum, or of a third state. The applicable law may also be 
restricted by the public policy of the forum. Once enacted, the regulation applies 
regardless of whether the result is the law of a Member State or of a third state. 
 
Regulation 864/2007, the Rome II Regulation, provides applicable law rules for non-
contractual obligations. It addresses delicts, torts and threatened wrongs. However, 
it does not apply to disputes alleging defamation. National applicable law rules 
continue to apply for such claims. 
                                            
24 V, Re, (also known as Re V (European Maintenance Regulation)) [2016] EWHC 668 
(Fam); [2017] 1 FLR 1083; [2016] Fam Law 682 (Fam Div) 
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Example 4 
 
Party A and B are travelling in a rented car through Country C. Party A is the driver, 
Party B the passenger. Party A enters a city car park in Country C to search for a 
parking space. He does not pay attention to the speed limit in the car park or follow 
the designated route. He crashes the car into Party D’s car, which in turn hits the wall 
of the car park. Party D is from Country C. His car contains two passengers, one 
from Country C and another from Country E, who sustain neck injuries from the 
collision. Both cars, and the wall, are seriously damaged. 
 
Key Questions 
 
· What law applies to the delicts? 
 
· Are there any exceptions that may apply for the law of another country to apply? 
 
· Can the parties agree an applicable law? 
 
The regulation applies the law of the country where the damage occurred. There are 
exceptions – for example, if the party liable and the party sustaining damage have 
the same habitual residence, that country’s law can apply. Another exception is that, 
where the delict is manifestly more closely connected to another country, the law of 
that country will apply. The regulation also provides special choice of law rules for 
particular categories of delicts such as product liability, unfair competition, 
environmental damage, IP rights and industrial action. The parties can select the 
applicable law to their dispute, provided this agreement exists before the event 
occurred. Once the applicable law is determined, it applies to both the substance 
and procedure of the dispute. Like the Rome I Regulation, mandatory rules of the 
forum may displace the applicable law. 
 
Judgments: Recognition and Enforcement 
 
The third component of private international law is the ability of a court to 
automatically recognise and enforce the judgment of another court. In civil and 
commercial matters, the Brussels I bis Regulation applies. The regulation seeks to 
simplify recognition and abolishes the need to satisfy Member States’ internal steps 
for recognition (exequatur). Recognition and enforcement will only be refused where 
the judgment is manifestly contrary to public policy, given in default of the 
defender/defendant’s appearance, or irreconcilable with an earlier judgment. 
 
In matrimonial matters, Article 22 of Brussels II bis Regulation equally provides that a 
judgment will not be recognised if it is manifestly contrary to public policy, given in 
default of appearance, or irreconcilable with an earlier judgment. In matters of 
parental responsibility, the grounds to refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment in 
Article 23 are broadly similar, but also include a ground where a party with parental 
responsibility was not given an opportunity to be heard. 
 
Future after Brexit 
 
As explained above, the EU will continue to further approximate laws concerned with 
civil judicial cooperation. The EU’s external remit continues through the EU 2020 
Agenda. The objective of this agenda is to ‘build an area of freedom, security and 
justice, without internal frontiers, and with full respect for fundamental rights.’ The 
interaction between this field of EU law and human rights law will become more 
prevalent. In particular, both EU PIL and national rules, where they prevail, must 
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ensure respect for parties’ rights to a fair hearing and fair trial, along with other 
analogous rights, such as the right to an effective remedy, respect for private and 
family life, freedom of expression and the prohibition of discrimination. 
 
The UK has generally opted in to measures in the field of civil judicial cooperation. 
The UK has enacted (most) EU regulations in PIL. It has done so by amending 
existing UK legislation. This legislation applies to parties from EU Member States 
and, in the case of jurisdiction in civil and family matters, applies to parties in 
different parts of the UK. UK courts have made preliminary reference requests to the 
CJEU in this field. As part of the Balance of Competences review, the UK 
government published a study in 2014 of UK-EU civil judicial cooperation. 
 
Brexit will have a significant impact not only on rules of jurisdiction and choice of law 
for commercial activities, but also for weaker parties such as consumers and 
employees. It will also impact upon EU-based residents who seek recognition of the 
status of their personal relationships (civil partnership, marriage, same sex marriage, 
separation and divorce) and for children subject to disputes concerning matters of 
parental responsibility (adoption, access/contact/custody and international child 
abduction). In parallel with the Brexit negotiations, the UK government and devolved 
administrations will have to review and revise existing private international law rules 
applicable between different parts of the UK (England/NI and Scotland) to ensure 
coherence and consistency prevail for the benefit of parties resident in different parts 
of the UK. 
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Key EU Regulations in the field of EU Private International Law 
 
EC 2201/2003 – Brussels II bis Regulation (Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters and 
Matters Relating to Parental Responsibility) 
 
EC 805/2004 – European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims 
 
EC 1896/2006 – European Payment Procedure 
 
EC 861/2007 – European Small Claims Procedure 
 
EC 864/2007 – Rome II Regulation (Non-Contractual Obligations) 
 
EC 1393/2007 – Service of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters 
 
EC 593/2008 – Rome I Regulation (Contractual Obligations) 
 
EC 4/2009 – Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement in Matters 
Relating to Maintenance Obligations 
 
EU 1259/2010 –Enhanced Cooperation for Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal 
Separation 
 
EU 650/2012 – Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Decisions in Matters Relating to Succession 
 
EU 1215/2012 – Brussels I bis Regulation (Jurisdiction, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters) (Recast) 
 
EU 655/2014 – European Account Preservation Order 
 
EU 2015/848 – Insolvency Proceedings (Recast) 
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Chapter 18 
 
The Position of EU Law on the 
Route to Qualification as a Solicitor 
Post-Brexit 
 
Rob Marrs  Law Society of Scotland 
 
The law of the European Union forms a mandatory part of the route to qualification 
as a Scottish solicitor, which is regulated by the Law Society of Scotland. This will 
continue to be the case as long as the United Kingdom remains a Member State of 
the European Union. After all, it is important that those intending to become solicitors 
understand the legal system in which they will be working. 
 
The academic element of the route to qualification as a solicitor in Scotland, the 
Foundation Programme (Scottish Exempting Degree) – more commonly known as 
the LLB – comprises outcomes. These outcomes are divided into three areas: (1) 
knowledge areas covering knowledge and sources of law; (2) skills including subject-
specific, general transferable, intellectual and key person skills; and (3) values and 
attitudes. The Society’s Accreditation Guidelines detail these outcomes in detail.25 
 
By the end of the Foundation Programme, a student should display a fundamental 
knowledge and understanding of the purpose and sources of law, and the main 
elements of public and private law in Scotland in the UK, EU and wider international 
law setting through the study of: the profession of law, legal systems and institutions 
affecting Scotland; human rights, freedoms and protections; persons; property; 
obligations; and commerce and crime. A knowledge and understanding of EU law is 
a fundamental part of the current Foundation Programme. Moreover, the outcome 
relating to legal systems and institutions affecting Scotland includes considerable 
specific content on EU law, such as: 
 
 Constitutional structure and competence of the EU and allocation of 
competencies between EU and Member States 
 Sources of EU law, EU institutions and the legislative process 
 relationship of EU law and national law including domestic and EU remedies 
 Principles of the EU single market 
 
                                            
25 The Accreditation Guidelines for PEAT 1 (the vocational stage of the route to qualification) 
note, when commenting on the Core and Mandatory Outcomes: ‘In addition, as regards EU 
and Human Rights legislation and their effects on legal practice, it is assumed that students 
will understand the implications of such legislation as regards area of practice studied in 
PEAT 1; and that such implications will form part of the resources to be made available to 
students. These include such matters as relevance of Convention rights, relevant EU and 
Human Rights case law, whether parties may bring proceedings and under which conditions, 
and the range of remedies a party may invoke.’ The areas of practice outlined in the PEAT 
guidelines are: business, financial, practice awareness; private client; conveyancing; 
litigation (civil and criminal); and tax. As PEAT 1 builds on the Foundation Programme, a 
certain level of knowledge of EU law is assumed. 
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The areas above are those where EU law is specifically named. There will be other 
areas of content which contain EU elements (e.g. principles and sources of 
constitutional law) and EU law appears in other outcomes (e.g. the principles of the 
EU single market appears in commerce, while human rights, freedoms and 
protections – which will have some EU content – is pervasive throughout all 
outcomes). 
 
When the UK leaves the EU, the position of EU law as mandatory content for 
intending solicitors will come under some scrutiny. Should EU law continue to be 
mandatory? Should it – can it? – be taught in a different way? Ought it to become an 
elective subject which is offered to students by universities, but is not required by the 
Society via its accreditation processes? If there were to be change, when should 
such change occur? 
 
What Happens Next? 
 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill currently provides for: 
 
 Repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. This Act provides legal authority 
for EU law to have effect as national law in the UK. This will no longer be the 
case when the Bill becomes law. 
 Transposition of all EU laws onto the UK statute books. This means that laws and 
regulations made during the time of the UK’s membership of the EU will continue 
to apply. 
 Power to make wide-ranging secondary legislation, including that which will 
amend Acts of Parliament. Technical problems will arise as EU laws are put on 
the statute book. For instance, many EU laws mention EU institutions in which 
the UK will no longer participate after Brexit, or mention ‘EU law’ itself, which will 
not be part of the UK legal system after Brexit. It is possible there will not be time 
for parliament to scrutinise every change, so the bill will give ministers some 
powers to make these changes by secondary legislation. 
 
It is understood these changes will come into effect on the day the UK leaves the 
EU. This, at present, will be in late March 2019, unless there is some form of 
transitional arrangement agreed. At that point, much of what is currently considered 
EU law will become the law of the UK (and subject to change by future UK 
governments rather than the EU institutions). The institutions of the EU, their 
directives, legislation and precedents will no longer affect the UK directly. 
 
The nature of the post-Brexit relationship between the EU and the UK will also be of 
significant importance to future Scottish solicitors, but at this stage it is impossible to 
know what that relationship will entail. It is also entirely possible that there will be a 
divergence between EU law and the law of the UK in certain areas post-Brexit. If the 
legal systems diverge, the requirement to maintain EU law as mandatory and as 
currently taught may become less tenable. 
 
What Do We Mean by ‘EU Law’ in Terms of the Route to 
Qualification? 
 
As above, in terms of the current route to qualification, EU law essentially means two 
things. The first consists of the matters outlined above which are part of the 
outcomes of the Foundation Programme. These matters are normally taught in 
courses titled ‘European Union Law’. This will be where EU law outcomes will usually 
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be assessed. The second expands on the relationship of European Union law and 
national law. Many modules include descriptors along the lines of ‘to consider the 
development of Scottish/British (insert area of law) law within its European context’. 
 
This is because EU law is pervasive and there is likely some EU element in most 
areas of legal knowledge (e.g. constitutional, family, employment and competition). 
As Lord Denning noted ‘it (EU law) flows into estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot 
be held back’.26 Indeed, later in his life, Denning described EU law as a ‘tidal wave 
bringing down our sea walls and flowing inland over our fields and houses – to the 
dismay of all’. 27 Regardless of where one bobs up and down on Denning’s watery 
spectrum, it seems as though, through the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, the UK government 
intends to erect levees and dykes in the near future. 
 
Having triggered Article 50, the UK will leave the EU. It is perhaps useful to state 
what that will definitely mean: the EU treaties will not apply to the UK. It will not elect 
MEPs nor will it be represented on the European Council or the European 
Commission. The European Union’s post-Brexit directives and regulations will not 
cover the UK (unless the UK either chooses to adopt them voluntarily or must do so 
as part of a trade agreement). The Court of Justice of the European Union will no 
longer have jurisdiction over the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom will no longer 
provide judges to the Court of Justice or the General Court or provide any Advocates 
General. The nature of access to the Single Market will change. In the short term, 
there may be no need to change the Scottish legal curriculum substantively, given 
the intended nature of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. In the medium to long term, will there 
have to be? 
 
How Much Will EU Law Still Matter? 
 
Whatever occurs post-March 2019, the law of the EU will continue to be of significant 
importance to our legal system. The EU (Withdrawal) Bill will, after all, incorporate an 
enormous body of EU law into UK law. The history, knowledge and sources of this 
law will remain distinctly European. There are some areas of law where a European 
influence is likely to continue into the future (e.g. procurement, competition and data 
protection). Some concepts within areas such as competition law would not exist but 
for the European Union. Existing CJEU case law will form precedent in UK courts. 
More than this, the EU (Withdrawal) Bill provides that, while UK courts will not be 
bound by decisions of the Court of Justice, they may have regard to them if it is 
appropriate to do so. There will also be ‘run off’ issues for a number of years post-
Brexit. 
 
If principles, concepts and sources of law which were previously considered as EU 
law become part of UK law – as is proposed – law students will likely need to have a 
knowledge and understanding of how and why that came to be. Whatever happens, 
it seems that some level of knowledge of EU law will be necessary to understand our 
own legal system. At a recent Scottish Universities Legal Network on Europe 
meeting, three of Scotland’s largest law firms made a case that they would expect 
future trainee solicitors to have significant EU knowledge.28 
 
                                            
26 HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418 
27 Smith, G (1990) The European Court of Justice: Judges or Policy Makers? (Bruges 
Group), Intro  
28 Brodies LLP; Maclay, Murray & Spens LLP; and Shepherd & Wedderburn LLP 
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Future Scottish solicitors will need to understand the nature of any trading 
relationship between the UK and EU, any transitional arrangements between the UK 
and the EU, and also trade agreements between the UK and the rest of the world 
(and how they interrelate with any agreement with the EU). This will, after all, be UK 
law. It is generally very difficult to unwrite history. In the same way that it would be 
difficult to remove the influence of Roman law or English law from the Scottish legal 
system, it will be difficult to remove the influence and importance of European Union 
law from the Scottish legal system. 
 
What Comes Next? 
 
Even taking on board the above points, it is hard to argue that the matters usually 
covered in a discrete EU law module would need to be mandatory for all intending 
solicitors post-Brexit. Why would – for instance – all future Scottish lawyers need to 
know the institutions of the EU and its legislative process, or the allocation of 
competencies between the EU and Member States? Whilst this may be useful, it 
seems (over the longer term) to be unfeasible that such knowledge should be 
mandatory for all future solicitors. As well as this, the UK government has signalled 
its intention to agree trade deals with countries globally, as well as negotiating a 
trade deal with the European Union. 
 
This trade focus means that Scottish solicitors will benefit from knowledge and 
understanding of the EU single market and the laws around that market. Depending 
on the UK’s post-Brexit status, knowledge of EFTA and its arrangement may also be 
beneficial. Given the intended global focus of a post-Brexit future, a deeper 
understanding of International Private Law, Public International Law, international 
arbitration, and international trade law will likely be necessary for Scottish solicitors. 
None of these are currently mandatory on the route to qualification as a solicitor, 
although some universities will teach, for instance, International Private Law and 
Public International Law (and intending advocates must study International Private 
Law). It ought to be noted that the current undergraduate curriculum is crowded. It is 
unlikely, without significant overhaul, that all the above areas, plus EU law as 
currently constituted, could be incorporated. 
 
What Are the Likely Future Options? 
 
There are a number of options before the Society. The first is status quo: mandating 
that EU law be taught as part of the route to qualification, regardless of the nature of 
Brexit and any subsequent trade deals. Some may say that the world’s largest 
trading bloc being so close to Scotland means that it would be prudent for the 
Society to continue to mandate EU law. Yet few would argue that Scottish law 
students need to understand English litigation practice and procedure, English 
probate, or English property law – despite Scotland sharing a constitution with 
England and Wales, the fact that the English legal market is one of the biggest in the 
world, and the nature of intra-UK business arrangements. 
 
The second option is that the Society rewrite its accreditation guidelines and remove 
mandatory references to the law of the European Union. This would likely fall into 
three choices. The first choice, in essence, would see EU law become a modern-day 
Roman law. Studying the Roman laws of contract, delict or property can be useful for 
studying the complexities of Scots law. However, many law students successfully 
navigate the choppy waters of Scottish legal study without formal study of Roman 
law. 
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The second choice would see EU law forming part of a wider ‘international law’ 
module and focus. At present, EU law is often taught as a discrete module. This 
would be comparatively easy to replace (e.g. EU law would leave the syllabus and 
be replaced with something else). The matter of EU law being taught pervasively 
means replacement becomes trickier. It is likely that its pervasive nature to an extent 
would mean an ongoing EU presence (e.g. the history and context of the newly 
incorporated British law would still require EU knowledge). It is likely that, even if the 
Society were minded to remove the formal requirement, some EU law would need to 
be taught anyway. The third choice would subsume – in some way – EU law into a 
bigger ‘international law’ module, incorporating, for instance, International Private 
Law and Public International Law, as well as EU law. How such a course is 
constructed and taught is another question entirely. 
 
It is likely that the Society will need to consult with the profession and academia 
about which areas of law (if any) should replace EU law. The bigger questions, 
though, would be: What are the principles that would guide any such consultation? 
And what do we want the qualification – and the badge of solicitor – to be? 
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Chapter 19 
 
The Future Place of EU Law in 
Admission to the Faculty of 
Advocates 
 
Kirsty Hood QC  Faculty of Advocates 
 
Current Position 
 
The Faculty of Advocates is the regulatory body for the Advocate branch of the 
Scottish legal profession. The requirements which have to be fulfilled in order to 
become an advocate are set out in the Faculty’s admission regulations, the 
Regulations as to Intrants. The core requirements29 are: (1) an LLB degree; (2) 
passes in examinations in certain specified areas of Scots law,30 and in an 
examination in Evidence Practice & Procedure;31 (3) the Diploma in Legal Practice; 
(4) a traineeship in a solicitor’s office; and (5) a period of pupillage (more commonly 
known as ‘devilling’) at the Faculty of Advocates itself (this comprising advocacy 
skills coursework, shadowing and assessment). 
 
With regard to the first aspect of requirement (2), the precise requirement is that 
applicants must pass a Faculty examination in each of the specified areas of Scots 
law, but may be exempted from these on the grounds of prior study. Indeed, subject-
for-subject exemption will be automatic where an applicant has passed the 
equivalent degree exams during his/her LLB within the seven years immediately 
preceding an application for exemption. Effectively then, those wishing to be 
admitted to the Faculty of Advocates must study these listed topics during their LLB 
degree (or pass an equivalent examination)32 or pass the Faculty examinations in 
each of those topics. One of these topics is European Law and Institutions. 
Inevitably, of course, EU law will form an important part of other of the listed topics 
(such as Constitutional and Administrative Law and International Private Law). 
 
Historical Context 
 
The importance attached by the Faculty of Advocates to the study of EU law actually 
pre-dates the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community (as it then was) 
                                            
29 Exemptions may be sought by applicants in the light of their own individual circumstances. 
There are also special pathways for legal practitioners from other EU Member States, and 
members of the Bars of England & Wales and Northern Ireland 
30 The subjects are listed in Appendix A(1) of the Regulations as to Intrants. They currently 
are: Roman Law of Property and Obligations; Jurisprudence; Constitutional and 
Administrative Law; Scottish Criminal Law; Scottish Private Law; Commercial Law and 
Business Institutions; Evidence; International Private Law; and European Law and 
Institutions 
31 See Appendix A(3) of the Regulations as to Intrants 
32 Thus, for example, an exemption may be granted where an applicant has passed the Law 
Society of Scotland professional examination in a subject, or has passed an examination in a 
subject as part of a Law degree taken outwith Scotland (and where no special knowledge of 
Scots law would be required) 
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in 1973. In the 1960s, the Faculty was revising the Regulations as to Intrants to take 
account of the full-time LLB beginning to be offered by Scottish universities33 – and it 
was in 1968 that a European law topic first appeared in those Regulations. At that 
time, European Institutions became one of a number of optional subjects, of which 
aspiring candidates for the Bar required to be examined in two. 
 
As early as 1970, the Faculty attained observer status at the Consultative Council of 
the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community Countries (CCBE), 
becoming a full member on the UK’s accession.34 In the 1982, and 1987, versions of 
the Regulations as to Intrants, European Community Law and Institutions remained 
on the list of optional subjects. However, in 1989, European Community Law 
became a mandatory subject of study for entry to the Faculty. As indicated at the 
outset, this remains the case now – thus EU law is one of a number of core subjects 
which the Faculty requires applicants to have studied. 
 
Future Position 
 
Following upon the result of the referendum on EU membership in June 2016, the 
UK government signalled an intention for the UK to withdraw from the EU – and then 
triggered the Article 50 procedure in March 2017. Inevitably, the question will be 
posed as to whether the regulatory bodies of the Scottish legal profession will 
continue to require that those entering the profession demonstrate a minimum level 
of expertise in EU law? 
 
For the short term, the clear answer from the Faculty’s point of view is ‘yes’. The UK 
remains an EU Member State at present, and it is therefore just as essential that 
those coming to the Bar continue to have the appropriate level of expertise in EU 
law, such that clients can be properly and accurately advised. In any event, there 
would still seem to be uncertainty as to exactly what the future holds for the UK, and 
for Scotland in particular, with regard to the relationship with the EU.35 It would 
therefore be premature to take a decision that EU law need not be studied by 
aspiring advocates, before the position becomes clear. Finally, were the UK to exit 
the EU and seek to cut all ties with that body (or forge a dramatically different 
relationship to that which exists at present), it would seem likely that there would be 
legacy cases,36 and there may well be transitional provisions. For clients to be 
properly advised and represented, a thorough knowledge of EU law therefore 
remains indispensable in the short term. 
 
In the medium to longer term also, there are certain considerations which would 
currently seem to support the continued study of EU law by those wishing to come to 
the Scots Bar. Firstly, the current position of the UK government is that EU law will 
essentially be transposed into the law of the various jurisdictions of the UK at the exit 
                                            
33 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Legal Profession Reissue, Para 92 
34 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Legal Profession Reissue, Para 90 
35 The EU-UK negotiations are still underway and thus have not been concluded. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the EU referendum, there has been debate as to whether there 
should be a further referendum on Scottish independence at some point 
36 See, for example the European Commission’s Position Paper on Ongoing Union Judicial 
and Administrative Procedures (TF50 (2017) 5); the UK government’s Ongoing Union 
Judicial and Administrative Proceedings Position Paper; the European Commission’s 
Position Paper on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial matters (TF50 (2017) 9/2); 
and the UK government’s Providing a Cross-border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework: A 
Future Partnership Paper 
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date (and that, thereafter, the UK could decide which of these rules and regulations 
are to be retained). Thus the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill currently provides 
that direct EU legislation will form part of the law of the UK jurisdictions, and EU-
derived domestic legislation will continue to have effect, despite the planned repeal 
of the European Communities Act 1972 on the exit date. Specific provision is also 
made in the bill with regard to how CJEU case law may be used in interpreting this 
‘retained EU law’. 
 
All of this would suggest that ‘retained EU law’ will form a significant part of Scots 
law for some considerable time to come – and not merely on an interim basis, as the 
intention of the UK government would seem to be that some of the ‘retained EU law’ 
will be permanently retained (and simply have a different legislative source than at 
present).37 Practising as an advocate can involve the need to consider, and advise 
upon, novel and complex legal problems. It is important that advocates have 
sufficient depth to their knowledge of the Scots legal system and Scots law, to be 
able to undertake reasoning from first principles as necessary, in such novel and 
cutting-edge cases. 
 
Thus the Faculty continues to demand that applicants study Roman Law of Property 
and Obligations, because of the formative influence of Roman law in the Scottish 
system. The compulsory study of Jurisprudence for entry to the Faculty ensures that 
applicants have an understanding of the philosophical roots of the law, and of the 
dilemmas which may arise. It can easily be seen that similar arguments might be 
made for a continued requirement to have studied EU law in order to be admitted to 
the Faculty, if EU law is to continue to shape, and essentially form a significant part 
of, Scots law. Secondly, even if the UK withdraws completely from the EU, it might 
yet still align itself with EU law in certain areas. If so, the study of EU law in those 
areas would continue to be important for those wishing to practise at the Scots Bar. 
 
It is necessary, however, to maintain an open mind as to what the Faculty should 
most appropriately seek from applicants in the future, in order to be satisfied that 
they demonstrate sufficient knowledge of EU law. Obviously, the context in which the 
Scottish universities teach EU law in the future may alter – for example, other 
international instruments or organisations may assume an importance such that EU 
law is taught as part of a wider course on international trade law. If so, the Faculty 
would require to consider whether study of that topic, rather than a narrower focus 
on EU law alone, should be mandated for entry to the Bar. 
 
It should be remembered that one of the other areas of Scots law which the Faculty 
already demands that applicants have studied is International Private Law.  
 
Similarly, if Scottish universities were to move to disperse the teaching of EU law, 
and EU-derived law, throughout other subject areas (such as constitutional law, 
family law and so on), clearly the Faculty would require to consider whether to take a 
similar approach with regard to the Faculty examinations. 
 
 
 
                                            
37 To take merely one example, it would currently seem to be proposed that the Rome I and 
Rome II instruments (which determine applicable law in respect of contractual and non-
contractual obligations) will be incorporated and retained in the law of the various UK 
jurisdictions (see the UK government’s Providing a Cross-border Civil Judicial Cooperation 
Framework: A Future Partnership Paper) 
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Conclusion 
 
The current position may be stated with certainty: knowledge and understanding of 
EU law remains a key requirement for those wishing to be admitted to the Faculty of 
Advocates, and no change is anticipated in the short term. However, at this stage, it 
is difficult to be so definite about the medium- to long-term future. Plainly it will be 
necessary for the Faculty to review the position once the shape of the future 
relationship between Scots law and EU law is clear. 
 
Whatever happens, it does seem likely that retained EU law will remain a sufficiently 
significant part of Scots law, so that the Faculty will wish to ensure (through its 
admission rules) that all applicants demonstrate the appropriate level of expertise 
therein. How that expertise is most appropriately demonstrated (whether by gaining 
a pass in a stand-alone compulsory EU law topic or in a wider compulsory topic, or 
by EU law being infused through the other compulsory topics) cannot yet be 
predicted. In this regard, the Faculty will continue to liaise closely with Scottish 
universities and the Law Society of Scotland going forward. 
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